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The steady clicking sound of four colored pens - alternating black,
red, green, and blue fills the history of the University of Denver College
of Law. So, too, does the steady shuffle of three by five cards by the
professor who holds them. Then there is the desert dry wit, with more
than a mild touch of sarcasm, cautioning the student that "anything
worth doing at all is worth doing poorly."
These sounds live in the collective memory of the College of Law
and are inextricably linked to its growth. Their life spans the time when
classes were taught in the 1920's to a handful of students stuffed into
Denver's old Arapahoe Street High School. They moved with the
school when it relocated upstairs from Mapelli's Meat Market at 15th
and Tremont Place in downtown Denver. Their resonance grew with
the number of students and continued to echo through the College's
successive homes, including the old Law Center across from the Denver
City and County Building. Today, they are institutionalized in the mod-
ern Lowell Thomas Law Building, where a faculty of over forty instructs
a student body exceeding 1,000. It is here, in the school's faculty meet-
ing room, that the portrait of Professor Emeritus Thompson G. Marsh is
displayed.
Professor Marsh began his legal career and association with the Col-
lege of Law accidentally. His family moved to Colorado when he was a
child, attracted to Denver by its dry climate that was said to help people
with asthma. Professor Marsh's father, who suffered from the affliction,
encouraged his son to try law school when the young man could not
decide on a career. Professor Marsh earned an undergraduate degree
from D.U. in English, mathematics, and Spanish. His father worked for
International Harvester, and Professor Marsh later recalled his father
observing that law might be a pragmatic career because people with
legal backgrounds were successful in the company.
Taking the suggestion, Professor Marsh enrolled in the College of
Law in 1924. Finishing in 1927, he immediately began teaching here
and left the College only to obtain advanced law degrees from North-
western University and Yale University in the 1930's, and to work as
legal advisor for the federal Office of Price Administration during World
War II. As a student, Professor Marsh earned his Phi Beta Kappa key.
As a teacher, Professor Marsh was the first full-time member of the Col-
lege of Law faculty. Upon retirement, he quipped that, "I'd never seen a
full-time professor until I became one!"
Today, most graduates of the College think of Professor Marsh
when they remember their first-year property class. Statistics reveal he
taught that course, and others, to at least seventy percent of the Col-
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lege's graduates. His methods, including the colored pens and three by
five cards, are legendary examples of his technique and influence. Pro-
fessor Marsh explained the "technicolor" approach to analyzing cases in
a 1978 interview with The Denver Post:
I used to talk about major premises and minor premises
and conclusions and I never got very far. So for many years
I've been teaching in what the students describe as technicolor.
I have them underline the words that tell who sued whom in
red, what they sought and what they got in red. Then in black
they underline the rule or rules or definitions the court says
impelled it to arrive at its conclusion. They underline in green
whatever the rule says is needed to make the rules operable.
This is the syllogism. The black is the major premise; the
green is the minor premise; the red is the conclusion. And the
reason the lawyer reads the case is to find some black that he
can use in his own case.1
Professor Marsh reasoned that reading accurately was simply not
enough. He maintained that linotype operators who print books could
do that much. Professor Marsh demanded more. He expected students
to analyze their readings critically. He also demanded critical listening;
that is where the three by five cards, each bearing a different student's
name, were used.
Students were required to recite when their card reached the top of
the pile. He would ask the student (or victim) of the day to read his or
her blacks, reds, and greens. Other students were called on to com-
ment. After hearing criticisms from peers, the student heard from the
professor. The dissection was complete when a student was summoned
to stand before the class and recall, without benefit of notes, the previ-
ous class lesson. Professor Marsh, of course, never used notes and ex-
pected his students to have equally vigorous memories:
I remind them that speakers who speak effectively don't
use notes. I think that everybody has observed that. And so
somebody will be called upon to state the previous day's cases,
not from his seat as with the technicolor exercise, but in front
of the class and not from notes. They don't like this because
they have to think of three, four or five cases at one time. Then
I call on someone else to criticize that, again the sins of com-
mission and omission.
2
Finally, Professor Marsh demanded that his students be writers.
For every class, students prepared written summaries of the assigned
cases, synthesizing relationships and drawing conclusions. Students
whose papers were read were subjected to criticisms from the professor
focusing on content, grammar, clarity, and style. Only a few students
survived a Professor Marsh course unscathed because their card some-
1. Mayer, 50 Years on the Same Job: Thompson G. Marsh of D. U. is a likely choice for a
prototype of the complete man, The Denver Post, Dec. 4, 1977, at 62-64 (Empire Magazine).
2. Id. at 64-65.
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how never reached the top of the pile. For this tiny minority, the lesson
was that it's often better to be lucky than smart.
Former students recall that a class with Professor Marsh often terri-
fied them until they realized just how much they were learning. Others
remember moments when mouths hung open as the many new terms
and phrases were rapidly explained. Overworked first years more than
once honored Professor Marsh with the notorious "Bloody Hatchet,"
for being the most difficult instructor. Evening students likewise sent
him their own "Golden Shaft" prize. Professor Marsh, however, was
also named Teacher of the Year many times. That award, bestowed by
the entire student body, reflects the admiration and affection students
came to have for him during their law school careers. His other honors
include University Lecturer in 1963, the Law Alumni Award in 1978,
and the Colorado Bar Association's Award of Merit in 1985. His impact
on the University of Denver, in its entirety, was recognized in 1984 when
he was given the Evans Award, named after the University of Denver's
founder and former Colorado Governor John Evans.
In 1971, Professor Marsh received the College of Law's first en-
dowed chair. In bestowing that special designation on him, the College
recognized his place and contribution as its first full-time professor.
The Charles W. Delaney, Jr. chair was named after the former D.U. stu-
dent who died while in the service in World War II and was established
by Mr. Delaney's mother, Edna 0. Delaney. Professor Marsh's contribu-
tions were further recognized when the College named its next chair
after him.
Professor Marsh's well-known interest in nature spans the same
sixty-year period during which he was a law professor, and continues
today. An avid mountaineer, he scaled all 53 Colorado peaks exceeding
14,000 feet, in addition to countless others of lesser height. During his
outings in Colorado and elsewhere, he sighted more than 700 species of
birds, making him one of North America's pre-eminent bird watchers.
In winter, the six-foot-two outdoorsman retreated to the mountains to
cross-country ski with his wife and family.
In fact, he met his wife, the former Susan Raymond, at a Stanley
Hotel dance in Estes Park where he asked her if she enjoyed mountain
climbing. The following day, the two climbed Long's Peak, the tallest in
Rocky Mountain National Park. Although married over 50 years, they
pursue their own interests. An authority on map-making, Mrs. Marsh
has authored children's cartography books, and is an accomplished mu-
sician. As a Denver Symphony Orchestra member, she played the viola
and even turned the tables on her husband when she taught him and
their four daughters to play with her, forming a family string quartet.
Professor Marsh retired from teaching in 1987. Students entering
the College of Law today, having heard of him from alumni and faculty,
may feel relieved upon learning that he no longer teaches property. It is
a mixed blessing. While all the first years are happy to be spared his
rigorous memory exercises and demands, most realize that his retire-
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ment denies them the opportunity to learn from the consummate
teacher. Fortunately, for those latter students, the name Marsh still in-
fluences life at the College. Some faculty members incorporate his tech-
niques, including the legendary three by five cards, into their courses.
His presence is especially strong in civil procedure, trusts, and property
classes taught by his daughter, Professor Lucy A. Marsh. In those
classes the colored pens continue clicking and the cards are regularly
shuffled, keeping students alert, prepared, and ready to recite. Known
as an unswerving and vocal student supporter, the younger Marsh con-
tinues the family affiliation with the College of Law.
With affection and respect, the board of editors of the Denver Univer-
sity Law Review dedicates its Fifteenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey issue




THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family
moved to Oklahoma City in 1927. He
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army
during World War II. He then returned to
complete his undergraduate studies at the
University of Oklahoma. receiving his B.A.
in 1947. He graduated from Harvard Law
School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he re-
turned to private practice in Oklahoma City
where he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968 and be-
came Chief Judge on September 15, 1984.
He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi
Gamma Delta.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He grad-
uated from Brigham Young University in
1957 with high honors. He received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago and be-
came the law clerk forJusticeJesse A. Udall
of the Arizona Supreme Court in 1960.
From 1961 to 1974,Judge McKay was with
the firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, tak-
ing two years out to serve as Director of the
United States Peace Corps in Malawi, Af-
rica. He was a law professor at Brigham
Young University from 1974 until he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1977.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He went on to be U.S.
Circuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los An-
geles firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the ca-
pacity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting pro-
fessor at Harvard Law School, The Univer-
sity of Texas Law School, Stanford
University, and the University of Michigan.
He was a commission for the U.S. District
Court from 1964 until 1967 and was a can-
didate for the U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi. He has co-authored nu-
merous books on estate planning and ad-
ministration. In 1977 he was appointed to




Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan, in 1940. She graduated
from Smith College, magna cur laude, in
1962 and earned her J.D. from Harvard
Law School in 1965. She was admitted to
the Oklahoma bar in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in
Boston, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston,
Texas, 1968-1969. Most recently, she has
practiced with the Tulsa firm of Doerner,
Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson from
1971 to 1979. Judge Seymour is a member
of Phi Beta Kappa, and the American,
Oklahoma, and Tulsa County Bar associa-
tions. She served as a bar examiner from
1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit by President Carter in 1979.
JUDGE JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Col-
orado in 1934 and still lives in Denver. He
received' his B.A. from the University of
Denver in 1956 and received his LL.B.
from the University of Denver College of
Law in 1959. Following graduation he
practiced as an associate at the Denver law
firm of Carbone & Walsmith until 1962.
From 1962 through 1975 Judge Moore
worked in the Colorado Attorney General's
Office. He served as Assistant Attorney
General from 1962 through 1967, as Dep-
uty Attorney General from 1967 through
1972, and, ultimately, as Attorney General
for the State of Colorado from 1972
through 1975.
In January of 1975, Judge Moore was
appointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. Judge Moore served as a
bankruptcy judge until July of 1982 when
he was appointed to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado by
President Reagan. President Reagan ap-
pointed Judge Moore to the United States




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College between
1949 and 1951, and Brigham Young Uni-
versity in 1955 and 1956. He received an
LL.B. degree from the University of Utah
College of Law in 1960. Judge Anderson
served in the United States Department of
Justice between 1960 and 1964. He was a
trial attorney in the tax division of the De-
partment ofJustice. In 1964, he became a
member of the law firm of Ray, Quinney,
and Webeker, P.C., in Salt Lake City, Utah.
From November, 1985, until the present,
Judge Anderson has served as a Circuit
Judge on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in 17 courts throughout the United
States. He has served as President and
Commissioner of the Utah State Bar. He
was a member of the Utah Judicial Counsel
and the Utah Judicial Conduct Commis-
sion. In addition, Judge Anderson pres-
ently serves as the chairman of the Utah
Law and Justice Center Committee and is a
member of the Fellows of the American Bar
Foundation. Judge Anderson has been a
director of three major corporations and
has held prestigious positions with the Salt
Lake Area Chamber of Commerce and the
University of Utah Law School Alumni
Association.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Deanell Reece Tacha grew up in
Scandia, Kansas. She graduated from the
University of Kansas in 1968 with a B.A.
degree with honors in American Studies.
At K.U., she was a member of Mortar
Board and Phi Beta Kappa. She attended
law school at the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, and received a J.D.
degree there in 1971. In the spring of
197 1, Judge Tacha was selected to be a
White House Fellow. During her
fellowship, she was sent on official trips to
Southeast Asia, East and Central Africa,
and the European Economic Community.
Following her year as a White House
Fellow, Judge Tacha was an associate with
the law firm of Hogan and Hartson in
Washington, D.C. In 1973, she returned to
Kansas and was engaged in a private law
practice in Concordia, Kansas.
In the fall of 1974, she was appointed
to the faculty of the Law School at the
University of Kansas. In 1979, she was
appointed as the Associate Vice Chancellor
for Academic Affairs, and in 1981 the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs. In
December of 1985, President Reagan
appointed her to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, where she
now serves as a Circuit Judge. With her
appointment to the Court of Appeals, she
became the seventeenth woman to be
appointed to that court in its nearly 200
year history.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Bobby R. Baldock was born in
Rocky, Oklahoma, in 1936 and grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico. He
is a graduate of the New Mexico Military
Institute in Roswell (1956) and received his
J.D. from the University of Arizona College
of Law (1960). He is a member of the New
Mexico and Arizona bars. Judge Baldock
was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in late
1985. Since 1983, he had served as a fed-
eral district judge in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. Before that and for 23 years, he
had been a trial lawyer in the firm of Sand-
ers, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. Judge Baldock
resides in Roswell.
JUDGE WADE BRORBY
Judge Wade Brorby was born May 23,
1934. He received his B.S. in 1956, and
J.D. in 1958, both from the University of
Wyoming. After law school, he entered the
United States Air Force, Judge Advocate
General Corps. In 1961 he entered the pri-
vate practice of law in Gillette, Wyoming,
where he stayed until 1988, when President
Reagan appointed him to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He
is married and has two sons.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kan-
sas on June 3, 1940. He grew up in To-
peka, Kansas, received a B.A. degree in
Economics at Northwestern University in
1962 and aJ.D. degree from the University
of Michigan Law School in 1965, where he
graduated first in his class. While at the
University of Michigan Law School, he was
elected to the Order of Coif and the Barris-
ter Society, and served as Editor-in-Chief
of the Michigan Law Review, Volume 63.
Following graduation, he clerked for
Justice Byron R. White at the United States
Supreme Court during the 1965-66 term.
Judge Ebel then joined the Denver law firm
of Davis, Graham & Stubbs, where he prac-
ticed for the next 22 years with an emphasis
on a litigation practice. During that time
he tried a number of securities, antitrust,
commercial contract, product liability, tort,
and constitutional law cases and provided
general corporate advice to clients.
Judge Ebel was nominated by Presi-
dent Reagan for a seat on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and
he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on
April 19, 1988. He assumed his seat on the
court on July 11, 1988, with chambers lo-
cated in Denver, Colorado.
Judge Ebel's community and civic ac-
tivities include teaching the Corporations
course at Denver University Law School as
an adjunct professor of law; teaching the
confirmation class at St. James Presbyterian
Church; work on a number of Bar Associa-
tion activities, including prior service as
Vice-President of the Colorado Bar Associ-
ation; and various activities with regard to
his local public school district. He is a fel-
low of the American College of Trial Law-
yers, a senior judge of the Doyle Inns of
Court, and a member of the Town & Gown
Society.
Judge Ebel is married and has four
children. His hobbies include fly fishing,
mountain climbing, tennis, and reading.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has
been a director of the Santa Fe National
Bank, chairman of the Legal Committee of
the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association,
and counsel for the New Mexico Cat-
tlegrowers' Association. He has also been
a regent of the Museum of New Mexico and
a director of the Santa Fe Boy's Club. In
1962 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by
President John F. Kennedy. He became
Chief Judge in 1977 and held this position
until September 15, 1984. On December
25, 1984, Judge Seth assumed senior
status.
SENIOR JUDGE ROBERT H.
MCWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived ever since. He re-
ceived his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the
University of Denver. In 1971, he was
awarded an Honorary Doctor of Law de-
gree from the University.
During World War II, Judge McWil-
liams served in the United States Army and
was with the Office of Strategic Services.
He has served as a Deputy District Attor-
ney, a Colorado district court judge, and
was a member of the Colorado Supreme
Court for nine years prior to his appoint-
ment to the Court of Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Ad-
ministration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta
Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta
Phi, and Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as
a Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. On
August 31, 1984, Judge McWilliams as-
sumed senior status.
SENIOR JUDGE JAMES E.
BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett,
who served as Wyoming's Congressman,
Governor, and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett
was born in 1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He
attended the University of Wyoming for
two years prior to his service in the Army
during World War 11. After the War, he at-
tended Saint Catherine's College at Oxford
University. He received his LL.B. from the
University of Wyoming in 1949. In 1973
he was given the Distinguished Alumni
Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Bar-
rett had been involved in private practice in
Lusk and had served as County and Prose-
cuting Attorney for Niobrara County;
Town Attorney for the towns of Lusk and
Manville; and attorney for the Niobrara
County Consolidated School District. In
1967 he was appointed by Governor Stan-
ley K. Hathaway to serve as Wyoming At-
torney General and he remained in that
position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review, and is a
trustee of Saint Joseph's Children's Home.
He was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1971.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kan-
sas, in 1906. He received his LL.B. from
Washburn College in 1929. From 1929 to
1943 he practiced law in Wamego, serving
as an Assistant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to
1936. He was general counsel for the Kan-
sas State Tax Commission from 1937 to
1939 and Chairman of the State Demo-
cratic Committee from 1946 to 1948. Dur-
ing World War II he was a Captain in the
U.S. Army. In 1945, he assisted in the
prosecution of General Yamashita in Ma-
nila. He was a U.S. District judge from
1949 until 1961 when he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. Judge Hill became a Senior
Judge on April 1, 1977.
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THE PROCESS OF DEATH: REFLECTIONS ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT ISSUES IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
STEVEN SEMERARO*
A question of morality that has escaped reasoned analysis for centu-
ries has now become integrated into the rational sphere of the law. The
justification for the taking of human life by a society in response to the
acts and intentions of an individual had never been adequately ex-
plained. In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court was called upon to
achieve through the power of reason, what a millennium of thought
could not attain. The first step was realistic. In an opinion written by
Justice Harlan, a six member majority of the Court held that while capi-
tal sentencing should command the utmost of thought and introspec-
tion, structured legal reasoning had no place in the individual moral
decision between life and death. Justice Brennan in dissent bemoaned
that no matter how difficult, the deprivation of life could not be a deci-
sion unbounded by the rule of law.' The Court has continually strug-
gled with these two realities ever since. Fundamentally wed to both;
unable to achieve either.
INTRODUCTION
The Court's initial attempt to distance itself from the death penalty
in McGautha v. Cahfornia,2 which left the entire area to state control, was
doomed to fail. In a society committed to using formal rules to govern
behavior, reliance upon pure humanity, unbounded by the structure of
rules, to impose capital punishment was unthinkable. Thus, two years
later in Furman v. Georgia,3 the Court reversed its course, holding that
the existing system of distinguishing those who live from those who die
was unconstitutional. If a state wanted a death penalty, it had to devise a
more rule bound scheme.
* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; Stanford Law School, J.D.
(1987); Rutgers College, B.A. (1984). Many of the ideas expressed in this article are
drawn from the scholarship of Robert Weisberg and Mark Kelman to whom I owe a con-
siderable debt. Kristina Ament's comments on earlier drafts have also been extremely
helpful. All errors are my own.
1. His assumption, of course, was that if Harlan was correct and the death penalty
could not be captured by the rule of law, then the death penalty itself was unconstitutional.
Brennan proved himself willing to follow through on this reasoning. Few others had suffi-
cient faith in the power of judicial decision or the dedication to advancing morality
through it. Even one as committed to liberalization through judicial reasoning as Justice
Douglas never took the absolutist position to which Brennan has clung for the past decade
and a half.
2. 402 U.S. 183 (1970).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Four years later in Gregg v. Georgia,4 the Court pronounced state ef-
forts successful. What could not be attained in centuries of philosophi-
cal contemplation had been achieved by the American judicial and
legislative process in less than eight years. According to the Court, the
United States now had a rational system of capital punishment.
But as the Court's hopeful rhetoric cannot alter truth, reason can-
not rationalize life and death decisions. We believe that punishment un-
controlled by the rule of law is unthinkable. Without clearly established
rules, punishment in particular cases is too likely to depend upon the
particular passions and prejudices of the time and the people involved.
We simultaneously believe, however, that jury verdicts are largely un-
principled decisions culled from experience and intuition. 5 This is nec-
essary, we believe, because the unique quality of any particular
defendant and the crime for which he is charged cannot be pigeon-holed
in a regularized, articulated scheme. Both rule bound and situation spe-
cific systems are in one sense just and fair, but neither is just nor fair in
another equally compelling sense. A society simultaneously committed
to rule bound systems and individualized determination cannot be con-
tent with a place in the middle. Any adopted ground will always be sub-
ject to attack from one side or the other by intellectually compelling
arguments.
6
This problem of a simultaneous commitment to incompatible meth-
ods of decision making is certainly not unique to the capital punishment
context. The deprivation of life, however, is the most severe (and in a
sense the most cruel) sanction that the government may impose. Be-
cause the stakes are so high, the pressures to avoid the problem com-
pletely or to try even harder to resolve it, are stronger than in other
areas. 7 Unwilling or unable to directly face this harrowing contradic-
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. For example, juries must give content to inherently subjective concepts such as
intent and malice.
6. The obvious question is, why is a compromise or blending of these two desires
insufficient to satisfy our simultaneous yearnings? While the scope of this article precludes
sufficient examples to substantiate the claim, the reader need not accept it on faith alone.
For a general discussion of the concept of the impossibility of a unitary solution complete
with numerous examples, see Chapter One of MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (1987). I will restate here only his conclusion:
[I]n any real substantive dispute a rulelike and a substantially more standard like
position could readily be offered to do equal battle (a well tailored conclusive
presumption is never conclusively better or worse than a well-guided discretion-
ary standard). . . It is true too that the extreme standards and extreme rules
sometimes converge in the sense that open-ended standards are made more rule-
like by the use of exemplars and in the sense that rules are tempered to become
more standardlike by limiting their jurisdictional coverage or scope; but the con-
vergence I believe I have demonstrated in dealing with real doctrine, is not to-
ward a point but toward at least two distinct and distant points.
Id. at 31-32. For a full-blown example of the historical oscillation of the dual commitments
in the area of real property ownership see Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577 (1988).
7. The same dilemma results with any crime. One who steals a loaf of bread is,
under the rule of law, guilty of the crime of larceny or some form of theft. He may justifia-
bly be punished, we believe, so long as he intentionally stole the bread. Yet, we also be-
lieve that a starving child, under appropriate circumstances, would be justified in stealing
[Vol. 66:4
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tion, the Court sought out surrogates.8 In part, the Court turned to
federalism. The issue of appropriate punishment for a particular crime
has traditionally belonged to the states. Thus, some justices argued, the
federal courts should not intrude into state capital punishment decisions
any more than they should when dealing with lesser sanctions. Other
justices have argued that capital punishment is cruel and unusual, and
hence, the eighth and fourteenth amendments require federal prohibi-
tion of the sanction. Neither approach even faces, much less resolves,
the dilemma between our commitment to both rule bound and situation
specific thought and behavior evaluation. The former merely transfers
the problem to the states, while the latter tries to cover it up by eliminat-
ing a most irritating example of the conflict.
Neither extreme position was to prevail. Instead, the compromise
chosen by the Court purports to leave the substantive decision as to who
should live and who should die with the states, while imposing a system
of heightened procedural safeguards as a matter of federal law to ensure
that the state's substantive policy choice as to who to execute is put in
practice through a sufficiently rule bound system. Generally, the Consti-
tution is said to require a heightened standard of reliability in capital
sentencing proceedings. 9 To satisfy this standard, a state must do some-
thing more than tell a jury to decide whether a defendant should live or
die; it must choose well defined categories, narrower than all first degree
murderers, in which a defendant must fall to be death eligible. In addi-
tion, a state must afford the defendant the opportunity to present, and
require the sentencer to consider, any evidence relevant to whether the
defendant should live or die. This requirement attempts to satisfy our
need for situation specific analysis. In achieving that goal, however, it
undercuts the rule bound rationality created by the narrowing of the
death eligible class.' 0
By adopting this system, the Court has attempted to achieve several
objectives. First, it has introduced the rule of law to the capital sentenc-
ing decision by requiring the states to choose narrow, well defined
enough bread to keep herself alive. Conversely, a con man may trick a baker into trading
him many loaves in exchange for some good or service that is completely worthless. The
con man might be more deserving of punishment than many a thief, but under the rule of
law, not subject to punishment because he did not steal. (Any fraud committed by the con
man would presumably not be a criminal violation). The desert of any defendant who
steals varies with a myriad of considerations such that the rule bound system of defining
theft is always unsatisfying. To mask our dissatisfaction, we define some things as theft
and others as smart business, but they remain categories of the same whole. Generally,
however, we can suppress the contradiction. The punishment for theft is not so disturbing
that the over or under inclusiveness of the rule is so great that errors become intolerable.
But the distinction between life and death raises the concern to a much higher level.
8. The Court has made virtually no reference to the contradiction that pervades all
of American criminal law in its capital punishment jurisprudence. The only references the
Court has made to this fundamental problem have involved the perplexing question of
racial prejudice. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The problem is related in
that we simultaneously believe that individuals should be treated equally, but recognize
that pervasive racial prejudice pervades the country. Problems of prejudice lend them-
selves to court cases better than do problems of thought.
9. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
10. See KELMAN, supra note 7, at 27-28.
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classes of death eligible defendants. Second, it has attempted to main-
tain the traditional state role in criminal sentencing by leaving to the
states the task of defining what those categories are. Third, the Court
has imposed the evidence in mitigation requirement to ensure ajust and
fair application of the death penalty to any particular defendant, and
thereby, satisfy our desire for a sentencing system which is sensitive to
the particular facts before the court.
To enforce its requirements and achieve its goals, the Court has
spent the last decade developing a new branch of criminal procedure
exclusive to capital cases. Although a prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment sounds like a substantive protection, the purely sub-
stantive aspect of it, the determination of sanctions that constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, has received virtually no attention in the de-
velopment of capital punishment law. Generally, justices have assumed
that since the death penalty has always been a fairly regular form of pun-
ishment throughout the history of the United States, it can hardly be
considered cruel and unusual on its face."I Instead, the courts have fo-
cused to a limited extent on the quasi-substantive issue of whether a
punishment is appropriate for a particular crime or individual. The
Supreme Court has virtually forbidden the use of capital punishment as
a sanction for any crime other than murder.' 2 It has also limited its use
to those blameworthy enough to deserve such a sanction even though
they may have committed an otherwise sufficiently aggravated murder. ' 3
The overwhelming majority of judicial energy, however, has been de-
voted to constructing a procedure by which state substantive decisions
may be imposed.
In turning to procedure as a compromise solution, the Court has
wholly failed to achieve its goals. Because the procedural solution does
nothing to resolve the contradiction between our commitment to rule
bound decision making systems and our commitment to individualized
determination, judges at all levels continually stray from it. Capital pun-
ishment is inflicted irrationally, the majority will is continually frus-
trated, and fairness is nowhere to be found. 14 The contradiction
between our commitment to rationality and its unattainability remains
masked by the Court's adherence to its compromise solution.' 5 Perhaps
11. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1970) (Black, J., separate opinion).
12. Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (kidnapping); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (rape of an adult woman).
13. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (defendant who commits murder
before age sixteen) (plurality opinion); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (death
row inmate who becomes insane); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (felony mur-
derer who does not kill, intend to kill, or display reckless disregard for the life of another).
14. See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting) for an
elaborate explanation of why existing caselaw wholly fails to eliminate arbitrary death
sentences. Any uniformity comes only at the expense of either binding rules or situation
specificity, or both. That is, clarity may result in practice, but only through institutional-
izing meaningless arbitrariness. See KELMAN, supra note 7, at 46-47 (using an example of
the relatively clear aggravating circumstances of killing a witness or killing for financial
gain).
15. Recent unanimous opinions in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) and
Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) strengthen the appearance of resolution.
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suppression of this horror is the Court's ulterior goal; in which case, it
has succeeded at least temporarily. A true solution, however, may well
depend on a recognition and reevaluation of our beliefs about the sys-
tem. Ignoring the problem will not make it go away.
This article explores the development of capital punishment proce-
dure. Debating procedural questions is no doubt easier than clashing
over substantive questions. The issue here, however, is whether the
procedure debate has rationalized the imposition of death while respect-
ing democratic preferences or whether it has simply masked a more in-
solvable problem by giving judges something to think and write about.
The Tenth Circuit provides an attractive microcosm for such an ex-
amination. It has jurisdiction over three states; Oklahoma, Wyoming,
and Utah, that are actively seeking to utilize death penalty statutes; yet,
none have succeeded in regularizing executions to the extent of some
other states.' 6 The situation in Oklahoma is particularly acute. Hun-
dreds of convicts are now on death row, but no executions have taken
place. The public views the Tenth Circuit as the impediment to the ful-
fillment of the popular will.
Presently, The Tenth Circuit is deciding a growing, but not over-
whelming number of death cases. Those opposed to execution have yet
to be worn down; those seeking execution have yet to be placated. The
result has been a court deftly struggling to apply the law; rationalizing
with procedure, yet unable to ignore substance. A trio of recent cases
epitomizes this intellectual conflict. The first case ponders what the
state must do to determine whether an individual's crime is egregious
enough to warrant execution. 17 The second and third cases consider
the scope of the defendant's right to present evidence that indicates that
even though the crime is sufficiently heinous, the defendant should not
be executed. I8
Part I of this article briefly traces the development of modem capi-
tal punishment law in the Supreme Court, and describes how the Court
chose to establish procedures that satisfy our need for generally applica-
ble specific rules and situation specific standards. Part II explores the
genesis of the judicial practice of employing procedure to achieve a so-
lution to the contradiction in our desire for both pre-conceived rules
and open-ended evaluation. Part III focuses on the trio of Tenth Circuit
cases. The analysis reveals the judge's painstaking attempts to follow
the law while grappling with their own values. Ultimately, ignoring sub-
stance makes this task easier, but it does not advance the stated interests
of rationality and democracy. Finally, part IV evaluates the future of the
procedural solution, by speculating on the potential for reason through
process to produce a fairly imposed death penalty.
16. Such states include Florida, Texas, and Georgia.
17. Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986).
18. Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987); Dutton v. Brown, 788 F.2d
669 (loth Cir. 1986).
19891
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
I. THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW
The history of capital punishment law began in 1970 with Justice
Harlan's opinion in McGautha v. California.19 At that time, all capital
punishment laws permitted the jury absolute discretion to determine
whether defendants, guilty of committing certain crimes, deserved to
die. The questions presented to the Court were whether the due pro-
cess clause required a separate hearing to determine whether capital
punishment was appropriate and whether the state had to supply stan-
dards upon which the sentencer would base his decision. The majority
declined to impose any procedural limitation upon the states in impos-
ing the death penalty. The rational as stated by Justice Harlan was quite
simple: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal
homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability."
'20
Justice Brennan's dissent was a scathing attack on the Court for ab-
dicating its judicial role. According to Justice Brennan, the issue was
whether the states were free to inflict the ultimate sanction in a manner
wholly divorced from the rule of law. He asked whether the due process
clause prevented states from utilizing death penalty laws "that are pur-
posely constructed to allow the maximum possible variation from one
case to the next, and provide no mechanism to prevent that consciously
maximized variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary
choice."'2 1 The Court's conclusion that the rule of law and "the power
of the states to kill" were necessarily in conflict mystified him.22 Surely,
the states could devise schemes for distinguishing who should live from
who should die that would provide some rationality, if not mechanical
precision, to the sentencing decision. 23
Justice Harlan sought to make the capital punishment problem go
away, at least from the Supreme Court. No matter how important care-
ful consideration of the seriousness of the capital sentencing decision
might be, Justice Harlan was willing to trust the basic human instincts of
a judge or jury to provide the appropriate care. The world of reason
that is the law, can add little to this centuries old conflict. The time,
however, was not one in which the Court could readily avoid difficult
questions, and Justice Brennan was unwilling to let that happen. He
argued that states could and must develop standards by which
sentencers can distinguish who should live from who should die.
Whether Justice Brennan intended it or not, few could read the Mc-
19. 402 U.S. 183 (1970).
20. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1970).
21. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 249.
23. "The Court neglects to explain why the impossibility of perfect standards justifies
making no attempt whatsoever to control lawless action." Id. at 282 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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Gautha dissent without believing that capital punishment could be
brought within the rule of law.
In 1972, the Court held the standardless implication of capital pun-
ishment unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. 24 Although the composition of the Court changed in the years
between McGautha and Furman, the reversal resulted from Justices Stew-
art's and White's abrupt change of position. Both joined Justice Harlan
in proclaiming that rational standards for determining who should die
could not be articulated and thus, should not be constitutionally re-
quired. Yet, two years later, both appeared to believe that capital pun-
ishment law without standards was cruel and unusual.
2 5
IfJustices Stewart and White believed both that no rational method
for making the life and death decision existed, and that without such a
method capital punishment was unconstitutional, little hope existed that
states could devise a constitutional death penalty. Yet thirty-five states
were determined to try. Some states imposed more or less mandatory
death penalties for certain crimes, while most attempted to provide stan-
dards to guide sentencer discretion.
Four years after Furman, the Court responded to these efforts, and
the positions ofJustices Stewart and White became clearer. Neither was
willing to hold the death penalty unconstitutional as a matter of substan-
tive constitutional law, despite the apparent conundrum which their
prior opinions seemed to suggest. Perhaps Justice Brennan's dissent in
McGautha had some effect. Although they may have adopted Justice
Brennan's view that if "the rule of law and the power of the States to kill
are in irreconcilable conflict, [a Justice must] have no hesitation in con-
24. Brennan now believes that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional for a vari-
ety of reasons that have never had much influence on the Court. The impact of Brennan's
McGautha dissent, however, remains paramount.
25. Justice Stewart focused upon the arbitrary and capricious nature of the death pen-
alty under the existing statutes writing:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightening is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners
are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). For Stewart,
the problem was that no rational basis existed to distinguish between those sentenced to
die from those who were not. Justice White was troubled by a slightly different problem.
In his view, when "the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is
too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice" it violates the eighth amend-
ment. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). For White, the possibility that the life and death
decision was not made with precise horizontal equity was not the central concern, but
rather the fact that state legislatures had not created capital punishment laws that in fact
yielded a non-trivial number of death sentences. He wrote:
[P]ast and present legislative judgment with respect to the death penalty loses
much of its force when viewed in light of the recurring practice of delegating
sentencing authority to the jury and the fact that a jury, in its own discretion and
without violating its trust or any statutory policy, may refuse to impose the death
penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime. Legislative 'policy' is thus
necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and
judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon them.
Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
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cluding that the rule of law must prevail,"' 26 they were no longer con-
vinced that such an acute conflict existed.
The views of Justices White and Stewart have formed the founda-
tions of the development of modem capital punishment law. Justice
White remains primarily focused on the inefficacy ofjudicial attempts to
thwart majority positions. Justice Stewart was much more willing to in-
troduce procedural safeguards, effectively permitting judicial review of
both legislatures and juries.
For Justice White, procedure may be incapable of rationalizing the
imposition of capital punishment to any meaningful extent; however,
states do not have to achieve meaningful rationality to pass constitu-
tional muster. All that was required for Justice White, was for the state
to adopt a capital punishment scheme likely to result in a non-trivial
number of death sentences for highly culpable defendants. Thus, he
approved of both the guided discretion and the mandatory statutes de-
vised as a response to Furman, because both seemed to require juries to
impose death sentences in enough horrifying cases to have them serve a
legitimate criminal law purpose. As long as a legitimate purpose was
served, Justice White believed the states were free to impose capital
punishment as they saw fit without violating the eighth amendment.
Justice White's position was not to carry the day. The case for the
protection of the individual through situation specific evaluation was
simply too strong. Perhaps Justice White implicitly recognized that
rules could not satisfy our desire for individualized determination. A
majority, however, was unwilling or unable to grapple with the problem.
Bolstered by Justice Brennan's argument in McGautha, Justice Stewart
led the Court in approving three capital punishment schemes that at-
tempted to guide jury discretion in determining whether a particular in-
dividual should live or die. 2 7 McGautha's underlying premise had been
proven wrong by the almighty power of reason.
28
26. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 249-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Brennan may well have recognized the problem as well as White; however, he
chose to argue that because execution is so radically different from anything else the state
may do to a criminal, our inability to resolve the conflict in our beliefs requires us to forbid
the practice. White may well have believed that Brennan was correct; but his fear of where
such reasoning might lead required the adoption of a more conservative position. The
views of these two Justices are actually closer than a cursory reading of their opinions
might suggest, and is apparent from the separate opinions in Godfrey. Justice Marshall's
concurrence (which Brennanjoined) and Justice White's dissent both disagreed with Stew-
art's plurality opinion in the same way. Both opinions recognized that the Georgia
Supreme Court had not strayed from an otherwise consistent pattern of decision. Mar-
shall and White simply disagreed on whether the Georgia high court was doing enough.
Both seemed to realize that the court could never do enough to justify capital punishment
within our belief structure. Marshall's answer was to forbid execution. White's was to be
satisfied with Georgia's efforts.
28. Stewart wrote:
We note that McGautha's assumption that it is not possible to devise standards to
guide and regularize jury sentencing in capital cases has been undermined by
subsequent experience. In view of that experience and the considerations set
forth in the text, we adhere to Furman's determination that where the ultimate
punishment of death is at issue a system of standardless jury discretion violates
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Justice Stewart first set out to dismiss the substantive issue. The
death penalty was constitutional because it had always been thought
constitutional and because no one was able to prove why or how it had
subsequently become unconstitutional. 29 Popular support for the sanc-
tion suggested that it had not been rejected as inhumane by the nation.
While the penological value of the penalty was perhaps more suspect, it
certainly served at the least, the legitimate goals of retribution and de-
terrence to a sufficient extent that the Court should not deem it uncon-
stitutional per se. The discriminatory aspects of capital punishment
were similarly unprovable, and presumably were ignored without sub-
stantial discussion because a sufficient non-discriminatory purpose
seemed apparent.
30
The value of capital punishment was sufficient to permit it for Jus-
tice Stewart only because the Court could require an elaborate array of
procedural protections far beyond anything ever previously deemed
constitutionally required. These new procedures, Justice Stewart as-
serted, would insure that the death penalty is rationally applied.
At the heart of the Georgia statute were two protections which Jus-
tice Stewart saw as essential. First, it mandated a separate sentencing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.47 (1976).
29. White's discussion of the per se constitutionality of the death penalty was some-
what less demanding.
30. Little mention was made of the problem of racial and social prejudice and capital
punishment. Only Justice Douglas among the Furman majority relied in major part on this
problem. He wrote:
It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defend-
ant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion,
wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives
room for the play of such prejudices. ... 'It is the poor, the sick, the ignorant, the
powerless and the hated who are executed.' One searches our chronicles in vain
for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society ....
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compati-
ble with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on
'cruel and unusual' punishments.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 242, 251-52, 256-57. Of course, Douglas had left the Court by 1976.
Even in his Furman opinion, however, he admitted that "[w]e cannot say from facts dis-
closed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were
black." Id. at 253; id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (racial discrimination has not been
proven). Certainly, Stewart felt that as with the penological purpose served by the death
penalty, speculative discrimination could not override the historical use of and current
desire for capital punishment. The Gregg opinion did not focus on the issue, perhaps be-
cause of the power of Douglas' argument. While intuition may suggest that capital punish-
ment does indeed deter, that same intuition suggests that it is discriminatorilly applied.
Thus, the same rationale that permitted the Court to assume a deterrent effect without
adequate proof should have required the Court to assume a prejudicial effect without evi-
dence to the contrary. Although Gregg's failure to address the discrimination issue was
understandable, it had the effect of shifting the entire debate (whether intentionally or
not) to the adequacy of the procedure. Once that shift occurred, McCleshy was foreor-
dained. Once the Court began to treat the death penalty like any other form of criminal
sanction, (albeit a sanction requiring more elaborate procedural safeguards) it had to
guard against attacks on capital punishment that could just as easily be applied to any
criminal case. Perhaps a better route would have been to emphasize the discrimination
issue rather than procedural protections, and conclude that in the capital context discrimi-
nation was intolerable. This approach would have required a recognition that the entire
criminal justice system is prejudicial though tolerable. Stewart sought to avoid such an
unappealing result.
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hearing, a procedure the McGautha Court had held constitutionally un-
necessary. This sentencing procedure permitted the introduction of evi-
dence solely relevant to sentencing or too prejudicial to be admissible at
the guilt determination phase of the trial. Second, the scheme required
appellate review by the state supreme court, including a proportional,
horizontal comparison between defendants sentenced to die to ensure
that death sentences were not imposed arbitrarily. 3 ' These procedural
devises would ensure that more care was paid to the decision. Presuma-
bly, more information and greater scrutiny by appellate judges who hear
numerous death cases would make decisions less arbitrary.
Also important for Justice Stewart was the inclusion of a statutory
list of aggravating factors, one of which had to be proven before the
defendant was eligible to be considered for the death sentence. One
who committed an aggravated murder3 2 was more likely to deserve
death than one who did not. Finally, the Georgia scheme permitted the
defendant at the sentencing hearing to introduce any evidence in mitiga-
tion of death. This mitigating evidence could be weighed by the jury
against the aggravating evidence, providing an admittedly rough stan-
dard to channel the life and death decision.
Although Gregg did no more than approve a statute, and hence,
merely made many things constitutionally relevant but not constitution-
ally required,3 3 Justice Stewart clearly viewed his opinion as a transfer
mechanism. The substantive eighth amendment question would give
way to a new procedural structure. To ensure this, Justice Stewart took
great pains to emphasize that the holding in Furman, though unclear on
its face, was that "the uniqueness of the death penalty ...[required]
sentencing procedures that [eliminated any] substantial risk that it
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."'3 4 The task of
devising a new body of procedural law would indeed be monumental,
but it was something at which judges were quite good.
The task of building capital punishment procedure began the very
day Gregg was decided. In Woodson v. North Carolina,3 5 the Court an-
31. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court held that such a proportionality re-
view was not constitutionally required. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). It has contin-
ued to maintain in dicta that some form of "meaningful appellate review" is
constitutionally required. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462, 466 (1984).
32. An aggravated murder is ordinary first degree murder plus at least one of the
aggravating circumstances articulated in the state's death penalty statute.
33. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, Sup. CT. REV. 305, 321-22 (1983).
34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). Stewart made references to Furman
requiring a new body of procedural law at several other points in the opinion as well. Id. at
179, 189, 195. Though disagreeing that Furman established any such requirement, Justice
Rehnquist had no trouble recognizing the direction in which Stewart was leading the
Court. The Woodson plurality, he wrote, sought to "import into the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause procedural requirements which find no support in our cases." Wood-
son, 428 U.S. at 309 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist was a lone voice in the wind
attempting to stay the Court's foray into a new body of criminal procedure. Procedure was
the stuff of courts, and mostJustices undoubtedly realized that they had best start agreeing
on procedure, because the splintering opinions on substance in Furman and the Gregg cases
could potentially destroy the Court's credibility.
35. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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nounced the principle upon which capital punishment procedure would
be based. Because the death penalty was categorically different from all
other penalties, a heightened standard of reliability had to be met before
a defendant could be executed. Thus, proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, though sufficient to imprison a person for his entire life, was
insufficient to permit an execution. The standards by which to deter-
mine the applicability of capital punishment remained an open question.
In making its first effort at establishing this new body of procedural
law, the Court did not limit its rationale to the points that seemed most
important in Gregg, such as appellate review. Rather, it held mandatory
death penalties unconstitutional, no matter how narrow the class of
death eligible defendants, in substantial part because these penalties did
not permit the defendant to introduce evidence in mitigation of death at
a separate sentencing hearing. The thrust of the opinions overturning
the North Carolina and Louisiana death sentences was clearly that
Furman did not signal a desire to return to the long ago rejected use of
mandatory death sentences. The requirement of individualized sentenc-
ing, however, soon became the paramount link in the new body of death
penalty procedure.
The Court's focus on individualized sentencing in Woodson rather
than the lack of the rationalizing procedures it praised in Gregg, demon-
strates the inherent instability of a sole commitment to rule bound deci-
sion. No amount of rhetoric can alter the unmistakable fact that judges
and juries do not determine guilt or sentence within a rule bound vac-
uum; our commitment to structured rationality is tempered by a simulta-
neous commitment to situation specific individual evaluation. Gregg
could satisfy only our hunger; Woodson was the first sip in an effort to
satisfy our equally insatiable thirst. Unlike hunger and thirst, however,
our longing for general rules to govern behavior and situation specific
evaluation to preserve justice cannot both be satisfied. The two exist in
irreconcilable conflict. The difficulty lower courts have had applying
capital punishment law results from our simultaneous commitment to
these two forms of decision making. No compromise can ever be
satisfying.
3 6
The Court's efforts to define the Constitution's application to capi-
tal punishment after Gregg and Woodson have proceeded through three
phases. In the first six years after Gregg, the Court conveyed constitu-
tional dimensions on various procedural devises in the capital punish-
ment context. 3 7 Beginning in 1982, the Court signaled an end to strict
36. See KELMAN, supra note 7.
37. During this period, the Court struck down death sentences on the basis of federal
constitutional error in every case on which it issued a full opinion except one. See Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (evidence of a troubled youth is relevant mitigating
evidence); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (privilege against self-incrimination and
right to counsel must be observed before psychiatric evidence may be introduced at sen-
tencing phase of capital trial); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (initial life sen-
tence is the equivalent of an acquital of a death sentence for double jeopardy purposes);
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (reaffirming Witherspoon); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625 (1980) (jury must be given lesser included instruction if supported by facts); Godfrey
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constitutional definition in death penalty statutes by upholding death
sentences in the face of both federal3 8 and state law3 9 error. During this
period, Gregg's praise for various procedural devises in the Georgia stat-
ute were held unessential to a constitutional capital punishment stat-
ute.40 Only the requirement that the defendant be permitted to present
and the sentencer be required to consider any relevant mitigating evi-
dence actually expanded during this period.
4 '
This second phase of post-Gregg capital punishment law ended with
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (aggravating circumstance must narrow the class of death
eligible murderers); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam) (discretionary evi-
dence rule may not be applied mechanistically against a capital defendant); Presnell v.
Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978) (per curiam) (due process considerations apply to capital
sentencing as they do to criminal guilt determination); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978)
(Lockett companion case); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (defendant must be permit-
ted to present and sentencer must consider any relevant mitigating evidence); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty unconstitutional for rape of an adult women);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (holding mandatory death sentence for one who
kills a police officer unconstitutional); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (constitu-
tionalizing defendant's right to respond to all evidence introduced as a basis for capital
punishment); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam) (extending Witherspoon
test for juror exclusion to exclusion of one veniremen). The only capital case of signifi-
cance during this period in which the Court upheld the death sentence was Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (rejecting claim that a death sentence imposed for a crime
committed before the effective date of capital punishment statute violated the ex post facto
clause).
38. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
39. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
40. Most significantly, the Court upheld state statutes that merely used aggravating
circumstances to narrow the class of death eligible defendants, abandoning Gregg's appar-
ent desire that such circumstances guide juror discretion. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983). The Court also held that proportionality review, another protection praised in
Gregg, was not constitutionally required. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
During this period, the Court upheld more death sentences than it struck down. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987); Cali-
fornia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Poland v.
Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (sentence vacated
but possibility of reimposition by state appellate court); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372
(1985); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Wain-
wright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) per curiam; California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
Even during this period, however, the Court continued to expand upon the proce-
dural requirements which the Constitution imposed upon the states in the capital punish-
ment area. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (eighth amendment requires
formalized determination of sanity of death row inmate); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28
(1986) (capital defendant accused of interracial crime entitled to have prospective jurors
informed of the race of the victim and questioned on issue of racial bias); Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (prisoner must be allowed to present evidence of good con-
duct while in prison awaiting sentencing); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)
(prosecution cannot reduce the jury's sense of responsibility by informing it that appellate
court would automatically review its sentencing decision); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S.
203 (1984) (initial life sentence constitutes an acquittal of death sentence for double jeop-
ardy purposes).
41. See Skipper, 476 U.S. I (1986). The Court has yet to decide whether the Constitu-
tion requires the state to permit the introduction of any evidence the defendant may seek
to present or whether the state can establish some limit. As the Court approaches the
question, the opinions again begin to splinter. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320
(1988) (producing three opinions, none commanding a majority of the Court).
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the Court's decisions in Tison v. Arizona 4 2 and McClesky v. Kemp.43 Tison
permitted states to execute defendants who did not kill or intend to kill.
McClesky permitted execution in the face of meaningful statistical evi-
dence that the race of the victim was a significant factor in the decision.
While these cases might have signaled an end to federal involvement in
state capital punishment law, they have merely reaffirmed the Court's
dedication to the procedural solution. While the Court was unwilling to
establish even the essentially minimal substantive requirements of an in-
tent to kill or no significant evidence of racial bias in the decision, subse-
quent cases forming a third phase demonstrate that its commitment to
heightened procedures remains firm. 4 4 These cases reinforce and
strengthen the Court's earlier procedural decisions by unanimously
holding, for example, that a death sentence cannot rest on an aggravat-
ing circumstance that does not narrow the class of death eligible defend-
ants to something less than all first degree murderers, 45 and that the
sentencer must be permitted to hear, and required to consider all rele-
vant mitigating evidence.
46
II. THE COMMITMENT To PROCEDURE
The judicial commitment to a procedural solution to our longing
for both general rules and situation specific standards is not of recent
vintage. Since the framers drafted the Constitution, there has been a
contradiction in what might be described as the "American way." On
one hand, society is committed to democratic forms of resolving social
questions and disputes. This conforms to rule based decision making
because it involves tallying votes or adhering to legislative decisions
(which are presumably the embodiment of tallied votes). The rule is
simple-the most votes wins. On the other hand, the American people
are committed to a series of ideals labeled, among other things, liberty,
justice, fairness, and equality, each requiring situation specific evalua-
tion of individual action. No matter how great a majority may oppose
these ideals, they must be considered in a non-rule bound fashion.
4 7
Even a cursory look at any point in history reveals that democratic
processes do not yield a society governed by either pure democracy or
42. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
43. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
44. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 57 U.S.L.W. 4958 (U.S. June 26, 1989); South Carolina v.
Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792 (1988); Johnson v. Mis-
sissippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988); Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988); Maynard v.
Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988); Sumner v. Shuman, 481 U.S. 1002 (1987); Booth v.
Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 2045 (1987); Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
During this period, the Court has upheld the following death sentences concerning
procedural issues: Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988); Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S.
Ct. 2273 (1988); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988).
45. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
46. Hitchcock, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
47. Justice Black's longtime commitment to rule bound analysis of many constitu-
tional goals has been abandoned by the current Court.
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cherished ideals. Rhetorically, the people claim complete commitment
to both, and can be- intellectually satisfied with nothing less.
The project of legal theory among constitutional law scholars has
been to define the proper roles of courts and legislatures in an effort to
produce a stable compromise to our conflicting desires. The traditional
view espoused by Hart and Sacks4 8 focused on the benefits of specializa-
tion and technical competence. Under this view, two different types of
social decisions must be made in order to maximize social welfare. The
first involves the settling of past disputes through reasoned elaboration
of the implications of preexisting rules. Courts are best equipped to
make this sort of decision because of their structure. Numerous individ-
ual cases come before courts, and judges practice applying rules to
them. Practice makes for efficiency.
The second form of legal decision involves the adaptation of the
legal system to changing circumstances. Legislatures were seen as bet-
ter able to deal with these sorts of decisions for a number of reasons.
Collegial groups representing broad constituencies are better attuned to
social trends and shifting needs than isolated judicial decision makers.
They are better able to see the necessity of compromise in dealing with
the new and unsettled. They are aware of what their constituency will be
willing to accept. Perhaps most importantly, their power is institution-
ally checked, limiting them to moderate efforts to reform existing legal
structure.
Under this traditional view, legislatures would be charged with the
task of determining whether and in what circumstances capital punish-
ment was appropriate. As circumstances and attitudes changed, repre-
sentatives could account for relevant developments and determine what
changes, if any, should be made to the capital punishment system. The
role of courts would be to interpret and apply the legislative decision as
to the proper imposition of capital punishment in particular cases.
Whatever merit may be attributed to this traditional view, it obvi-
ously leaves little room for judicial review of morally problematic legis-
lation, without which the judicial role is limited to the rational
application of legislatively imposed rules. That courts were engaging in
the task of evaluating legislation to achieve situation specific fairness had
become a given by the 1970s. The courts justified their action by claim-
ing to be upholding the Constitution. Of course, legislatures are sup-
posed to uphold the constitutional as well, but sometimes they err.
Through judicial review, courts are able to nullify these errors. Because
this form of intervention is the very definition of anti-democratic deci-
sion making, not bound by a rationally applicable rule structure; it must,
according to the prevailing view, be used sparingly.
The consensus among American legal theoreticians throughout our
history has consistently been that some measure ofjudicial review is nec-
essary. As long as some means is found for limiting the scope of that
48. HENRY HART AND ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958).
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review, it can properly perform its corrective function without under-
mining our simultaneous commitment to democracy. The notion that
judicial review could be entirely eliminated has been almost completely
foreign; yet, the justifications for it have been profoundly problematic.
Judicial review is often seen as a means of preserving American val-
ues and ideals other than democracy, which is presumably reflected
through the legislative process. The simple solution of looking to the
Constitution as a super statute that courts could interpret in conjunction
with current legislation has always been attractive, but problematic. A
strict textualist approach would permit a theoretical limiting of the judi-
cial power to nullify statutes whose wording directly conflicted with the
wording of the Constitution. Such statutory interpretation was a famil-
iar practice for courts. The "chief virtue" of this justification of judicial
intervention, however,
is that it supports judicial review while answering the charge
that the practice is undemocratic. Under a pure interpretive
model . . . when a court strikes down a popular statute ... it
may... reply to the resulting public outcry: 'We didn't do it-
you did.' The people have chosen the principle that the statute
or practice violated, have designated it as fundamental, and
have written it down in the text of the Constitution for the
judges to interpret and apply.
4 9
The central problem with a pure textualist approach, in which
judges must interpret the Constitution's meaning directly from the
words of the document, is that its phrases are far from clear. For exam-
ple, due process, equal protection, freedom of contract, and the broad
language of the ninth amendment are simply not amenable to a strict
textualist approach. 50 These sorts of phrases have no core linguistic
meaning. One simply cannot tell whether many actual practices should
be constitutional by reference to any generally accepted understanding
of the meaning of constitutional phrases. Perhaps the very existence of
this sort of language indicates that we cannot be satisfied by a highly
structured rational decision making system. More fundamentally, lin-
guistic exercises offer no aid whatsoever in determining whdther a par-
ticular practice is legitimate. 5 1 In the context of capital punishment, no
amount of meditation on the words "cruel and unusual" will explain
anything useful about whether execution should be legitimate.
The alternative to the strict textualist approach of judicial review
focused on the search for fundamental rights or shared values. 5 2 To a
49. Thomas Grey, Do We Have a Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705
(1975).
50. For examples of how virtually every meaningful portion of the Constitution has no
commonly accepted clear meaning see ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDI-
CIAL REVIEW, 13, 14, 28, 30, 34 (1980).
51. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204
(1980); KELMAN, supra note 7, at 215.
52. This approach is associated with the work of Ronald Dworkin and Henry Welling-
ton. For a lucid exposition of the tradition see Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
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greater or lesser extent, proponents of this approach to constitutional
interpretation sought to interpret the values behind the drafting of the
Constitution. The move from interpreting the text of the Constitution
to interpreting the values of either contemporary society, or that of
some imagined historical society, is no less problematic than interpret-
ing the text.
Numerous commentators have expressed the impossibility of basing
judicial intervention on a framework of fundamental values. Initially,
judges are simply ordinary men, thus, the product of their decisions will
be as sensitive to political beliefs as any legislative outcome. Proof of
any other interpretation is impossible to muster. When the legislature
enacts a law, the judicial decision that some shared fundamental value
should prevent its enforcement is suspect, unless the legislature com-
pletely misjudged the impact of its decision.
5 3
Perhaps the most powerful attack on a shared values rational is that
American society does not readily appear to have the cultural and polit-
ical unification necessary to a meaningful shared value structure. 54 At-
tempting to discover a current consensus view about capital punishment
epitomizes this problem. No such consensus exists on any principle that
could logically lead to a definite conclusion on the death penalty. Be-
cause we believe in protecting the innocent from wrongful punishment
at the hands of the state in any situation, 55 our fears must be that much
stronger in the capital context. The thought of an innocent man (or
even an undeserving man) being put to death is horrifying. Conversely,
we believe in the concept of just deserts, which logically translates into
execution for particularly aggravated murderers. The problem is that
these two goals are incompatible. If the guilt/innocence decision is suf-
ficiently subject to error that it requires special protection, the extent of
aggravation necessary to justify execution must similarly be determined
with adequate protections. When these protections take the form of
prophylactic rules, like proof beyond a reasonable doubt,56 they result
in a horizontally inequitable system where defendants are convicted or
executed not because of what they did vis-a-vis another, but only be-
cause for some reason wholly apart from themselves, the state was able
to satisfy the prophylactic rule in their cases. In straying from strict
rules to escape their inequity, we have produced inequity. No reference
to a common shared principle can enable us to overcome this division.
Discovering the value system of some imagined past time, such as
that of the framers, and using that as a limiting principle of, and justifi-
53. M. Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholar-
ship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1311-13 (1979).
54. That problem aside, a group of upper-middle-class and predominantly white male
judges are unlikely to figure out what those values are. Experience undoubtedly shapes
our view of highly charged issues, and judges do not share anything resembling the com-
mon experience. P. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 770-73 (1982).
55. Thus, we guarantee all defendants among other things the assistance of counsel,
and we require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
56. Most death penalty statutes require the state to prove at least one aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.
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cation for, judicial review is no less problematic than identifying a con-
temporary consensus. Again, there is an initial hurdle in that the
Constitution was drafted by a group, and ratified by an even larger
group. Divining the intentions of a group is an exercise in speculation,
especially because we have no way of knowing whether the intention of
the framers was for us to follow their intent or merely the words they
chose for the document.5 7 Another obvious difficulty is that many prac-
tices were not in existence in the eighteenth century, and even those that
were have not extended through time with precisely the same meaning
that they had then. To attempt to determine what the framers inten-
tions would have been with respect to these practices is folly.5 8
In regard to the death penalty, one could strongly argue that capital
punishment as it exists today is a far cry from what the framers knew and
accepted. Execution may have a profoundly different meaning in the
vastly more secular contemporary society where few die young of natu-
ral causes than it had when the Constitution was drafted. Numerous
evaluations would be necessary to compare meaningfully the penalty
across eras, including: alternative punishments and societal attitudes to-
wards them; the crimes for which the death penalty is imposed, the like-
lihood of its imposition, the commonality of the crime, how the crime is
currently perceived versus how it was perceived centuries ago; where
does the death penalty fit on the scheme of punishments, for instance is
it the most severe available sanction or a liberalization over horrible
forms of torture; how do other societies utilize the penalty. 5 9 All of
these issues and more would have to be fully considered before any
meaningful concept of original intent in regard to the death penalty
could be formulated.
Without a stable theoretical base for judicial activism, legal theory
returned to a commitment to sharp division between legislative and ju-
dicial roles, but with a twist. To preserve a meaningful role for and ex-
plain the existence of judicial review, scholars 60 altered the focus of
nullification of legislative decision from protecting non-democratic ide-
als, to purifying the democratic process so that it could better preserve
all of our ideals. Thus, courts did not denounce legislation simply be-
cause it conflicted with a fundamental or shared value enunciated in the
Constitution, rather they struck down particular legislation in order to
improve the implementation of democratically chosen substantive goals.
Although legislatures were best able to sum the amalgam of popular will
concerning the substance of a particular law, the courts could nonethe-
57. Brest, supra note 52, at 209-17.
58. Why should we feel privileged to impose a deterministic thought structure upon a
group of historical figures? That is, why should we be willing to believe that because the
framers were patriotic, they would have supported laws requiring people to say the pledge
of allegiance? Even if we could perform this intellectual exercise with some hope of accu-
racy, why predicate contemporary decisions on our speculation about how a group of ra-
cist, sexist, rich, white males would have handled a problem 200 years ago.
59. KELMAN, supra note 7, at 217; Brest, supra note 52, at 220-22.
60. Particularly, ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); see generally JESSE CHOPER, JU-
DICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
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less play an active role in shaping the process by which that substantive
law would be applied.
Ely contended that this approach would in fact improve upon de-
mocracy as a register of individual desire by correcting defects in the
legislative process. 6 1 In his view, judicial review is a means in which to
make a flawed democratic process less flawed, and hence, more demo-
cratic. True, the procedural choice requires discretion, but Ely consid-
ered the necessary discretion more limited than that required by
substantive decisions. "The question is what procedures are required to
treat the complainant this way, not whether the complainant can be
treated this way at all."
' 6 2
The obvious focus of Ely's theory was on voting rights and redis-
tricting decisions where judicial decisions actually made the process of
registering preference more democratic by including more people or
equalizing the strength of each vote. The more interesting aspect of
Ely's process theory focuses not on the process by which a legislature is
formed, but rather on the process by which a legislatively chosen sub-
stantive goal can be achieved. This inquiry has two components re-
ferred to (for familiarity sake) as an equal protection component and a
due process component.
The most attractive aspect of this approach for Ely was its equal
protection component. The problem is simply that the government or
government power is controlled by a rather elite group of individuals,
and their own values could reasonably be expected to overshadow and
disproportionately deemphasize those of other less vocal and less aware
groups. In other words, an apparently rule bound structure actually
contains built in mechanisms for allowing situation specific determina-
tions to be applied discriminatorally in favor of the powerful. When
dealing with any criminal issue involving discretion from search and
seizure, to guilt determinations, and ultimately to sentencing and capital
sentencing decisions, the disparity of position and lack of capacity for
empathy in the decision-maker is likely to be more acute. Police officers
are most surely to devalue the interests of those they search and arrest,
and sentencing judges or juries are likely to devalue the interests of
those who most often are the subject of capital sentencing decisions.
[A] discretionary system of selection always carries the po-
tential for invidious discrimination... Such systems amount to
failures of representation, in that those who make the laws (by
61. Paul Brest described the effort as follows:
John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust culminates a tradition of scholarly attempts
to establish modes ofjudicial review that leave the choice and accommodation of
values to legislatures and limit judicial intervention to assuring that legislatures
go about their business efficiently, representatively, and (in a quite limited sense)
fairly.
Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 131 (1981).
62. See ELY, supra note 51, at 21. For further justification, Ely harkened back to the
Hart and Sacks model contending, "what procedures are needed fairly to make what deci-
sions are the sorts of questions lawyers and judges are good at." Id.
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refusing effectively to make the laws) 63 have provided a buffer
to ensure that they and theirs will not effectively be subjected
to them.
64
The role of judicial review is "not simply to ensure that decisions are
being made democratically but also to reduce the likelihood that a differ-
ent set of rules is effectively being applied to the comparatively
powerless."
6 5
The due process component of the process model emphasizes less
an invidious intent on the part of the law makers, enforcers or adjudi-
cates, and more on the limitations of human decision making. No mat-
ter how democratic or rule bound a decision, the actual implementation
of a substantive value will often have to be achieved through a more or
less imperfect system--one that leaves room for situation specific evalu-
ation. For example, under this model the legislative choice is not that
the death penalty should be imposed in as many cases as possible, but
that it should be imposed when it is proper to do so. The role of proce-
dure is to advance the legislatively chosen "proper" substantive
decision.
By operating individual decision making systems on a regular basis,
courts are presumably best attuned to the procedure that is best able to
achieve the legislative goal. A decision, maker in any particular case may
be swayed by a number of irrelevancies, producing erroneous applica-
tions of the substantive legislative choice. The result is a frustration of
the democratically chosen legislative decision. The more serious the
consequences, the greater is the need to ensure that mistakes do not
occur. Courts can do this by imposing heightened safeguards.
6 6
In terms of the death penalty, Ely clearly preferred the equal pro-
tection method of analysis. 67 The eighth amendment, he wrote, "surely
had to do with a realization that in the context of imposing penalties too
there is tremendous potential for the arbitrary or invidious infliction of
'unusually' severe punishments on persons of various classes other than
'our own.' "68 The elite who inhabit or exert significant influence over
the legislature and who sit on the bench and even those who sit in the
jury box "don't commit murder very often, . . . but [they] do some-
times."' 69 That white, upper middle class people are never executed, for
63. This was Justice White's main contention in Furman. The legislature was refusing
to define who should be executed. Therefore, no one could be executed and the legisla-
tive will would not be frustrated. Whether White worried as Ely does that such discretion
is discriminatory remains an open question.
64. See ELY, supra note 61, at 177.
65. Id.
66. Theoretically, the opposite problem could occur. Sentencers and enforcers could
demonstrate too much restraint in carrying out the legislative will. By altering procedures,
courts could help increase positive outcomes just as it can limit overzealous pursuit of
legislative goals.
67. ELY, supra note 7, at 176. "Death being the ultimate and irreversible penalty, one
can at least strongly argue that a 'prophylactic equal protection' holding that capital pun-
ishment violates the Eighth Amendment is appropriate." Id.
68. Id. at 97.
69. Id.
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Ely, is demonstrative proof that the process is flawed. The role of the
courts is to invalidate laws that leave significant room for such unequal
application as the Court did in Furman.
Rather than face the difficult question of whether an invidious self-
protecting mechanism was at work in the drawing up and application of
capital punishment law, the Court has instead focused exclusively on de-
termining what process is due. Recognizing that death is the ultimate
criminal punishment, the Court has required greater procedural protec-
tion for capital defendants. The eighth amendment, it has declared, re-
quires a heightened standard of reliability realizable through more
elaborate procedures.
III. THE USE OF THE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
The heightened process demands of the eighth amendment in capi-
tal cases has centered on the development of a separate penalty trial.
After guilt is determined, a separate hearing occurs at which both sides
present evidence relevant to sentencing. In shaping the procedure of
this penalty trial, the Court has established two basic requirements.
First, the state must narrow the class of death eligible defendants. This
requirement forbids the states from simply requiring that all those con-
victed of first degree murder be executed. This prong of the Court's
procedural matrix is designed to rationalize the capital punishment sys-
tem. The legislature decides that murderers who fall within specific
guidelines should be executed. The sentencer determines whether a
particular defendant committed murder and whether his actions do in-
deed fall within those guidelines. If so, execution follows. The Court
has refrained, however, from discussing the substantive issue of which
circumstances are sufficiently aggravating to justify the death penalty.
Who deserves to die, according to the Court, remains a substantive
criminal law decision best left to the states. Thus, the only requirement
placed on the states by the federal Constitution is to establish a proce-
dure whereby the prosecution is required to prove something in addi-
tion to that proof necessary to establish that the defendant committed
an ordinary first degree murder in order to justify capital punishment.70
In reality, even this minimal requirement has proven impossible to im-
plement in a satisfying fashion. Any aggravating circumstance which is
chosen always includes too many or too few murderers to satisfy our
desire for situation specific consideration.
The second aspect of the penalty trial involves what evidence the
defense may present. By granting defendants a right to present and
have the sentencer consider all mitigating evidence, a measure of uni-
queness is introduced into every case, but with it comes irrationality.
Again, the Court has attempted to limit its holding to requiring states to
establish a procedure by which the defendant can present mitigating evi-
70. Vague aggravating circumstances are unconstitutional because they do not re-
quire the state to prove anything. When a circumstance could apply to any murder, the
state has no added burden of differentiating who should live from who should die.
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dence. Woodson appeared to leave the states free to make the substantive
decision of what factors mitigate against the use of capital punishment to
virtually the same extent it chose aggravating factors. Subsequent cases,
however, have overturned decisions in which the defendant was pre-
vented from presenting certain types of evidence. 7 1 In any event, the
problem remains that because weight cannot be placed on mitigating
evidence it will de-rationalize the decision by effectively permitting the
sentencer to refuse to impose the death penalty in any case.
7 2
A. Aggravating Circumstances
When the Supreme Court held the death penalty unconstitutional
in Furman, it criticized the standardless and unguided manner in which
juries and judges were asked to determine who lived and who died. The
wholly situation specific approach to capital sentencing was simply unac-
ceptable to a legal theory which was simultaneously committed to gen-
eral rules. In Gregg, the Court approved a system that permitted
unstructured consideration of mitigating evidence. In Zant, the Court
permitted the unstructured consideration of aggravating evidence.
Thus, the requirement that the state prove at least one aggravating cir-
cumstance must fulfill our entire desire for rule bound rationality.
73
71. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
72. If the Court were willing to rest on process protections alone, the most it could do
would be to remand any given case for a state court determination of relevance. The
Court has, however, abandoned the logical consistency of the pure process approach, and
gone further. It has held that evidence reflecting upon the character or record of the
defendant or the circumstances of the crime is relevant. In other situations, the Court has
gone even further, suggesting that the defendant must be permitted to introduce any evi-
dence relevant in the sense that it would tend to make the sentencer less likely to impose
the death penalty. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5.
Although it is true that any such inferences [drawn from post-crime prison
behavior] would not relate specifically to petitioner's culpability for the crime he
committed.., there is no question but that such inferences would be 'mitigating'
in the sense that they might serve 'as a basis for a sentence less than death.'
Id. at 1671 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604).
Recently, a plurality of the Court again suggested that the state bears the ultimate
responsibility for determining what evidence is relevant to the life and death decision.
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2330 (1988)(state must determine what is relevant).
Justice Powell expressed a similar view of the mitigating circumstance requirement in his
separate opinion in Skipper. He wrote:
But the [sitates, and not this Court, retain 'the traditional authority' to deter-
mine what particular evidence within the broad categories described in Lockett and
Eddings is relevant in the first instance. As long as those determinations are rea-
sonable - as long as they do not foreclose consideration of factors that may tend
to reduce the defendant's culpability for his crime .... this Court should respect
them .... It makes little sense, then, to substitute ourjudgment of relevance for
that of state courts and legislatures.
Skipper, 476 U.S. at 11, 15 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).
This interpretation would have limited the constitutional requirement to a procedure
by which defendants can present and sentencers must consider all evidence that the state
has determined relevant to the decision. As this article goes to press, the pendulum has
swung once again. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 57 U.S.L.W. 4958 (U.S.June 26, 1989) a sharply
divided Court significantly limited the state's power to define relevant mitigating evidence.
73. The Court's opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), probably also re-
quired a separate hearing focused exclusively on sentencing. Such a procedure would be
expected to focus the sentencer's attention more fully on the life and death decision, and
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Any other guidance provided by the statute through enumerated factors
could freely and constitutionally be disregarded by the jury so long as it
was "considered."
The aggravating circumstance requirement is so closely intertwined
with the substantive question of who should die, that the Supreme Court
has carefully avoided saying much about it. The state, the Court has
held, must narrow the class of death eligible defendants to some sub-
class of first degree murderers. This requirement alone is a significant
intrusion in the state's traditional province. It prevents a state from
making the substantive decision that all first degree murderers must die,
or from deciding that other heinous criminals should be eligible for the
death penalty.
The Court's efforts to define what narrowing the class of death eligi-
ble defendants really means has been difficult to explain. 74 The Court
has apparently approved a system where an aggravating circumstance
may be so vague that any reasonable person could conclude that any
first degree murderer falls into that category, as long as the circum-
stance is further defined in such a way that does not provide such a
sweeping interpretation. In Proffitt, for example, the Court recognized
that the Florida aggravating circumstance requirement that the murder
be "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" could make any capital de-
fendant death eligible. 75 The Court began by recognizing that although
susceptible to overly vague interpretation, these words could be defined
in a sufficiently specific way to satisfy the narrowing function. The Court
did not ask how a sentencer would likely define this requirement. 76 In-
stead, it considered the provision as it had "been construed by the
Supreme Court of Florida."' 77 Since the Florida high court had held that
it interpreted the circumstance to be limited to "the conscienceless or
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim," the provi-
sion did provide adequate assurances against the arbitrary infliction of
capital punishment.
The Court's treatment of the circumstance in Proffitt appears curi-
ous, but once one recognizes our dual commitment to both general
rules and case-by-case evaluation, the Court's approach becomes under-
standable. Unable to formulate a consistent rational system that satisfies
our dual belief structure, the Court has passed the task to the states.
the ultimate result would likely be somewhat more carefully considered. (Though any
judge or jury making the life and death decision in any circumstance is likely to give it
significant consideration). More focused consideration, however, is not necessarily any
more rationalized in the legal sense. Without rules to guide the jury, their decision is
standardless.
74. Presumably, the Court retains the weak form of rationality review that exists in
other areas. If a state adopts an aggravating factor that narrows the class of death eligible
defendants in a way that has no rational relationship to the defendant's blameworthiness
(e.g., hair color), the Court would likely strike down the requirement on ordinary due
process grounds.
75. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976).
76. In Florida, the jury only recommends a sentence to the trial judge, who then actu-
ally imposes the sentence. Id.
77. Id.
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Despite the Court's rhetoric, very little is specifically required and no
guidance is given to help the states discover the balance. The minimal
requirement of an aggravating circumstance that meaningfully narrows
the death eligible class is rendered meaningless by the Court's treatment
of the heinous, atrocious and cruel instruction. Apparently, the state
may utilize vague aggravating circumstances that arguably permit any
first degree murderer to be found death eligible so long as a state appel-
late court adopted a limiting definition and weeded out those cases
which did not fit the definition. 78 The Court even suggested that the
state need not explicitly rely on a declared limiting construction so long
as the facts of the case fit the limiting construction previously adopted. 79
The next case to deal with the aggravating circumstance require-
ment, Godfrey v. Georgia,80 placed some limit on the state's ability to util-
ize vague aggravating factors. However, Godfrey still left open the
possibility that a death sentence could be constitutional, if based upon a
vague aggravating circumstance in the first instance, provided an appel-
late court applied an appropriate limiting construction. In Godfrey, the
aggravating circumstance at issue permitted the sentencer to chose the
death penalty if the offense "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim." 8' Although the sentencing jury was in-
structed with the words of the statute, its verdict stated only that the
murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman."'8 2
The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the sentence stating only that the
jury's phrasing was not objectionable and that the evidence supported
the finding of the presence of the aggravating circumstance. The court
did not determine whether the offense involved torture or an aggravated
battery to the victim, although it had previously spoken in terms of the
presence or absence of these factors. 83
The Supreme Court held this application of the aggravating circum-
stance unconstitutional because the words relied upon by the jury failed
to limit its discretion and the trial court's instructions did nothing to
explain or define those terms in a way that would supply the requisite
78. Presumably, a state supreme court's limiting construction should be utilized by
trial courts in instructing the jury as to how to apply the aggravating circumstances. The
Court did not explicitly require this approach in Proffitt. A possible explanation is that
because capital sentencing in Florida is done by the trial judge, who can be expected to be
aware of the limiting construction, the original sentencer is not actually utilizing a vague
concept in determining whether death is the appropriate punishment in the first instance.
That the Court has never explicitly stated that the sentencer must be aware of the limiting
construction in subsequent cases dealing with aggravating circumstances indicates that the
Court's discomfort with any true rule bound system, rather than the peculiarities of the
Florida capital punishment scheme, are behind its treatment of the vague aggravating cir-
cumstance requirement.
79. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 n. 12.
80. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
81. Id. at 422. In Gregg, the Court had stated that this language, though potentially
vague, was susceptible to more limited constructions.
82. Id. at 426.
83. Id. at 427, 430-31.
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guidance. 8 4 The Georgia Supreme Court's affirmance of the death sen-
tence was insufficient to cure any vagueness problem, because it failed to
apply the limiting construction that it had previously utilized. Thus, its
decision was as tainted by the vagueness of the aggravating circumstance
as the sentencing jury's.
The aggravating circumstance requirement presents the clearest ap-
plication of our contradicting beliefs to the capital sentencing context.
When choosing aggravating factors, a state is choosing what considera-
tions are relevant and sufficient to justify a death sentence. The prob-
lem is that any articulation that is chosen will include some who should
not be executed and not include others who should, in terms of consid-
erations most would find very relevant. Under the Supreme Court's
precedents, a federal court should accord full deference to the state's
substantive choice, but strictly review its procedural mechanism.
Problems arise when a judge believes that a flawed mechanism produced
the right substantive result or a proper procedural decision is substan-
tively wrong. In either case, opinions can appeal to our commitment to
either rules or standards to justify whatever result is sought.
In 1986, the question of the constitutionality of Oklahoma's aggra-
vating circumstance, requiring the murder to be especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel, reached the Tenth Circuit in Cartwright v. Maynard.
85
Oklahoma sought to execute the defendant relying on an aggravating
circumstance nearly identical to that approved in Proffitt.8 6 The
Oklahoma courts had adopted a limiting construction of the circum-
stance also patterned after that used by the Florida supreme court. In
Cartwright, however, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
87
changed its position, declaring that it had "not defined the 'especially
heinous atrocious or cruel' aggravating circumstance [to require tor-
ture] .... While it is true that torture may be a sufficient factor to justify
a finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel...
it is not a necessary one."'8 8 Rather than rely on torture, the court
"deem[ed] it proper to gauge whether the murder was heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel in light of the circumstances attendant to the murder."
'8 9
84. Admittedly, the plurality opinion reads as if the Court simply disagreed with the
state's conclusion that this case was sufficiently more egregious than others to justify
death. In an opinion concurring in judgment, however, Justice Marshall correctly identi-
fied the issue as "whether the court below has adopted so ambiguous a construction of the
relevant provision that the universe of cases that it comprehends is impermissibly large,
thus leaving undue discretion to the decision maker and creating intolerable dangers of
arbitrariness and caprice." Id. at 435 n. 1 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
85. 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986).
86. The aggravating circumstance included the familiar phrase "especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel." Id. at 1218.
87. The Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest court in Oklahoma for reviewing
criminal matters.
88. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 554 (Okl. Crim. App.) cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911
(1985). Other Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cases, however, both before and after
Cartwight suggest that torture is a necessary factor. See Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 280
(Okla. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562,
563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
89. Cartwright, 695 P.2d at 554.
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After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Cartwright sought habeas
corpus relief. The state court's decision was upheld throughout state
habeas proceedings and by an Oklahoma federal district court. Cart-
wright then appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The majority panel opinion
began by reading Proffitt as broadly as possible, asserting that it estab-
lished that not only was the statutory language acceptable, but that the
sentencer did not have to be apprised of any limiting construction
through jury instructions, so long as some subsequent reviewing court
determined that the facts of the case comported with an acceptable limit-
ing construction. 90
Although one could read Proffitt in this manner, such a reading leads
to a strange result. The state can utilize completely standardless aggra-
vating factors that wholly fail to provide any guidance at the trial level,
as long as some reviewing authority makes the independent judgement
that the facts of the case meet the stricter limitations of the limiting con-
struction. Such a primary reliance on appellate fact finding is not a de-
sirable result if one maintains any commitment to the notion that
whoever hears the evidence is best able to interpret it.9 t The conserva-
tive Judges on the Cartwright panel certainly did not have an affinity for
appellate fact finding. But from a situation specific perspective, Cart-
wright appeared at least death eligible. 9 2 That he did not fit easily into
an established aggravating circumstance was insufficient to change the
result in the minds of these Judges, because our commitment to rule
bound systems is no stronger than our commitment to situational
analysis.93
The panel went on to consider Godfrey which it believed prohibited
an appellate court from abandoning an established, acceptable limiting
construction and relying on the bare, vague language of the statute it-
self.9 4 After a brief review of Oklahoma cases considering the heinous,
atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance, the court concluded that
the circumstance at issue had been applied in an inconsistent manner
violating Godfrey. State cases both before and after Cartwright adopted
90. Cartwright, 802 F.2d at 1221.
91. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985) (extending broad pre-
sumption of correctness to trial court fact findings in Title VII context). See Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (MarshallJ., concurring in judgment) (unless the sentencer
is apprised of the narrowing construction, it is effectively granted unbridled discretion).
92. Cartwright had tortured his victim's companion. Although she did not die, she
was certainly tortured in a meaningful sense.
93. A more coherent reading of Proffitt would have noted that in the Florida system,
the jury serves only an advisory role, while the court does the actual sentencing. Since the
court would be aware of the limiting construction, someone who had actually heard the
evidence would be applying the proper law to the facts in the first instance. The panel
simply ignored this distinction and held that even when the jury does the sentencing, it
need not be told of the limiting construction.
94. Cartwright, 802 F.2d at 1220. In Godfrey, however, the sentencing jury had been
instructed in a manner that apprised it of the limiting construction at least to the extent
that the statute itself contained some limiting language. Thejury simply omitted this lan-
guage from its verdict. Thus, although the Godfrey Court noted that nothing in the trial
court's instructions cured the vagueness problem, it did not hold that a vague aggravating
circumstance could be presented to an ultimate sentencer without any suggestion of a
limiting construction.
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the Florida torture construction, while Cartwright claimed to rely on a
totality of the circumstances approach. The Tenth Circuit concluded,
however, "that this departure is harmless because once the evidence is
measured against the correct standard it is clear the killing ... satisfies
the test." 9 5 Obviously, the Tenth Circuit was seeking to eliminate the
effect of the procedural error because it believed the substantive result
correct. The court's belief that it had the power to make this decision,
however, misreads Godfrey. Therein, the plurality did not determine that
the particular facts of the case were not sufficiently egregious to justify
an execution, but rather the Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court
had approved the sentence by relying on an unconstitutionally vague
aggravating circumstance. 9 6 This reliance on procedure prevented the
federal courts from intruding into the state's province, and simultane-
ously freed the federal courts from the impossible task of resolving the
conflict between our desire for the rule of law to govern capital punish-
ment and our equally strong belief that individual circumstances must
be considered. When commitment to a procedural rule conflicts with
our commitment to individual determination, courts are pulled from
strict adherence to the procedural system and the compromise breaks
down.
The Tenth Circuit's commitment to individualized culpability deter-
mination led the panel opinion further astray than this misreading of
Godfrey. The panel did not simply conclude that Cartwright tortured his
victims, and therefore, had the Oklahoma high court applied the limiting
construction approved in Proffitt and its own earlier cases, the death sen-
tence would have stood. Instead, the Tenth Circuit first found that
Oklahoma did not rely solely on the presence of torture, but rather ap-
plied a combination of factors test.9 7 The court then curiously noted
that this test was applied by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in
Cartwright. Was the court changing its mind from one paragraph to the
next? If the Oklahoma high court applied an appropriate construction,
affirmance should have been routine.
After reciting the facts, the court then stated that all it meant was
that in Oklahoma, consideration of the combination of facts was merely
used to determine if the defendant had "tortured" the victim. In other
words, the vague aggravating circumstance was limited by requiring tor-
ture, but torture was defined only with reference to the particular facts
of the case. Following this articulation of the law, the court concluded
that "[o]ur independent evaluation of the evidence supports the conclu-
sion of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that Cartwright's acts
were unnecessarily torturous."
9 8
Despite its inconsistency, the panel opinion initially appeared to un-
95. Cartwright, 802 F.2d at 1221.
96. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427, 430-31.
97. The considerations in addition to torture to the victim included the manner of
killing, the circumstances surrounding the homicide, and the killer's attitude. Cartwright,
802 F.2d at 1221.
98. Id.
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derstand its role as a process policer. It did not purport to impose its
own limiting construction or in any way suggest what sort of limiting
construction the state should apply. This approach properly left the
substantive choice of who should die to the state.
The problem with the panel opinion, however, is that once it found
a process error, it sought to avoid reversal because it believed that the
correct substantive result had been reached. Properly unwilling to sup-
ply its own limiting construction, however, the panel was required to
reverse. Cartwright had been sentenced to die because his action was
judged to have satisfied an aggravating factor that any murderer might
have satisfied. All the state appellate court did was review all the evi-
dence presented to the jury and found that it agreed that this murderer
was heinous, atrocious or cruel, and therefore deserving of death. 99 No
state body applied a sufficiently definite limiting construction that
clearly separated this murder from ones in which execution would be
inappropriate. The panel affirmed, however, because it agreed with the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that this murder was sufficiently
aggravated to justify death.
Under the procedural system developed by the Supreme Court,
neither the state nor federal court's belief that a particular murder is
sufficiently aggravated is relevant. A rational standard applicable to all
cases must have been developed and met. Neither the Oklahoma courts,
nor the panel expressed such a standard, so the death sentence had to
be reversed. Yet, a jury hearing all conceivable relevant evidence ex-
pressed its belief that this defendant deserved to die. Obviously, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and a panel of the Tenth Circuit
agreed. If this man so clearly deserved to be executed in the minds of
close to twenty people,' 0 0 why should reversal be required? The an-
swer, "because he did not fit within the established rule" is not very
satisfying.
If pressed for an answer, one might address the panel opinion by
noting that after struggling to give proper weight to the states' substan-
tive choices, the panel ended up totally ignoring the state's duty to make
those substantive choices by upholding a death sentence based on its
99. The concurring opinion of Judge Tacha recognized that the state court's pur-
ported reliance on "all of the events surrounding a murder fails to 'channel the sentencer's
discretion by "clear and objective standards" that provide "specific and detailed gui-
dance," and that "make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death.' " Cartwright, 802 F.2d at 1224 (Tacha, J. specially concurring) (citing Godfrey, 446
U.S. at 428). Judge Tacha concurred, however, because she felt that a proper limiting
construction could have been defined as suffering inflicted on a surviving victim. Since the
Oklahoma courts had not rejected this limiting construction and it was present in Cart-
wright, she agreed with the result. Her mistake, however, was obvious. A federal court has
no business making the substantive choice of what limiting construction is proper. If the
state has not fulfilled its duty to properly "channel the sentencer's discretion" by making
the difficult substantive choice about who should die, a federal court may not uphold the
state's standardless decision to impose a death sentence simply by supplying an appropri-
ate standard that was met in the case.
100. The twenty minds include the members of the jury and all reviewing appellate and
habeas judges prior to consideration by the Tenth Circuit, en banc.
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own standardless evaluation of the evidence. A federal court's compe-
tency to read the record and determine whether a murder was heinous,
atrocious, or cruel is no greater than a state appellate court's. Federal
courts are not somehow above the need for a proper limiting construc-
tion. Thus, the panel's conclusion that the sentence could stand be-
cause it felt the murder was sufficiently aggravated was an improper
assertion of federal power into a substantive choice that, under the
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, properly belonged to the
state. 10 1
Rehearing the question en banc, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
panel decision, essentially adopting this reasoning. First, the court re-
versed the panel's erroneous interpretation of Proffitt by making the un-
remarkable observation that a vague, aggravating factor that is cured by
a narrowing construction cannot serve its function of narrowing the
class of death eligible defendants, unless the sentencer knows of the nar-
rowing construction.1
0 2
Second, the court held that the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach to limiting the aggravating factor adopted by the Oklahoma
courts and approved by the panel opinion was really no limit at all. Un-
less the state courts said what was not heinous, atrocious or cruel, the
sentencer's discretion was left unchanneled. An extensive review of
Oklahoma case law revealed that after initially adopting the Florida con-
struction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals abandoned any at-
tempt to limit the application of the aggravating circumstance. States
have the right to make the substantive choice of determining who should
live and who should die, but they also have the responsibility to make
that choice. When a state refuses to define an aggravating circumstance
in a concrete way, it abdicates that duty, just as did the states that em-
ployed the standardless laws, which were struck down in Furman.'
0 3
Finally, the court held that unlike Georgia, where the state courts
had consistently followed a limiting construction, but merely failed to
use it in one case, the Oklahoma courts had no consistent instruction for
the en banc court to apply. 10 4 A federal court cannot make the substan-
tive choice as to whether a particular defendant should live or die and
impose that choice on the state. An appellate court reweighing the evi-
101. In reality, of course, the state would have no more luck satisfying both desires for
clear rules and situational justice.
102. The court stated that its role was to "decide whether this construction serves to
'channel the sentencer's discretion by "clear and objective standards" that provide "spe-
cific and detailed guidance," and that "make rationally reviewable the process for impos-
ing a sentence of death.' " Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1489 (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428).
Obviously, if the sentencer's discretion is to be channeled, it must know the channeling
factor.
103. "[I]f a [sitate wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional re-
sponsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty." Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
104. The Godfrey plurality only determined that the Georgia Supreme Court did not
apply an adequate limiting construction, it did not reweigh the facts. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at
432-33.
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dence must have rational guidance to channel its discretion, just as the
original sentencer must.
Although the en banc court could be commended for following the
Supreme Court's lead in relying on a pure procedural model, it is none-
theless unsatisfying. A state must make rules to determine who should
die, and those rules must be clear. The problem remains that any rule a
state attempts to use will be both over and under inclusive. The clearer
the aggravating circumstance is, the more apparent this problem be-
comes. The court, in so convincingly restating the Supreme Court's
procedural solution, simply ignored the state's problem of trying to in-
clude all who should die within its capital punishment scheme. Nothing
in the en banc court's reasoning helped Oklahoma resolve this problem.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Tenth Circuit's treat-
ment of the constitutionality of the aggravating circumstance issue. It
similarly left unanswered, however, the question of how a state could
resolve the problem. Although the Court left open the possibility that a
vagueness problem could be cured by the application of a proper limit-
ing construction on appellate review, it flatly rejected the notion that
state's could adopt such constructions post-hoc, stating: "It [Godfrey]
plainly rejected the submission that a particular set of facts surrounding
a murder, however shocking they might be, were enough in themselves,
and without some narrowing principle to apply to those facts, to warrant
the imposition of the death penalty."' 1 5 The point to note about the
Court's decision is that the discretion condemned here is as much the
discretion not to impose a death sentence as the discretion to impose it.
If the Court was worried solely about erroneous death sentences, partic-
ularly egregious facts would be sufficient to justify execution. Because
the problem is not simply an erroneous sentence in a particular case, but
the special problem of unguided discretion in the capital context, the
state must fulfill its responsibility of making at least a general, limiting
choice of who should live and who should die through specific aggravat-
ing circumstances.
The Court has thus forced states wishing to impose the death pen-
alty to adopt a rule equally applicable in all cases and more or less ra-
tionally applicable to a given set of facts. In other words, the Court is
requiring states to control capital sentencing through the rule of law.
With such a rule, the sentencer will more clearly know that one who
violates the rule should die under the substantive state law. Thus, only
with a clear rule does the jury's ability to reason replace its expression of
its desire. The problem remains, however, that in a strong sense we are
committed to the notion that an expression of desire may well be a more
accurate determinate of who should die. 1
0 6
105. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1859 (1988).
106. The Court's unanimous opinion in Hitchcock, decided almost a year to the day
before Cartwright came down, specifically required states to give content to our yearning
for situation specific justice in the capital punishment context through consideration of
mitigating evidence.
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B. Mitigating Evidence
The defendant's right to present mitigating evidence has been more
fully articulated by the Court. The justification for the right and its
scope, however, have been difficult for the Court to explain. By refusing
to allow a state to require sentencers to adhere to strict rules to govern
factors that should discourage the sentencer from imposing the death
penalty, the Court has required the states to retain a portion of the arbi-
trariness condemned in Furman. This requirement seems clearly
designed to satisfy our commitment to situation specific evaluation. The
Court, however, has refrained from proclaiming that the states can set
no limit on the defendant's right to present mitigating evidence. It has
merely stated that a defendant must be able to present any evidence
relating to his character or record, or the circumstances of his of-
fense.10 7 Like the concept of limiting death eligibility in the aggravating
circumstance context, however, the term "character" has proven ex-
tremely difficult to define. The more strictly states are permitted to limit
sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence, the more the sentenc-
ing decision will resemble a rational deductive process derived from the
requirements of the state's death penalty law.
In the past year, the Tenth Circuit has had two opportunities to deal
with the relevance question in mitigating evidence situations. In both
cases, the courts' opinions demonstrate the judge's inability to follow
the logical progression of the process model, and their unwillingness to
establish affirmative substantive guidelines. The commands of the
Supreme Court justify this latter approach, but passing the difficult
questions to the state with no offer of guidance will not lead to a
solution.
In Dutton v. Brown,10 8 the Tenth Circuit was faced with a state court
decision to exclude the testimony of the defendant's mother because she
had not been sequestered during trial. The principle that state evidence
law could not be mechanistically applied to circumvent a defendant's
right to present mitigating evidence was well established. 10 9 Neverthe-
less, the panel opinion found no constitutional error. Although the
court's reasoning was far from clear, it seems to have recognized that
the issue was whether the state court denied the defendant his right to
present relevant mitigating evidence.1 10 It then attempted to construct
107. The Court's articulation of the defendant's right to present mitigating evidence
has progressed as follows: In Woodson, the Court held that "individual culpability is not
always measured by the category of the crime committed." Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 298 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger,
CJ., concurring)). Lockett followed by declaring that a constitutional right existed to pres-
ent evidence of the defendant's character, and record, and the circumstances of the of-
fense. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Following Lockett, the Court simply
emphasized that it meant for Lockett to be interpreted broadly. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). No opinion commanding a
majority of the Court has yet to approve of a state statute, instruction or evidentiary ruling
that limited the introduction of evidence by the defense.
108. 788 F.2d 669, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1986).
109. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) per curiam.
110. Although the claim was apparently raised as an ineffective assistance challenge,
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an unsupported logical argument for affirmance that turned the sub-
stance/process distinction on its head."'
The state court did not deny the introduction of mitigating evi-
dence with reference to its substantive death penalty law, reversing the
decision for failure to comply with federal procedural standards would
therefore have been easy to justify. Agreeing with the substantive deci-
sion to impose the death sentence, the Tenth Circuit struggled to find
another solution. The panel argued that the trial judge was not aware
that no other witness was available to present the evidence that Dutton's
mother sought to present. "Because the court was not aware of the ef-
fect of its ruling, we cannot say it precluded mitigating evidence.", 12
The court apparently reasoned that excluding a particular witness'
testimony should not be construed as prohibiting the defendant from
presenting the evidence in question, because he could do so through
other sources. While this reasoning may be correct when a sufficient
number of other witnesses are available, a trial court's decision to pre-
clude the introduction of relevant mitigating testimony without any indi-
cation that the evidence could come from other sources must be
constitutional error. The sentencer in such a case was required to make
the life or death decision without the benefit of relevant mitigating evi-
dence that the defendant sought to present." 3 The constitutional error
must be founded on the state action's effect on the defendant, rather
than the state actor's culpability. The right is guaranteed to the defend-
ant, and it does not matter why he was improperly prohibited from exer-
cising it.
Perhaps realizing the tenuous nature of its logic, the court con-
cluded that "the evidence Mrs. Dutton would have offered would have
been irrelevant to the issue of mitigation; therefore, petitioner has failed
to show how he was prejudiced by this ruling.1' 14 Thus, after elaborat-
ing a sketchy, novel theory for affirming, the court concluded by an-
the court's opinion demonstrates that it recognized the right to present mitigating evi-
dence was at issue. Dutton v. Brown, 788 F.2d 669, 674 (10th Cir. 1986).
111. The court began by noting that part of the excluded testimony was duplicitous.
(The trial court had not relied on this ground). Even if technically duplicitous, in the
context of capital sentencing where the test is generally whether a particular factor could
have had an effect on sentencing, the added emphasis provided by live testimony from the
victim's mother would certainly remain relevant. Perhaps realizing the irrelevance of its
first twig of support, the panel noted that the state court had discretion under state law to
strictly enforce its sequestration rule. Id. If the defendant has a federal constitutional
right to present the evidence, however, a state procedural rule to the contrary would be
irrelevant.
112. Id.
113. Interesting questions arise concerning the use of a state law basis for denying a
defendant a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution. When a defendant attempts to
assert that right in a timely fashion, state law bars are at their weakest. At the sentencing
phase of a capital trial, the bars must be weaker still. The state interest (avoiding a rede-
termination of sentence) is virtually non-existent while the defendant's interest (avoiding
execution) is paramount. Even if an attorney should generally be responsible for inform-
ing the court that no other avenue exists to introduce the evidence, his failure to do so
cannot permit a death sentence to stand where the sentencer has not had access to rele-
vant mitigating evidence that the defendant tried to present.
114. Id. at 674-75.
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nouncing without any inquiry into the circumstances, that the evidence
was not relevant mitigating evidence. The state court could therefore
have properly precluded its introduction even in the absence of the se-
questration rule.
Although piecing together the judges' beliefs about the basis for
affirmance is difficult, the opinion suggests that had the evidence been
relevant, in their opinion, the death penalty could not have stood. This
view is precisely the opposite of that engendered by the sub-
stance/process distinction. Instead of granting deference to the state's
formulation of what evidence is relevant to the death penalty question,
while strictly policing the state's procedure to ensure that the state's
substantive choices are imposed through a process that ensures a
heightened standard of reliability, the panel did the opposite. It de-
ferred to state procedural law that had the effect of denying the defend-
ant the right to present evidence, while taking upon itself the task of
assessing whether the evidence was relevant.
Not surprisingly, the en banc Tenth Circuit reversed. 1i5 The court
began by assuming that the evidence was likely to be relevant mitigating
evidence because of "the record in this case, as well as the context of the
proceeding and the nature of the witness. ' 16 Once making that as-
sumption, the conclusion that the defendant could not be precluded
from introducing the evidence was clear. Nevertheless, the court care-
fully set out the relevant Supreme Court precedent dealing with mitigat-
ing evidence. It demonstrated that following that precedent, a state
procedure that denied the introduction of potentially relevant mitigat-
ing evidence violated the eighth amendment. The state court's enforce-
ment of its sequestration order had that effect in this case, and was thus,
unconstitutional as applied." 1
7
The en banc court's opinion in Dutton expresses either confusion
about, or an unwillingness to deal with the question of relevance. The
en banc opinion continually stated that Mrs. Dutton's testimony was rele-
vant mitigating evidence. Admittedly, this conclusion does flow easily
from the relevant Supreme Court cases. The en banc court never at-
115. Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
116. Id. at 599.
117. The court cited the following cases as reaching a similar conclusion: Wright v.
State, 473 So.2d 1277, 1280 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094 (1986); Ex parte Fair-
cloth, 471 So.2d 493, 496 (Ala. 1985) (sequestration rule cannot support denial of consti-
tutional rights); Allen v. State, 277 Ark. 380, 641 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1982); Cobb v. State,
244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979); Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1972)
(sequestration rule cannot be used to prevent evidence favorable to criminal defendant in
any situation).
The original panel members concurred in the courts reversal of their prior decision;
however, they again stressed what they saw as the importance of what the trial court knew
about the testimony. "Defense counsel's opening remarks," they wrote, "informed the
court of what he intended to show through the testimony of his witnesses. These remarks
(.. [left] no doubt that [Mrs. Dutton] would present relevant mitigating evidence." Dutton,
812 F.2d at 603. The mechanistic application of the sequestration rule in this situation was
constitutional error. If the trial judge had not been "told what the defense witnesses were
going to say," his decision to prevent the defendant's mother from testifying would not, in
their view, have been constitutional error. Dutton, 812 F.2d at 604 n.2.
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tempted, however, to explain why the state could not determine that this
evidence was irrelevant. The most the reader can cull from the opinion
is that Skipper adopted a broad definition of "character," and therefore,
testimony that a defendant was a "slow learner" or a "follower" were
obviously relevant. Even though the federal district court and the panel
opinion had reached the opposite conclusion, the court did not attempt
to provide any guidance beyond citing Skipper. " ' 8 Thus, as in Cartwright,
the en banc court managed to follow precedent. Once again, however the
court failed to provide any guidance to the state that would lead to the
elimination of arbitrary death sentences.
The need for guidance became apparent later in the year when the
circuit was presented with another relevant mitigating evidence question
in Robison v. Maynard. 1 9 Therein, the defendant sought to prevent the
victim's sister from testifying that she did not think the defendant should
be executed. The trial court excluded the testimony on the ground that
it was irrelevant.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the proffered evidence
was not relevant. The court viewed the evidence as an individual opin-
ion on the appropriateness of the death penalty. If such opinions were
considered relevant, the court believed, courts would have to permit the
prosecution to present opinion testimony that the death penalty was ap-
propriate. The court concluded that the introduction of conflicting
opinions to the calculus would merely add arbitrariness to the process.
In reaching its conclusion, the court compared the issue to that in
Booth v. Maryland,12 0 where the Supreme Court held that statements
describing the impact of the crime on surviving members of the victim's
family were inadmissible at the sentencing phase. The rationale in Booth
was that such evidence is irrelevant to the life or death decision, because
it does not reflect upon the defendant's "personal responsibility and
moral guilt." Yet, when faced with questions involving mitigating evi-
dence with a questionable relation to the defendant's moral culpability,
the Court has been much less willing to permit the -exclusion of
evidence. 12'
The Robison panel ignored the apparent conflict between Booth and
Skipper, reading Booth as granting trial courts broad discretion to exclude
118. Id. at 601.
119. 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987).
120. 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2533 (1987).
121. Skipper, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). Consistency in this area is not readily apparent; how-
ever, Justice Stewart's proclamation in Gregg that nothing prevents the state's from grant-
ing mercy on any particular defendant might provide the answer. Perhaps the Court now
reads the Constitution to require the state to permit the defendant to present whatever
evidence might encourage the sentencer to grant mercy, but limiting the prosecution to
evidence related to moral culpability. Such a procedure would neither intrude on the
state's province of defining the substantive basis of death penalty law nor conflict with
dogma that the eighth amendment requires a heightened standard of reliability before a
state can execute a defendant. If a defendant has free reign to put before the sentencer
anything it chooses while the state is limited to evidence of blameworthiness, then a sen-
tencer's decision to execute would be quite reliable in the sense that only the worst cases
should result in death.
1989]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
any evidence from the sentencing trial that might de-rationalize the deci-
sion. Under this view, any evidence that does not relate to culpability
would make the sentence less reliable in the sense that it will distract the
sentencer from the culpability question. A majority of the Supreme
Court, however, has never adopted the notion that culpability (however
it is defined) is necessarily the question the sentencer must answer. In-
deed, the Court's mitigating circumstances cases suggest that the de-
fendant must be given the opportunity to present a much wider array of
evidence than any standard definition of culpability would yield. Per-
haps testimony by the victim's relatives stretches the apparent unfair-
ness of permitting the defendant broader latitude than the state in
presenting evidence further than necessary. The panel's failure to even
discuss the mitigating circumstance cases, however, is disturbing even if
its result is correct.
More troubling than the Robison court's disturbing reading of Booth,
however, was its apparent willingness to tell the states what is relevant to
the life and death decision. The defendant had argued that the retribu-
tive value of execution in part justified the continued existence of capital
punishment. That the victim's sister did not think the death penalty ap-
propriate in a particular case certainly appeared relevant to the retribu-
tive value of the penalty in that case. The court refused to engage this
problem. Instead, it found a broad limitation on the introduction of
mitigating evidence in Lockett. Although recognizing that under the or-
dinary understanding of relevance "relevant mitigating evidence is that
which suggests the penalty should not be imposed,"' 2 2 the court went
on to assert that "the universe of that evidence is circumscribed by Lock-
ett's holding that mitigating evidence is that which applies to either the
character or record of the defendant or to any of the circumstances of
the offense."' 123 Since a witness's personal opinion of whether the pen-
alty should be imposed does not reflect upon the defendant's character
or record, "[siuch testimony, at best, would be a gossamer veil which
would blur the jury's focus on the issue it must decide."'
12 4
On the surface, the Court's treatment of the issue is troubling in
that the Supreme Court has never read Lockett as placing a limitation on
the defendant's right to present evidence. On the contrary, the Court,
though repeatedly parroting Lockett's language, has pressed beyond the
limits of Lockett's original holding.
Aside from completely ignoring the obvious implications of the
Court's post-Lockett cases, the Robison panel's references to arbitrariness
suggest that some constitutional limitation may prohibit the states from
permitting sentencer consideration of the victim's family's views on the
appropriate penalty, when those views mitigate against death. But, if the
state retains the power to make the substantive decision as to who de-
serves to die, why could not the state determine that the death penalty is
122. Robison, 829 F.2d at 1504.
123. Id. at 1504-05.
124. Id. at 1505.
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only justifiable if it serves a very strong retributive purpose in the indi-
vidual case? 125 A state could require statements showing that the vic-
tim's friends and family were not unanimously opposed to execution as
a prerequisite to death eligibility. Under such a scheme, if those who
knew and cared about the victim did not think the death penalty appro-
priate, the retributive value of that particular execution might well be
too insubstantial to justify execution. Only by letting the sentencer con-
sider such evidence could the heightened standard of reliability be main-
tained. Even if the retributive value of an execution to society in general
is considered relevant, the retributive value of any one execution to soci-
ety when the victim's friends and family thought it inappropriate should
be quite small.
12 6
The Robison case provided more guidance to the states than either
the Cartwright or Dutton en banc opinions. The court set out its belief that
introducing non-culpability related mitigating evidence made the deci-
sion more "arbitrary." States could, and should, the court intimated,
make capital sentencing decisions more rational by excluding such evi-
dence. This advise might be helpful if all that mattered was rule bound
rationality. Should a state attempt to follow this advise, however, our




The Tenth Circuit's recent experience with both the aggravating
125. In a separate opinion in Skipper, Justice Powell suggested that the Constitution
should not be read to require a state to permit the introduction of mitigating evidence
unrelated to culpability, however, even Justice Powell did not suggest that the Constitution
forbade the introduction of such evidence. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 11 (Powell,J., dissenting in
part and concurring in judgment).
126. If the society at large wanted a particular execution more than the victim's family,
one would have to wonder whether misinformation or an improper understanding of the
situation exerted overinfluence upon the popular opinion.
127. Recently, both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
standardless consideration of mitigating circumstances. The Circuit did so in the context
of an instruction prohibiting the jury from considering sympathy for the defendant. Parks
v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
The majority held that in order to effectuate the constitutional requirement that the sen-
tencer consider all mitigating aspects of the defendant's character; the eighth amendment
prohibits trial courts from instructing the jurors to disregard all sympathy for the defend-
ant. The dissenting opinion retorted that such a holding undermines the constitutional
requirement of "reasoned, channeled, reliable and reviewable sentences." Id. at 1569-70
(Anderson, J., concurring and dissenting in part). The Supreme Court attacked the ques-
tion of whether a state could limit the purposes for which a sentencer could consider the
mitigating evidence presented to it. Penry v. Lynaugh, 57 U.S.L.W. 4958 (U.S. June 26,
1989). The majority held that the constitutional mandate of individualized evaluation of
capital defendants requires a state to provide the sentencer with a means to "give effect"
to mitigating evidence through the imposion of a life sentence. The dissent responded
much as Judge Anderson had declaring that "the line of cases following Gregg sought to
eliminate precisely the unpredictability [the Court's holding] produces." (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). The six to four split in the circuit and five to four
split on the Court on this issue demonstrates that nearly two decades of ignoring the irrec-
oncilability between our commitment to regularized rules and open ended standards in
the context of capital punishment has moved us no closer to a choice of either pole or to
some equilibrium compromise solution.
19891
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
and mitigating circumstance requirements demonstrates the inherent ir-
resolvability of the problem of our simultaneous commitment to rule
bounded rationality and situation specific determination within the ex-
isting system. Rules provide predictability, but they do not lessen arbi-
trariness. Any rule a state may devise will produce arbitrary results.
Clearly not every murderer who fits any defined category will deserve to
die.
Rules simply take the human element out of the decision. If all the
human element meant was the introduction of irrational prejudices into
the system, its sacrifice would be desirable. But the human element
must mean more than that. It includes qualities of compassion, experi-
ence, understanding and desert that no system of rules can accurately
simulate.
The law now tries to overcome rules' inherent shortcoming by re-
quiring sentencers to consider any mitigating factors that defendants in-
troduce. The apparent goal is to mitigate the distorting over-inclusive
effect that will inhere in any rule chosen to distinguish who should live
from who should die. The problem is not solved, however, because
murderers who do not fit the rule will also be deserving of death, and
under the current system, they would not qualify. If preventing im-
proper execution of those wrongly included by a rule is constitutionally
required, it must also be constitutionally problematic that one no more
culpable than another is executed simply because he fits within a rule,
and the other does not.
The only answer to this latter sort of arbitrariness is a broad case by
case consideration of the desert of each particular defendant. This was
forbidden by the Court in Furman, because it does not comport with our
commitment to the notion that a decision, especially one as serious as an
execution, should not be made without strict rule bound rationality.
The Court's retreat to procedure merely transfers the unanswerable
question to the states. Whenever the states attempt to solve it one way
or the other, the federal courts demonstrate uneasiness with the deci-
sion. The Tenth Circuit's recent cases demonstrate that judges are still
haunted by the underlying contradiction. Society wants predictability
and rationality, but craves fairness. It has yet to find a way to have both.
The Supreme Court has commanded leaving the substantive choice
to the states, because the Court cannot solve it. Those decisions like
Robison, that try to guide the states toward an acceptable death penalty
by ignoring our commitment to one ideal or the other, can be criticized
under existing Supreme Court cases for intruding upon the states' sub-
stantive choices. Reversals that offer states no guidance, justified as pro-"
cess decisions, demonstrate our inability to accept either a general rule
or situation specific decision making system. Even those en banc cases
that have tried to follow the pure process model set up by the Supreme
Court are unsatisfying. They do nothing to explain why one person
should die and another should not, and they tell the state nothing about
how to make the decision.
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REFLECTIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Court's adoption of the process model masks our conflicting
desires, but it cannot satisfy them. The model cannot resolve the con-
tradiction through compromise, most fundamentally because purifying
the process to precisely articulate the legislative will cannot correct er-
rors inherent in the formulation of the legislative will. Groups that tend
to be outside the political process are unlikely to have their views articu-
lated in a legislative body. Death eligible defendants, one would expect,
do not comprise any sort of politically influential group that might exert
the slightest influence over legislative choice.12 8 When this lack of voice
to those most effected is combined with the uninformed fervent public
support for the death penalty in many areas, legislatures would be ex-
pected to make a far from optimal choice on when particular defendants
should be executed.1
2 9
The underlying premise of the process model is that in some sense,
the current legislative decision making process is basically legitimate.
Except for isolated areas of irrational prejudice, the interests of all are
considered. The problem, however, is that the uncontroversial political
system, which a system of process review is designed to support, simply
does not exist. Those advancing the process model are oblivious "to a
particular type of malfunctioning; the routine political ineffectiveness
and quiescence-rooted in social and economic inequality--of masses of
ordinary citizens." 
130
Judges, because of their position, are acutely aware that they are
better able to understand, fairly evaluate, and react to arguments against
capital punishment. Life tenure removes most of the political pressure,
and regular dealings with criminals and the criminal process make them
better able to incorporate all relevant considerations into a calculus of
the optimal capital punishment decision.
128. One might argue that such people are unworthy of a say. But if socially optimal
choice is based on the most complete and accurate information, why should the typical
voter's uninformed view about the death penalty mean anything, much less be paramount?
Although there are good reasons to consider the typical voter's views on capital punish-
ment, the views of those closer to the actual infliction of the punishment are certainly
relevant. Some might argue that such opinions are most relevant. To paraphrase Paul
Brest: However sincerely I hold a moral view on capital punishment, it is-by contrast to
one more likely to actually face execution-an essentially irresponsible view. Cf. Brest,
supra note 52, at 139.
129. A few years ago, I was living in California during a campaign to determine
whether three of the state's supreme court justices would retain their positions. A great
deal of money was spent to convince the public that these justices would not permit the
state to enforce its death penalty. The deception exceeded even that of the 1988 presiden-
tial campaign. More importantly, however, the money from the campaign came from cor-
porate interests that sought the removal of the liberal justices more for their tort and
commercial law decisions than for their death penalty decisions. Thus, capital punishment
served as a tool for large corporate interests to attain a court favorable to them. Had the
public known the specifics of the issues with which the corporations were most concerned,
it may have had an entirely different opinion of the justices.
130. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - and its Future, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223, 249
(1981). Parker notes several ways in which the process school's concern with a focus on
prejudice (and the power generated through the outcome of particular cases) masks the
real problems of unequal power distribution, unequal participation, private power distri-
bution, and socialization of the masses to be both willing and wanting to subject them-
selves to the will of others. See id. at 250.
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The assumption underlying the process based solution is so obvi-
ously incorrect in the capital punishment area, judges realizing the prob-
lem must at some level feel compelled to do something about it. This is
especially true in that the compelling intellectual force of Ely's process
based position rested on an assumption that judges could legitimately
purify the process through decision. When process purification appears
impossible, judges are much more likely to press hard for the result they
believe a truly pure process would produce. But within our existing so-
cial thought system, the effort is futile.
The persistence of process based solutions results from the unshak-
able fortitude of the human spirit. If we could simply clear out the irra-
tional prejudices, democracy will produce the right answers. That is, a
system of rule bound rational decision that produces situation specific
fairness will be possible. The hope for a better solution should certainly
not be scorned at. The blind faith in established institutions and the
pure deception contained therein, however, only hinder the develop-
ment of a true solution. Why should a judicial decision (made by one
trained to solve problems in the best interests of society after hearing
and considering the self-interested arguments on both sides of the dis-
pute) be considered illegitimate, while the decision of legislatures
(predominantly controlled by self-interested lobbyists and the shifting
moods of middle of the road voters) be considered legitimate?
A truly just system of capital punishment requires that we struggle
with such questions. Cases may eventually begin to appear consistent,
however, this result comes at the expense of a commitment to either
rule bound rationality or situation specific evaluation. When courts ac-
tually struggle with the decision, as the Tenth Circuit has, any apparent
consistency will break down. Sweeping the problem under the rug by
manufacturing a false sense of stability, as the Court may be attempting
through recent unanimous opinions, only masks what will inevitably re-
surface. Admitting that a conflict pervades our beliefs about crime and
punishment alone provides no answer. It would, however, allow legisla-
tures, judges, and legal scholars to begin working on a true solution. A
serious reconsideration of many of our beliefs and institutions may be in
order, but we will never be sure until we are brave enough to look be-
hind the historical accidents that we have come to accept as universals
truths.
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THE LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDER
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
When a man or woman wrongs another in any way, that person
must confess. He must make full restitution for his wrong, add
one-fifth to it and give it all to the person he has wronged.
Numbers 5:7
INTRODUCTION
The federal government shall be liable in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.I Why
then has Rodney Heitzenrater, rendered a quadriplegic due to the gov-
ernment's negligence, been forced to live without vital medical necessi-
ties even though he received a five million dollar judgment against the
United States?2 This article will discuss the liability and responsibility of
the United States as mandated by Congress pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
3
This paper is presented in the context of the case, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United Stales,4 recently decided by Judge Jim R. Carrigan of
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 5 In that
decision, Judge Carrigan awarded 6 Rodney over five million dollars,
much of which was for future medical services. 7 But Rodney has been
denied medical treatment while the government relitigates an issue that
would relieve it of this obligation. The government argues8 that the
United States should not have to pay that portion of the award which is
for future medical services. 9
The government's right to forego the payment of a monetary
1. This policy is found in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982)
[hereinafter FTCA or Act]. The FTCA states in part: "The United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." Id.
2. Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12,
1988).
3. See supra note 1.
4. See supra note 2.
5. By analyzing the government's responsibility in light of its effect on an actual vic-
tim of government negligence, the harsh realities of the government's evasive actions will
be most apparent.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982). In FTCA actions all trials are to the court. There is no
right to trial by jury. For an extensive discussion on the injustice resulting from this denial
see Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amendment
Right, 58 TEx. L. REV. 549 (1980).
7. See infra note 56 and accompanying test.
8. Defendant's Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 6-10, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
9. Id. The government contends that through the facilities of the Veterans' Adminis-
tration ("VA") it has the means to supply those same medical services. This argument is
thoroughly analyzed in pp. 210-212.
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award, notwithstanding the language of the FTCA, will be analyzed in
light of Rodney's judgment and the forthcoming appeal to the Tenth
Circuit.' 0 This article begins with a general discussion of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, followed by the highlights of Rodney's particular cir-
cumstances. Other cases that have dealt with this issue will also be ex-
amined. The article includes a discussion of the pros and cons of
allowing the federal government to act in a manner and extent different
from that of a private individual. Finally, the article concludes with
some suggestions of how to compel the government to accept its legal
responsibilities under the FTCA.
I. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
For over 150 years, prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the United
States enjoyed legal immunity from the torts committed by its employ-
ees. I During this time, the sole remedy available to the victim of a fed-
eral government employee's negligent or wrongful act or omission was
relief by private bill.' 2 The individual would have to embark on a
lengthy and uncertain path of petitioning his local representative to in-
troduce a bill that would grant him monetary relief. Hearings before
congressional committees were mandatory and the bill had to be passed
by both branches of the legislature.' 3 Because Congress was not well
equipped to evaluate and adjudicate these private matters, most of these
claims were never addressed or improperly investigated.14
Realizing that the judiciary and not Congress was the appropriate
body to handle the grievances of its citizenry, Congress, as early as 1832,
considered tort claims legislation.' 5 As could be expected, there was
strong opposition to a law that would waive sovereign immunity. 16
Some of the most vocal arguments included: the United States govern-
ment has stepped into the shoes of the King of England, and it is univer-
sally accepted that the king can do no wrong;17 the United States would
10. Judge Carrigan's Order was filed September 12, 1988. The Judgment was filed
September 13, 1988. The government's Notice of Appeal was docketed on November 17,
1988. It is expected that the appeal will be before the Tenth Circuit in 1989.
11. Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939). The Supreme Court de-
scribed the government's freedom as "exceptional freedom from legal responsibility" for
the tortious acts of its employees. Id.
12. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979) defines "private bill" as
"[liegislation for the special benefit of an individual or a locality."
13. Mullins, Holding the Government Liable for its Torts: Payton v. United States, 13 U. TOL.
L. REV. 463, 468 (1982).
14. L.JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY: HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs, § 52 (1989) sum-
marizingJudge William A. Richardson's first-hand observations as one of the early appoin-
tees to the Court of Claims.
15. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House judiciary Committee, 77th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 49 (1942).
16. Mullins at 464-467 discussing how the English doctrine of the divine rights of the
king was carried over and made applicable to the United States government.
17. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879), holding that the doctrine
that a king can do no wrong has no place in the United States where a democratic govern-
ment has replaced the monarch.
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be degraded by appearing in the courts of its own creation;' 8 and there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law upon
which the right depends. 19
In 1855, Congress established the Court of Claims to hear claims
against the United States arising from United States contracts or federal
law. 20 It was another sixty years before Congress seriously considered a
comparable avenue of relief for tort claims. 2 1 As more and more citi-
zens claimed injuries at the hands of negligent federal employees, Con-
gress came under pressure to devise a tort claims bill.22 Years of debate
over the appropriateness of waiving sovereign immunity culminated in
the summer of 1945. On the morning of July 28, 1945, an airplane
struck the Empire State Building killing and seriously injuring people
both in the building and on the streets. Extensive property damage also
resulted. The aircraft was a United States Army bomber piloted by a
serviceman who was flying too low.
23
The victims of this tragic accident were shocked to learn that there
was no judicial remedy to recover damages from the United States gov-
ernment. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provided an insurmount-
able barrier to relief.24 This tragedy may have been the impetus to
finally abolishing the doctrine, because twelve months later, on August
2, 1946, the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed.
2 5
The new law authorized federal district courts to adjudicate civil ac-
tions for money damages accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury
or loss of property caused by the tortious acts of government employees
while acting within the scope of their employment. Liability would be
imposed under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable in accordance with the law of the state where the act
occurred. 2 6 As previously discussed, one purpose of the Act was to re-
18. U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882), holding that the United States' ability to
function for the benefit of the people would not be impaired if it were to be sued in the
courts which it created.
19. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), affirming the impracticality
of a citizen suing the government for protection of a legal right when the government
makes the law upon which the legal right is based.
20. Plave, United States v. Varig Airlines: The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of Government
Liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 197, 202 n.18 (1985).
21. Id. at 202.
22. Jayson, supra note 15, § 52.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 2671-80 (1982)).
26. The complete text of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) is:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, to-
gether with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and
after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Gov-
ernment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
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lieve Congress of its burden of private relief bills. 27 The other purpose
was to do justice to those who had suffered injuries or losses through the
wrongs of government employees.
28
At the time of the enactment of the FTCA, existing precedent
strictly construed statutes under which the government consented to
suit in favor of the sovereign. 2 9 Changing times, however, saw the need
for changing attitudes. Several years prior to the adoption of the FTCA,
the Supreme Court indicated that it was backing away from strict con-
struction in favor of a more liberal interpretation of governmental im-
munity waivers. 3 0 In United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., l the
Court expressly rejected the rule of strict construction by allowing an
insurance company to sue in its own name under the Act on an assigned
claim.3 2 This was contrary to an anti-assignment statute which sharply
restricted the assignment of claims against the United States.3 3 By al-
lowing this assigned claim to be brought under the FTCA, the Court
firmly established that the new law would be liberally construed.
We think that the Congressional attitude in passing the Tort
Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's
statement [that] . . . "[t]he exemption of the sovereign from
suit involves hardship enough where consent has been with-
held. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construc-
tion, where consent has been announced."
'3 4
Other Supreme Court cases followed this liberal interpretation.3 5
In United States v. Brown,3 6 the Supreme Court allowed a claim by a vet-
It is interesting to note that this legislation, though enacted in 1946, provided relief
for claims occurring on and after January 1, 1945, thereby including claims from the July
28, 1945 crash.
27. See supra notes 13-16.
28. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
67-69 (1945).
29. Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U.S. 244, 250 (1935). See also Eastern
Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 (1972); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584 (1941).
30. "[W]e start from the premise that such waivers by Congress of governmental im-
munity in case of such federal instrumentalities should be liberally construed. This policy
is in line with the current disfavor of the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit, as
evidenced by the increasing tendency of Congress to waive the immunity where federal
governmental corporations are concerned." F.H.A. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940).
31. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
32. Id. at 380, the court acknowledged the broad sweep of the FTCA in imposing
upon the United States private person liability.
33. Id. at 370. The anti-assignment statute construed in Aetna provided that "[a]ll
transfers and assignments ... made of any claim upon the United States, or any part or
share thereof, or interest therein ... shall be absolutely null and void .... 31 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1976). This language no longer appears in the present version of the statute at 31
U.S.C. § 3727 (1982). Today, "an assignment may be made only after a claim is allowed,
the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been is-
sued." Id.
34. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 383 (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140,
147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926)).
35. For one example see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), where the
Court, utilizing a liberal construction, interpreted the term "any claim" to allow the claim
of an off-duty soldier caused by the negligent driving of an on-duty soldier.
36. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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eran who was negligently treated in a Veterans Administration hospital.
The Court departed from the Feres doctrine3 7 in ruling that since the
claim was based on an injury which had not occurred in the course of
military duty, it was actionable under the FTCA.3 8 In Feres the Court
recognized that servicemen's benefit statutes provide generous compen-
sation3 9 so additional compensation under the FTCA is duplicative.
The Brown Court took the opposite position, commenting that since
Congress had not pronounced a doctrine of exclusiveness or election of
remedies in the Tort Claims Act, it would not do so.40 This liberal inter-
pretation of the FTCA insured that liability was imposed on the govern-
ment "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances.
' 4 1
The term "private individual," referred to above, was defined in
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States.4 2 In Rayonier, the plaintiff alleged that em-
ployees of the United States Forest Service acted negligently while fight-
ing a fire, resulting in the destruction of the plaintiff's timber, buildings,
and other property. The Supreme Court held that giving the FTCA its
plain and natural meaning, the United States is liable to the plaintiff for
the Forest Service's negligence if state law would impose liability on pri-
vate persons or corporations under similar circumstances. 43 Addition-
ally, the United States has been treated as a "private individual" for
impleader purposes.
44
The term "under like circumstances" was given a liberal interpreta-
tion, contrary to the government's position, in Indian Towing Co. v. United
States.4 5 In Indian Towing, the plaintiff claimed damage to a vessel and
cargo when the vessel was grounded due to the Coast Guard's negli-
gence in maintaining a lighthouse. The government argued that mainte-
nance of a lighthouse was a "uniquely governmental activity" 46 for
37. In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Court barred a negligence
claim by a serviceman. It declared that American law has never permitted a soldier to
recover, against either his superior officers or the government, for negligence; in other
words, there is no analogous private individual liability. Id. at 141. See also Abney, Suing
Uncle Sam in Tort, 5 CAL. LAw. 31, 33-34 (1985).
38. "[U]nlike the claims in the Feres case, this one is not foreign to the broad pattern
of liability which the United States undertook by the Tort Claims Act." Brown, 348 U.S. at
112.
39. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145.
40. Brown, 348 U.S. at Il1.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
42. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
43. Id. at 318. The Court emphasized that the government's liability was not to be
measured by that of municipal corporation or other public body. Id. at 319. This obviated
the need to consider whether the government acted in a proprietary or uniquely govern-
mental capacity.
44. See United States v. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543 (1951), where the Supreme Court
treated the United States as a private individual and allowed it to be impleaded as a joint
tortfeasor.
45. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
46. Simply stated, the "uniquely governmental activity" doctrine insulates the govern-
ment from liability where its activities are solely governmental without a corresponding
activity in the private sector. This is so because the FTCA imposes liability on the govern-
ment as it would on a private individual. The government reasoned that if there were no
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which there was no private counterpart, thus liability could not be im-
posed.4 7 The Court held otherwise. It interpreted the Act to impose
liability on the United States under "like circumstances," not under the
same circumstances. 4 8 The Court went on to say that when the govern-
ment undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reli-
ance, it must perform its good samaritan task in a careful manner or
answer in damages.
49
The actual language of the FTCA, in addition to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act, establishes that the United States is to
be placed in the same position, for liability purposes, as private parties,
individual or corporate. That is not to say, however, that the United
States completely waived its sovereign immunity; it did reserve by stat-
ute thirteen specific exceptions to liability50 in addition to the judicially
private individual engaging in the activity, there could be no liability imposed on the gov-
ernment. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64-65.
47. Id. at 65.
48. Id. at 68-69.
49. Id. at 69. The Court refused to distinguish between a good samaritan task per-
formed by the government and an individual. When the government undertakes such a
task, the FTCA imposes the same duty of care on the government as exists on an individ-
ual. Id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) states:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to -
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission
of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or
customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790
of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Gov-
ernment in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a
quarantine by the United States.
(g) Repealed.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Gov-
ernment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall ap-
ply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out
of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforce-
ment officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to
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created Feres doctrine. 5 '
Tort actions under the FTCA have some important distinctions
from standard state tort actions. An injured plaintiff seeking to establish
liability and damages for the alleged tort of the government has no right
to a jury trial. 5 2 Instead, all trials are held before a United States Dis-
trictJudge. 53 Additionally, a plaintiff cannot recover prejudgment inter-
est 54 or punitive damages5 5 even though recoverable under state law.
With this understanding of the Federal Tort Claims Act, this article
turns to Rodney Heitzenrater's dilemma.
II. THE CASE OF RODNEY HEITZENRATER5 6
Rodney Heitzenrater was born on May 24, 1959. 5 7 At the age of 17
he enlisted in the United States Army. 58 By so serving, Rodney is enti-
tled to use the Veterans' Administration ("VA") hospital facilities 5 9 and
to receive VA medical care.
60
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal
law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or
by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal
intermediate credit bank, or a bank for co-operatives.
For a detailed discussion of exception (a), the "discretionary function" exception, see
Rice, United States v. Varig. Can the King Only Do Little Wrongs?, 22 CAL. W.L. REV. 175
(1985).
51. See supra note 37. See also Heldman, Suing the United States Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 14 COLO. LAw. 1808, 1812 (1985).
52. See supra note 6.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 1.
55. Id. For a detailed discussion see, Sullivan, Defining Punitive Damages Under The Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 251 (1984).
56. The information contained in this section, except where noted, is excerpted from
Judge Carrigan's Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
57. Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
58. Defendant's Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 2, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
59. 38 U.S.C. § 610 (1982) states:
The Administrator, within the limits of the Veterans' Administration facili-
ties, may furnish hospital care or nursing home care which the Administrator de-
termines is needed to -
(B) any veteran for a non-service-connected disability if such veteran is un-
able to defray the expenses of necessary hospital or nursing home care;
38 U.S.C. § 610(a)(1)(B) (1982).
60. 38 U.S.C. § 612 states:
Except as provided in subsection (b), the Administrator, within the limits of
Veterans' Administration facilities, may furnish such medical services as the Ad-
ministrator finds to be reasonably necessary to any veteran for a service-con-
nected disability. The Administrator may also furnish to any such veteran such
home health services as the Administrator finds to be necessary or appropriate
for the effective and economical treatment of such disability (including only such
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On May 26, 1983, Rodney was admitted to Denver Veterans' Ad-
ministration Center for treatment of an apparent psychotic condition.
6'
Shortly after admission he was left unsupervised in his room on the hos-
pital's seventh floor. In response to his psychotic delusions, he broke
through the window screen and fell seventy feet to the ground, sus-
taining injuries which left him permanently disabled.
6 2
After the fall, Rodney was hospitalized at the Denver VA Medical
Center from May 26, 1983 to August 26, 1983. He was initially diag-
nosed as having thoracic spinal compression which rendered him para-
plegic from the waist down. Traction was administered in an attempt to
free the locked vertebrae of the spine. This treatment, however, was
unsuccessful. Moreover, during treatment at the Denver facility several
complications developed. Shortly after the injury, an emergency trache-
otomy tube was inserted. The kinking or plugging of this tube caused
respiratory arrest on three separate occasions. 63 Additionally, Rodney
developed gastro-intestinal problems which developed into an ulcer.
Pressure sores developed on his heels, legs, sacrum and coccyx. Due to
these and other problems, Rodney's weight dropped from 152 pounds
to 118 pounds. 64 Rodney's treatment at the Denver VA Medical Center
was, needless to say, less than a pleasant experience.
After three months at the Denver facility, Rodney was transferred
on August 25, 1983, to the Cleveland VA Medical Center, which special-
izes in the treatment of spinal injuries. 65 He was initially discharged on
March 30, 1984. During this time not only was treatment ineffective in
restoring any of Rodney's sensitivity or motor skills, 66 but in fact, his
condition worsened from paraplegia to quadriplegia.
6 7
Rodney was readmitted in February, 1985, with atrophied forearms,
hands, thighs, and legs. He was also experiencing a loss of sensation in
his hands. 68 In August, 1987, Rodney was diagnosed as having com-
plete motor and sensory paralysis.
6 9
Rodney is presently living in a mobile home in Pennsylvania with
his wife and three daughters aged eight, six, and five. 70 These living
improvements and structural alterations the cost of which does not exceed $2,500
(or reimbursement up to such amount) as are necessary to assure the continua-
tion of treatment for such disability or to provide access to the home or to essen-
tial lavatory and sanitary facilities. In the case of any veteran discharged or
released from the active military, naval, or air service for a disability incurred or
aggravated in line of duty, such services may be so furnished for that disability,
whether or not service-connected for the purposes of this chapter.
38 U.S.C. § 612(a) (1982).
61. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 1-2,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 7.
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conditions impose extreme inconvenience, deprivation of privacy, and
limitation of treatment. Rodney's paralysis requires constant attention
for he cannot even turn himself when lying in bed. There is no question
that Rodney will be dependant on others for the remainder of his life. 7 1
On April 18, 1986, Rodney and his wife filed a claim against the
United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.7 2 On October 23, 1987, the government admitted liability
and causation. 73 The only issues presented at trial were the types and
amount of damages to be awarded.
74
A trial was held on June 27-29, 1988. 7 5 After considering all the
evidence, including the testimony of Rodney, his experts, and the gov-
ernment's experts, Judge Carrigan found that Rodney was seriously and
permanently disabled. 76 Damage awards were divided into two catego-
ries: those for Rodney and those for his wife. 7 7 The categories and
amounts are briefly summarized to give an understanding of exactly
what damages the government disputes. It is noteworthy that almost 90
percent of the damages awarded are fully consistent with the recommen-
dations of the government's advisory witness, John E. Dahlberg, 78 a
quadriplegic with a Master's degree in vocational rehabilitation. In ad-
dition to his testimony at trial, Mr. Dahlberg prepared a report, relied
upon by Judge Carrigan, entitled "Anticipated Annual Medical and Re-
habilitation Expenses - Rodney Heitzenrater.
' 79
The categories and amounts awarded by Judge Carrigan are as
follows: 80
1) Future medicines and supplies - $267,326;
2) Durable medical equipment and transportation
- $270,812;
3) One-time medical needs for spinal cord and tendon injury
- $51,252;
4) Future medical care and evaluations - $150,495;
5) One-time medical emergency fund - $65,000;
6) Daytime nursing aide, attendant and household services -
$2,111,022;
7) Home modifications - $22,000;
71. Id.
72. See Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
73. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 2, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
74. Id. at 1.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 7-8. This article focuses on the damages awarded Rodney because the dam-
ages awarded his wife are not contested by the government within the context of this
article.
78. Id. at 9.
79. Id.
80. In computing the amounts, Judge Carrigan used the United States Life Tables to
ascertain Rodney's life expectancy of 43.9 years. All amounts which were computed for
the lifetime expectancy were discounted to a present value.
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8) Therapy, rehabilitation, counseling and related services -
$81,970;
9) Recreation and leisure expenses - $27,489;
10) Loss of past income - $34,624;
11) Loss of future income - $603,557;
12) Pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life - $2,000,000;
Total awarded: $5,685,502.81
III. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
The government's argument that it should not have to pay the cost
of future medical services and supplies by offering instead, the use of the
Veterans' Administration's facilities has already been decided in two
other cases. An understanding of this controlling precedent will demon-
strate the folly and resulting injustice of the government's argument.
In Feely v. United States8 2 the material facts are similar to those in
Rodney's case. Like Rodney, Donald Feely was a veteran of the armed
forces,8 3 and therefore entitled to free medical care and treatment pur-
suant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 610 and 612.84 Additionally, Donald availed him-
self of these services on several occasions.
While working for the city of Philadelphia, Donald was struck by a
postal truck driven by an employee of the federal government, causing
injury to his right leg and knee.8 5 The trial court found the government
negligent and awarded Donald, as part of his recovery, $12,000 for fu-
ture psychiatric medical expenses.8 6 The government argued, on ap-
peal, that this part of the award was error because Donald had made use
of the free government hospital and medical facilities in the past and
would continue to in the future. If Donald chose to avail himself of the
free psychiatric care from the Veterans' Administration, the government
would be forced to pay twice for his future care.87
The Third Circuit upheld the trial court's award, dismissing the
government's argument. It found that accepting the government's posi-
tion would result in forcing Donald, financially speaking, to seek only
the available public assistance.88 Donald would have to pay for any pri-
vate medical care. The court reasoned that this would be an uncon-
scionable burden to place on a successful plaintiffs 9 The victim of
another's tort is entitled to choose, within reasonable limits, his own
doctor and treatment facility. Forcing the victim to choose between ac-
cepting public aid or bearing the expense of his own rehabilitation is an
81. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 11-23,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
82. 337 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964).
83. Id. at 926.
84. See supra notes 59 and 60.
85. See Feely, 337 F.2d at 926.
86. Feely v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 718, 720 (E.D. Penn. 1963).
87. Feely v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 934 (3d Cir. 1964).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 935.
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unreasonable choice. 90
The court went on to say that there are many reasons why Donald
may have chosen not to accept the VA offer. He could feel that the pub-
lic facilities are inferior; that a private physician is superior; or that be-
cause of over-crowded conditions at the VA center, he may not receive
timely care. 9 1 The fact that Donald made use of the free government
services in the past did not mean he would do so in the future. 92 With-
out adequate funds, Donald would not have the privilege of choice.
With the funds he could choose the care he prefers. The court said
Donald had the right to make the choice.
93
The court noted the government might have to pay twice for Don-
ald's injuries, should he decide to seek care after receiving an award.9 4
The court said this factor should not be a consideration in awarding
damages under the FTCA. It is a policy decision which should be made
in the administration of veterans' benefits.
95
Simply put, the Third Circuit held that the United States is respon-
sible for payment of a judgment in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual. This is precisely what the FTCA man-
dates. Congress, when it enacted the FTCA, was aware that certain indi-
viduals could receive free benefits from the VA, 96 yet it chose not to
require the plaintiff to elect a remedy.9 7 Therefore, if such a choice is to
be required, it is Congress, not the courts which must do so. 98
Twenty years after Feely a similar situation arose in Powers v. United
States.9 9 Robert Powers was a World War II veteran of the United States
Army. ' 00 This entitled him to free medical care provided by the VA.1 0 '
In 1971, Robert slipped and fell on a patch of ice.' 0 2 Due to resulting
neck pain, Robert entered the VA hospital in Newington, Connecticut.
After diagnosis and consultations, surgery was performed to fuse to-
gether bones of his cervical column, eliminating the excessive motion
and dislocation thought to be causing the pain.10 3 As a result of negli-








96. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
97. In Brooks, the Court allowed a serviceman to recover damages under the FTCA for
injuries sustained when the automobile he was riding in was negligently struck by an army
truck driven by a serviceman, even though the injured party was entitled to benefits for the
injury under other statutes. "[T]here is nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the veterans'
laws which provide for exclusiveness of remedy." id. at 53.
98. Id.
99. 589 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Conn. 1984).
100. Id. at 1089.
101. See supra notes 59 and 60.
102. Powers, 589 F. Supp. at 1089.
103. Id. at 1090.
104. Id. at 1095.
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As in Feely, the government argued that if the plaintiff were to make
use of the available VA medical services, he would be receiving both free
treatment as well as the monetary value of that treatment. In awarding
damages for future medical treatment the Powers court dealt directly with
the problem of a double payment by the government, i.e., the tort dam-
ages awarded may be compensating Robert for medical treatment which
he could potentially receive gratis from the VA.
10 5
The court decided not to offset any possible future medical benefits
from a monetary award. The court reasoned that this would, as a practi-
cal matter, unduly limit and virtually predetermine not only the kind of
medical care necessary for the treatment of Robert's condition, but also
the source of the medical care.10 6 This predetermination would be bur-
densome because Donald could not receive nursing-home care or un-
dergo outside surgical procedures without the approval of a VA
physician. This predetermination, moreover, would be especially oner-
ous if it were to force Donald to undergo treatment at a VA facility
whose sister facility caused him to suffer the very injury for which he
now needs treatment.
10 7
As in Feely, the Powers court concluded with the observation that
congressional action is the appropriate means of not only eliminating
the windfall conundrum which confronts and concerns federal courts
under these, or similar circumstances, but also protecting the federal
treasury from the threat of an unnecessary double payment for the same
injury.' 0 8 The holdings in both of these cases are consistent with the
spirit and interpretation of that part of the FTCA which imposes liability
on the government in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances. 0 9
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT HAS No LEGAL BASIS
The government seeks to avoid paying that portion of Rodney's
award which it can provide through the services and facilities of the Vet-
erans' Administration."l 0 In support of its position, the government re-
lies on cases which discuss the Collateral Source Rule."' In order to
understand the government's argument, a brief discussion of the Collat-
eral Source Rule is presented.
A. The Collateral Source Rule
The Collateral Source Rule, in federal tort claims litigation, has a
105. Id. at 1108.
106. Id. at 1108 (quoting Feely v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 934-35 (3d. Cir. 1964)).
107. Id. at 1108.
108. Id. at 1108-09.
109. See supra notes 1 and 26.
110. The government's position is set forth in its Proposed Findings of Fact and Trial
Brief at 6-10, Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept.
12, 1988).
111. The fact that the cises relied upon by the government discuss the Collateral
Source Rule indicates that these cases are inapposite.
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common meaning. Because the FTCA requires federal district courts to
use the law of the state where the tort occurred it is appropriate, in this
situation, to examine Colorado's Collateral Source Rule.l"
2
Colorado courts have interpreted this rule to mean that, "compen-
sation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not
contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from
the wrongdoer.""11 3 Thus, a collateral source is one which is distinct
from the funds of the defendant. 1 4 In the context of an FTCA suit, an
injured party who has already been compensated for his or her injuries
can also recover damages from the United States, unless the source of
the original compensation was funds provided by the United States." 15
The Tenth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to consider
the application of the collateral source rule in an FTCA action. In United
States v. Gray, 116 the court held that an award under the FTCA should be
reduced by the monthly payments that the plaintiff would receive pursu-
ant to service disability benefit statutes."17 The holding in Gray was just
and logical. The government should not have to pay twice for its single
tort. 118
The Collateral Source Rule developed an interesting wrinkle when
a plaintiff, suing under the FTCA, claimed that social security benefits
were collateral to an award under the Act. In Steckler v. United States,
19
the plaintiff sought and obtained a favorable court awarded judgment
based on the medical malpractice of the VA hospital in Denver.120 The
hospital staff neglected to recognize and treat a lack of blood circulation
in the plaintiff's legs, resulting in amputation of his left leg.'
2 1
The trial court rejected the plaintiff's argument that social security
benefits were collateral to an FTCA award.' 2 2 The Tenth Circuit re-
versed this finding and held social security disability payments to be col-
lateral to, and therefore recoverable in addition to, an FTCA award.
123
112. See supra note 26.
113. Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Kistler v. Hal-
sey, 173 Colo. 540, 545, 481 P.2d 722, 724 (1971)).
114. Berg, 806 F.2d at 984.
115. Id.
116. 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952).
117. Id. at 244. The court found the service disability payments to be a non-collateral
source to the FTCA award, since the source of both funds was the United States. Citing
United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949), the Gray court refused to allow
plaintiff a double recovery.
118. In Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949),just three years after the enact-
ment of the FTCA, the Court stated, "we now see no indication that Congress meant the
United States to pay twice for the same injury."
119. 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
120. Id. at 1373. The plaintiff argued that since the source of social security payments
was from his and his employer's contributions, they were collateral to the government's
funds. Id. at 1375.
121. Id. at 1373.
122. Id. at 1375.
123. Id. at 1379. The court stated:
There is a dearth of authority on whether Social Security disability payments are
to be regarded as income from a collateral source insofar as they represent pay-
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The court reasoned that the Social Security Fund is comprised, for the
most part, from funds contributed by individual workers and their
employers. '
2 4
The holdings of Brooks, Gray, and Steckler teach us that a plaintiff
cannot receive a double monetary recovery from the United States for a
single injury, unless the injured plaintiff has contributed to a fund from
which he seeks compensation. The government attempts to place Rod-
ney Heitzenrater in a category of plaintiffs that receives double compen-
sation for their injuries from non-collateral sources. This is an incorrect
analogy since Rodney is seeking a single monetary recovery under the
FTCA, and not looking for additional service disability or social security
benefits.
B. The Government's Legal Confusion
With this understanding of the Collateral Source Rule, we now ana-
lyze the government's argument and how the facts in Rodney's case
demonstrate that the government should be required to pay the award.
The government argues that hospital benefits under 28 U.S.C. § 610125
and medical benefits under 28 U.S.C. § 612126 are non-collateral to an
award under the FTCA since Rodney has not contributed to either
fund. 12 7 These cases are now analyzed.
In Berg v. United States, 128 Philip Berg, a 73 year old retired colonel
from the United States Army was admitted to Fitzsimmons Army Medi-
cal Center after complaining of dizziness. A cerebral angiogram was or-
dered to confirm a suspected brain tumor. Negligence by the United
States in performing the angiogram caused Mr. Berg to suffer a stroke
resulting in his blindness. 129 Mr. Berg sought Medicare benefits in ad-
dition to the FTCA award.' 30 In deciding whether Medicare benefits
were collateral to an FTCA recovery, the Berg court distinguished be-
tween benefits that come from unfunded, general revenues of the
United States (deductible) and those that come from "a special fund
supplied in part by the beneficiary or a relative upon whom the benefit is
dependent (nondeductible)."' 13 ' The court found that Medicare bene-
ments made by the injured person and his employer. Logically they are collat-
eral. We do know that the government has supplemented the fund from time to
time where this has been necessary. The extent to which the payments under
Social Security disability can be traced to the government is questionable. The
part contributed by the worker and the employers has the aspects of social insur-
ance and as such is collateral to monies contributed by the government.
Id.
124. Id. at 1379.
125. See supra note 59.
126. See supra note 60.
127. Defendant's. Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 8, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
128. 806 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 982-83.
130. Id. at 984.
131. Id. (quoting from United States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.
1960) (emphasis in original)).
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fits are a collateral source being funded by the same employment tax
scheme that funded the social security disability benefits in Steckler.
132
Thus, Mr. Berg was entitled to both the federal tort claims award and
the medicare benefits.'
33
The United States next cites Mays v. United States,' 3 4 a companion
case to Berg. In Mays, the Tenth Circuit was faced with deciding whether
benefits received from the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services ("CHAMPUS") are a collateral source to an FTCA
award.' 3 5 The Mays court found that, "[a]ll of the money for the
CHAMPUS program comes from the general treasury of the United
States; no money is paid directly into the fund by the recipients of
CHAMPUS benefits."' 3 6 The court found CHAMPUS benefits to be
noncollateral to the funds of an FTCA award. Since both the Federal
Tort Claims award and the CHAMPUS benefits derived from the un-
funded general revenues of the United States, the plaintiff was entitled
to only a single recovery.
In Steckler v. United States,' 3 7 the court decided that social security
benefits are collateral to the extent that the injured party contributed to
that fund' 3 8 while veterans' benefits are unquestionably a non-collateral
source which is deductible from an award in that it is derived entirely
from government funds and cannot be claimed to originate in any collat-
eral contribution.' 3 9 In each of these cases the plaintiff sought mone-
tary compensation from a government funded program in addition to an
award under the FTCA. By citing these cases, the government attempts
to equate the receipt of money, as compensation for injury under the
veterans' program, with the offer of services under that program.
The government also argues that it would be paying a punitive dam-
age award "when Rodney avails himself of VA benefits, but has been
awarded money to pay for that care in a private setting."' 40 The gov-
ernment's presumption that Rodney will avail himself of VA benefits
cannot be taken for granted.
V. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED To PAY THE JUDGMENT
Rodney's position is supported by caselaw, the words and interpre-
tation of the FTCA, as well as common sense. The Feely court stated that
a victim of another's tort is entitled to choose, within reason, his own
132. Hayashi, 282 F.2d at 603.
133. Berg, 806 F.2d at 985-86.
134. 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 977.
137. 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
138. Id. at 1379.
139. Id. (citing Gray v. United States, 199 F.2d 239, 244 (10th Cir. 1952)).
140. Defendant's Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 10, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988). The United States
relies on Burke v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 981, 994 (D. Md. 1985), a case which disal-
lowed the plaintiff a double recovery.
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doctor and treatment facility.' 4 1 In dealing with the uncertainty of a
potential recovery, the Powers court stated that a "trial court must deal
with [the uncertainty of a double recovery] as it deals with other uncer-
tainties by using its best judgment after all the facts and circumstances
of the case have been taken into consideration."' 14 2
In dealing with the uncertainty of a double recovery in Rodney's
case, Judge Carrigan found ample evidence at trial demonstrating Rod-
ney's disappointment with, and distrust of, his treatment at the Denver
VA Medical Center. 14 3 It is for this reason that Judge Carrigan stated
that a private defendant cannot escape an award of damages in a civil
suit for future medical expenses by contending that a plaintiff, who hap-
pens to be a veteran, is entitled to free medical care at a VA Medical
Center.14 4 There is no reason why the federal government, having ad-
mitted negligence, should not be subject to the same rules governing a
private individual, 14 5 as mandated by the FTCA. 146 Common sense re-
quires that Rodney not be forced to return to the tortfeasor who caused
his quadriplegia, for treatment of that condition.
VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to show how Congress has re-
moved the federal government's cloak of sovereign immunity, thereby
requiring the United States to account for its negligence. The plain
meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act, along with the Feely and Powers
decisions, as well as common sense, require fault to be imposed on the
United States in the same manner it is imposed on individuals. In Rod-
ney Heitzenrater's situation, the federal government must pay the award
as any "private individual" would. The offer of services in lieu of money
is an unacceptable alternative. Since individuals are not entitled to this
barter exchange it should not be available to the government.
One commentator states that "[tihe Act as a whole is an example -
perhaps a rare one - of a statute that generally achieves its intended
purpose."' 14 7 If the United States is permitted to deprive Rodney of his
choice of private medical care, then the Act will not achieve its intended
purpose of "doing justice."
148
By attempting to provide medical services in lieu of paying the
award, the federal government seeks to be treated differently than a pri-
vate individual. If the government is to be treated differently, it should
141. Feely v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 935 (3d Cir. 1964).
142. Powers v. United States 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1108 (D. Conn. 1984) (quoting United
States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1949)).
143. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 14, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 1 and 26.
147. Axelrad, Litigation Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 LrTIGATION 22, 55 (1981).
148. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
67-69 (1945).
[Vol. 66:4
FEDERAL TORT CL4IMS ACT
be required to right its wrong in a way that would expand rather than
curtail Rodney's freedom of medical choice, expediting his
rehabilitation.
Justice delayed is justice denied. In light of Feely and Powers, the
government should not be permitted to delay paying the award. Ac-
knowledging that both parties have a right to appeal a trial court's find-
ings, this article proposes a compromise.
The 5.6 million dollar award was based on Rodney's life expectancy
of 43.9 years. 14 9 On a yearly basis this breaks down to approximately
$128,000. In light of the government's admission of liability, 15 0 and Mr.
Dahlberg's recommendation as to the appropriate amounts recover-
able, 15 1 a reasonable compromise would be for the government to pro-
vide this annual amount during the pendency of its appeal.' 5 2 This
would allow Rodney to begin receiving rehabilitation treatment, choos-
ing his own doctors and facilities. If the Tenth Circuit decides to allow
the government to provide services in lieu of paying the award, the gov-
ernment will have paid a minimal amount. But more importantly, Rod-
ney could receive treatment immediately.
153
Fortunately, there is another remedy already available to Rodney.
If a "private attorney" signs a pleading without obtaining information
necessary to support it, he or she may be forced to pay the opposing
party's legal fees. 154 Congress has deemed it equitable that the United
States likewise be disciplined for signing frivolous pleadings. The Equal
Access to Justice Act' 5 5 imposes liability on the United States for rea-
sonable legal fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party
would be liable. Acknowledging the precedent set by Feely and Powers,
the Tenth Circuit may find that the government's appeal is indeed frivo-
lous. If so, the government would be liable for Rodney's legal fees and
expenses in defending the appeal. Such a remedy would not expedite
149. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 6, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
150. Id. at 2 Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 2,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
151. Id. at 9 Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 9,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
152. This compromise solution is offered only because of the strong precedent estab-
lished by Feely and Powers. If this issue had not already been decided, then the government
would have the right to appeal as any "private individual" would, without having to make
any payment.
153. Under this comprise, Rodney could stipulate not to avail himself of the free VA
services while receiving the annual payments, thereby preventing any double recovery.
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982) states:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and
expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the
United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her
official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States
shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party
would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which
specifically provides for such an award.
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Rodney's access to badly needed treatment. But the delay, caused by
frivolous pleadings, could at least be compensated for monetarily.
In conclusion, the federal government of the United States exists to
serve the people. The only way the government can serve in a fair and
just manner is if it acts responsibly. This does not mean it will always act
correctly. People make mistakes. The government, being no more than
an aggregate of people, will likewise err. In order to act responsibly, the
government must accept the consequences of its inevitable errors. As
our government realizes this and begins to accept responsibility for its
acts, it will begin to better serve those who created it.
G. Michael Harz*
* I wish to express my thanks to my mother and father, Arlene and Victor, for their
eternal faith and unyielding support.
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Montero v. Meyer: Official English, Initiative Petitions and
the Voting Rights Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Now the whole earth was of one language .... And the Lord came down
to see the city and the tower, which the sons of men had built. And the
Lord said, "Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language;
this is only the beginning of what they will do; what they propose to do
will not be impossible for them. Come let us go down, and there confuse
their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. " So
the Lord scattered them abroad from the face of the earth .... Therefore
its name was called Babel, because there the Lord confused the language
of all the earth .... I
The Tower of Babel is a story of a united people whose nation dis-
integrated because their language became so mixed they could not un-
derstand one another.
The unique success of the United States of America as a melting pot
of cultures is the result of a conscientious effort to maintain a common
language. For example, to obtain citizenship in the United States under
naturalization laws, a candidate must demonstrate "an understanding of
the English language, including an ability to read, write, and speak
words in ordinary usage in the English language."
'2
Efforts in Colorado to preserve English as the state's official lan-
guage resulted in the passage of an official English amendment to the
Colorado Constitution in November 1988.
The Colorado amendment ratifies in law what is a social and cul-
tural fact: English is already the common language of Colorado. The
amendment reads as follows: "The English language is the official lan-
guage of the State of Colorado. This section is self executing; however,
the General Assembly may enact laws to implement this section."1
3
The Colorado amendment is strikingly similar to a proposed
amendment to the United States Constitution which was introduced in
the United States Senate by Senator Sam Hayakawa of California.
4
Although the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the issue in
1984, 5 Congress has not yet acted on the proposed federal amendment.
1. Genesis 11:1-9 (Revised Standard Version).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982).
3. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (to be published in 1989).
4. The text of the proposed federal amendment reads:
Section 1. The English language shall be the official language of the United
States.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.
5. The English Language Amendment, Hearings on S.j Res. 167 Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate Committee onjudiciary, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress an-
alyzed the federal proposal and concluded that the first section declar-
ing English as the official language, standing alone and without
reference to the subsequent enforcement provision, would not have any
practical legal effect. The practical force and effect of the amendment
would therefore turn largely on the exercise by Congress of the power
granted to it in section one to enforce the article by appropriate legisla-
tion. Implementing congressional action, in order to be valid, must be
"plainly adapted to that end" of enforcing the amendment and "not
prohibited by but ... consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the Consti-
tution.' "6 These observations of the Congressional Research Service,
by analogy, apply as well to the Colorado constitutional amendment.
The Colorado amendment was not passed without opposition. In
Colorado a proposed amendment to the state constitution may be
placed on the ballot through an initiative procedure reserving to the citi-
zens of the state the power to enact laws and to amend the state consti-
tution independent of the legislative assembly.7 Opponents challenged
the methods used in the petitioning phase of the initiative procedure.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, in an
ironic twist, ruled that certain of the initiative petitions were invalid be-
cause they were circulated in English only. The court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against the initiative so that it could not be placed on the
ballot in the November 1988 general election.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, seven days prior to the elec-
tion, reversed the district court and ordered that the initiative be placed
on the ballot. The amendment passed. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully pe-
titioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.8
II. BACKGROUND
Colorado State Representative Barbara Murray Phillips introduced
legislation in the 1987/1988 session of the Colorado General Assembly
to declare English the official language of the state of Colorado. When
the 1987/1988 general session came to a close and Representative Phil-
lips had not attained her goal, she contacted the Official English Com-
mittee 9 in Colorado to generate a proposed amendment to the
Colorado Constitution through the initiative process.
Representative Phillips and other proponents of the initiative sub-
6. Dale, Legal Analysis of S.J. Res. 167 Proposing an Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to
Make English the Official Language of the United States, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress (June 13, 1984), citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51
(1966).
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 to 115 (1973 & Supp. 1988). See also COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 1.
8. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3249
(1989).
9. The Official English Committee is a national organization founded by Senator
Sam Hayakawa to preserve and promote the English language.
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mitted a draft proposal, pursuant to statutory initiative procedures, 10 to
the Colorado Legislative Counsel Staff and the Legislative Drafting Of-
fice. These two agencies reviewed the proposal and met with Represen-
tative Phillips to discuss the agencies' comments.
On April 29, 1987 the Official English Committee formally submit-
ted the proposed amendment to the state constitution to the Colorado
Secretary of State, Natalie Meyer ("the Secretary"). The Secretary's of-
fice issued a notice the next day indicating that a public hearing would
be held on May 6, 1987. The notice of the hearing was written and pub-
lished only in the English language. The notice stated that at the hear-
ing a title for the amendment, a ballot title, and a submissions clause
would be set. A summary of the proposed initiative would also be pre-
pared, all as required by the Colorado statute."I Notice of the hearing
was given to the public by mailing copies of the notice to all parties who
had registered an interest with the Secretary and by posting copies in
the press room of the capital building.
12
The Secretary announced at the May 6, 1987 hearing that any pro-
test to the language of the initiative would have to be filed within thirty
days. She also sent a letter dated May 7, 1987 to Representative Phillips
which stated that any protest concerning the title or the submissions
clause must be filed within forty-eight hours of the hearing. 13 There
were no other public notices concerning the right to protest the form or
the content of the proposal. The Secretary did not receive any protest
to the proposed initiative.
The members of the Official English Committee and Representative
Phillips printed the initiative in the form of petitions in accordance with
the statutory guidelines. 14 These petitions were written only in the Eng-
lish language and were circulated in numerous counties in Colorado.
The petitions were filed on October 29, 1987 with the Secretary, who
verified on November 13, 1987 that an adequate number of valid signa-
tures appeared on the petition forms. The Secretary then issued a pub-
lic notice that protests to the petitions could be filed on or before
November 27, 1987.15
Rita Montero filed a verified protest with the Secretary on Novem-
ber 27, 1987. In her protest she asserted that the petitions circulated by
the Official English Committee did not comply with the Federal Voting
Rights Act, 16 and therefore the signatures gathered in the bilingual
10. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101(l)-(3) (Supp. 1988).
11. The purpose of the Title Board, pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101(2)
(Supp. 1988), is to set a proper fair title for the proposed constitutional amendments and a
submissions clause. See also In re Proposed Initiative Concerning Drinking Age, 691 P.2d
1127 (Colo. 1984) (board created to assist the people in implementation of right to initiate
laws).
12. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Montero v. Meyer, 696 F.
Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1988) (No. 88-C-889).
13. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-40-102 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
14. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-104 to 107 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
15. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-40-109 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
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counties were invalid.17 She also asserted that the language of the pro-
posed amendment was unconstitutionally vague and that a fiscal impact
statement previously filed with'the Secretary in connection with the initi-
ative was vague and unconstitutional. She also claimed that her due
process rights were violated due to a lack of adequate notice of the May
6 hearing.
A hearing on Rita Montero's protest was held by the Secretary on
December 15, 1987. The Secretary refused to hear any evidence or ar-
guments regarding the alleged violations of the Voting Rights Act' 8 and
deprivation of due process rights 19 resulting from the lack of notice pro-
vided to Ms. Montero and other persons similarly situated. The Secre-
tary ruled that jurisdiction of those issues is in the federal courts and the
only issue that properly could be raised at this protest hearing was the
validity of the signatures appearing on the petitions. Because there were
no allegations that the signatures were not of registered voters or that
specific signatures were improper the Secretary dismissed the protest.
III. COLORADO DISTRICT COURT DECISION
Ms. Montero then filed an action 20 in the District Court for the
State of Colorado to compel the Secretary to hear the alleged Voting
Rights Act violation and the constitutional issues.
The district court dismissed the action on May 23, 1987, agreeing
that the Colorado Secretary of State did not have any authority to rule
on Federal Voting Rights Act violations. Further, the court stated that
matters of constitutional vagueness could not be determined prior to
the election approving the proposed initiative.
2 1
The court held the Secretary did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
and did not abuse her discretion by dismissing the protest, nor were due
process rights denied by her actions. The court ordered that the pro-
posed initiative be placed on the November 8, 1988 general election
Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to the prohibitions of the
second sentence of subsection 4(a) of this section provides any registration or
voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information
relating to the electoral process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the
language of the applicable language minority group, as well as in the English
language....
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(c) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to the prohibitions of
subsection (b) of this section provides any registration or voting notices, forms,
instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral
process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the applicable
minority group, as well as in the English language....
17. The counties subject to bilingual requirements of the amended Voting Rights Act
of 1965, in which the petitions were circulated, are: Alamosa, Archuleta, Bent, Conejos,
Costillo, El Paso, HuerFano, Las Animas, Otero, Pueblo, Rio Grande, and Saguache. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4) & 1973aa-la(c) (1982).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1986).
19. Reporter's Partial Transcript at 5, Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo.
1988) (No. 88-C-889).
20. Pursuant to COLO. R. Civ. PROC. 106(a)(4) (1973 & Supp. 1988).




ballot by the Secretary. 2 2
It is interesting to note that the court was satisfied that the Federal
Voting Rights Act (the "Act") does not apply to the circulating of peti-
tions. While the Act may apply to some petitions, the court held it does
not apply to petitions used by the public to place an initiative measure
on the ballot. Only after the initiative is on the ballot would the Act
apply. The court stated "[t]he ballot and the accompanying submissions
clause . . .have to be bilingual at that time, at the November general
election, but not at the time the petitions are circulated."' 23 Thereafter,
Rita Montero filed an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.
IV. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The complaint in the federal district court alleged initiative peti-
tions are "materials or information relating to the electoral process"
which under the Act 24 cannot be circulated in only the English language
in bilingual counties. The Act defines bilingual counties as those coun-
ties in which more than five percent of the citizens of voting age are
members of a single language minority group. 25 The plaintiffs claimed
that the rights of Colorado citizens to vote and to participate in the elec-
toral process had been unlawfully abridged because the initiative peti-
tions circulated in bilingual counties of Colorado were not printed in
both English and Spanish. The complaint alleged that over sixty-one
thousand of the petition signatures from bilingual counties were invalid
because the petitions were not printed in both languages.
The complaint also asserted that the plaintiff's due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment were violated by the Secretary's al-
leged failure to provide adequate notice of the May 6, 1987 hearing.
Plaintiffs prayed for a declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief.
The Secretary, joined by the Official English Committee, filed a mo-
tion to dismiss, contending the Act does not apply to the ballot initiative
petitions and the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice of the May 6 hear-
ing because it was quasi-legislative in nature, requiring only general no-
tice to the public.
The federal district court granted a preliminary injunction on Sep-
tember 16, 1988 barring placement of the official language amendment
on the general election ballot. The court held initiative petitions must
be circulated in both the English and Spanish languages under the Act if
the petitions are a part of the electoral process. The electoral process
was held to include all activities which are required to occur prior to the
holding of an election under state law and which therefore are prerequi-
sites to voting.2 6 The court held Colorado law requires that petitions be
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 4.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(0(4) & 1974aa-la(c) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b) (1982).
26. Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540, 547 (D. Colo. 1988).
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circulated prior to an election for a constitutional amendment by initia-
tive and "[tihus it is an essential step in the electoral process." 27 The
court also held "as a matter of law, ballot petitions constitute 'materials
or information relating to the electoral process', within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4) and 1973aa-la(c)."
28
Voting Rights Act requirements apply only to state action. The
court held governmental action dictated by the state initiative statutes,
which includes a review and comment, a setting of title, the counting of
signatures, and the holding of hearings to entertain challenges to peti-
tions, constitutes state action under the Act. 29 Since it was likely that
plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, the court granted the temporary
injunction without addressing due process issues.
V. TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Secretary and the Official English Committee in a hurried move
before election day, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit. Its decision, handed down November 1, 1988, re-
versed the judgment of the United States District Court, vacated the pre-
liminary injunction, and remanded the case.
The Tenth Circuit held that the language of the Voting Rights Act
concerning the electoral process had been construed too broadly by the
federal district court when it ruled that initiative petitions are a part of
the electoral process. The court held that the electoral process is lim-
ited to actions directly related to voting. The court reasoned that the
Act limits the meaning of the term "vote" to include only action that
involves "registering one's choice at a special, primary, or general elec-
tion." °3 0 Therefore, only matters which are prerequisite to voting and
relate directly to the casting of a ballot are a part of the electoral pro-
cess. "This interpretation accords with the common meaning of the
word 'vote'."
3 1
Implicit in the common and statutory definitions of voting is the
presence of a choice to be made. The court wrote: "One ordinarily
votes to pick one candidate or another, or one votes for or against the
adoption of an initiated measure. Thus, applying the concept of voting
to a process which provides no choice defies the commonly accepted
usage of the term. "32
The Tenth Circuit found no way to register opposition to an initia-
tive under the Colorado procedure until the measure reaches the ballot,
likening the circulation of a petition to the process of nomination. The
court held the electoral process to which the bilingual requirements of
27. Id. at 547.
28. Id. at 548.
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4) & 1973aa-la(c) (1982 & Supp. 1984) states "whenever
any State or political subdivision provides ......
30. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1988).




the Act apply "does not commence under Colorado.law until the Secre-
tary of State certifies the measure is qualified for placement on the bal-
lot, and that signing of an initiated petition is not 'voting'." 3 3 The court
concluded:
The Congressional purpose in expanding the Act to include the
minority language provisions was to give 'meaningful assist-
ance to allow the voter to cast an effective ballot.'3 4 The view
adopted by the [United States] District Court takes the Act into
activity outside of the casting of a ballot and improperly broad-
ens the scope of the law.
35
The Tenth Circuit also disagreed with the trial court on the state
action issue. Although the district court concluded that the initiative pe-
titions had been provided to the public by the state, the Tenth Circuit
held that the state, through its officials, merely performed ministerial
acts designed to make the initiative process impartial and fair but did
not provide petitions to the public. The Tenth Circuit cited the Colo-
rado Constitution,3 6 which states that a person who circulates an initia-
tive petition exercises an individual right solely for himself and not for
the state. The court held "[a]t most, the acts of the state officers could
be regarded as 'regulatory', but state regulation is insufficient to convert
private action into state action."
'37
In announcing its decision, the Tenth Circuit cited with approval a
similar case from California, Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles.38 In Zaldivar, a
notice of intention to recall a councilman, which had been circulated in
English only, was challenged under the Act. The federal district court
held that there was no state action involved in the recall attempt.
Rather, efforts to place the recall before the electorate were made solely
by private citizens. The recall petition process is not part of the electo-
ral process because "nothing one would associate with an election oc-
curs at that stage; principally, no voting occurs .... The court cannot
reasonably conclude that such conduct violates the Act when it is merely
the first step in a process which might ultimately lead to the holding of
an election."
39
The court in California also found the action to be frivolous, and
imposed sanctions upon the plaintiff's attorneys pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The attorneys appealed and the Ninth Cir-
cuit 40 held: 1) a plausible, good faith argument could be made by a
competent attorney to the effect that state action existed; and 2) a good
faith argument could be made that a recall petition is part of the electo-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 608 (citing S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 774, 799).
35. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 608 (10th Cir. 1988).
36. Id. at 609 (citing COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1).
37. Id. at 610.
38. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
39. Id. at 855.
40. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ral process. It was, therefore improper for the district court to impose
sanctions under Rule 11.
The only issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit was the applicability
of Rule 11. While discussing the Rule 11 issue, however, the court indi-
cated the Act did apply to the petitions. But, in the words of the Tenth
Circuit, that "observation was the purest of dictum .... The focus was
to test whether counsel had asserted an arguable claim by contending
the Act applied to the petition process."' 4 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit was
not swayed by the Ninth Circuit's footnote. Rather, it held that the initi-
ative process is not state action, and reversed the federal district court's
decision.
VI. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Ms. Montero unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. See supra note 8. Petitioners challenged
the Tenth Circuit's holding that the state's regulation of the form of
petitions to initiate a state constitutional amendment does not constitute
state action for purposes of the Voting Rights Act. They also challenged
the ruling that petitions are not "materials or information relating to the
electoral process" and that petitions are not a prerequisite to voting or a
standard procedure or practice with respect to voting within the mean-
ing of the Act.
A further issue could have arisen in the Supreme Court. In a foot-
note4 2 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged a first amendment issue which
had been raised by the defendants. Since the federal district court did
not consider the argument, the Tenth Circuit did not rule upon it. De-
fendants' contention was that the initiative process is core political
speech protected by the first amendment; therefore it cannot be fettered
by the imposition of the Act.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the first amendment issue
when it upheld a Tenth Circuit decision, Meyer v. Grant,43 striking down
a Colorado statutory provision which made it a crime to use paid peti-
tion circulators in the initiative process. The Supreme Court held that
since the state afforded its citizens the right to an initiative procedure to
bring about political and social change, it cannot interfere with the exer-
cise of that right. The Court held:
Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colo-
rado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the
41. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 608 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
42. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607-08 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988) reads as follows:
Defendants raise another issue which we do not consider, whether the Act
can be applied to the right of initiative. Plaintiffs contend the initiative process is
"core political speech," Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1892-93 (1988), which
cannot be fettered by the imposition of the Act. Because the district court did not
consider this argument, and it is not essential to our analysis, we will not address
it.
43. Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988).
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need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment. The
circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both
the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion
of the merits of the proposed change.
44
This decision clearly indicates that the initiative petition process is
protected core political speech for purposes of the first and fourteenth
amendments. But for now the Supreme Court has decided not to fur-
ther examine the issue.
VII. ANALYSIS
A. Colorado Constitution and Statutory Regulations
The Tenth Circuit was correct when it held there is no state action
involved in the circulating of initiative petitions. The Colorado Consti-
tution provides that the right to initiative is reserved to the people.
45
The absence of state action in the initiative process is obvious in Article
V, Section 1(5) of the Colorado Constitution. In reference to the pro-
cess of submitting the proposed initiative to the legislative research and
drafting office for comment and review, the Colorado Constitution
states that the drafting office shall render its comments to the propo-
nents of the initiative but "[n]either the general assembly nor its com-
mittees or agencies shall have any power to require the amendment,
modification, or other alteration of the text of any such proposed mea-
sure." 4 6 The state constitution does not allow any government entity to
change the content of an individual's proposed amendment to the
constitution.
The statutes which govern placing an initiative on the ballot are
designed to keep the procedure uniform and the information clear.
47
The individuals sponsoring the initiative bear all the expense for the
petition process. The Secretary and the Title Board do not initiate the
petitions, draft the language of the petitions, or participate in the circu-
lation of the petitions or the gathering of signatures. Nor are they in the
position of deciding the merits of the proposed initiative.4 8 Their duties
are to ensure that the statutory procedures for form are followed, that
the title placed before the public is fair, that the submissions clause is
clear, and that the signatures are gathered by the appropriate means.
Likewise, the Secretary does not provide any materials to the public.
The individuals who are seeking to have the initiative placed on the bal-
lot must provide all materials.
44. Id. at 1891.
45. CoLo. CONST. art. V., § 1(2).
46. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5).
47. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-106 & 107 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
48. See also In re Branch Banking Initiative, 200 Colo. 85, 612 P.2d 96 (1980); In re
Second Initiated Const. Amend., 200 Colo. 141, 613 P.2d 867 (1980); Spelts v. Klausing,
649 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1982) (impartiality by the board required).
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B. Case Law
As previously mentioned, 49 the United States Supreme Court up-
held the Tenth Circuit holding in Meyer v. Grant 50 that the state cannot
impede or diminish the power of the people to exercise the initiative
right once the state has reserved that power to the people. Only after
the initiative has been certified to the ballot must all information, mater-
ials, notices and ballots disseminated by the state be bilingual in the af-
fected counties. There simply is no state action for purposes of the
Voting Rights Act until the initiative is certified to the ballot.
Lower courts in jurisdictions other than Colorado have held that
initiative petitions are not a prerequisite to voting and do not constitute
materials or information relating to the electoral process for purposes of
the Voting Rights Act.
The most current case regarding petitions is an Eleventh Circuit
case from Florida, Delgado v. Smith. 5 1 Citizens of Florida circulated, in
accord with the statutory procedure, petitions to gather enough signa-
tures to have a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution placed
on the ballot. The issue on appeal in this case was whether the petition,
written in English only and circulated in designated bilingual political
subdivisions, violated the Voting Rights Act. The court examined the
legislative history of the Act and concluded that Congress was con-
cerned exclusively with a citizen's ability to exercise effectively his right
to vote. "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to remedy the
systematic exclusion of blacks from the polls by the use of poll taxes,
literacy tests, and similar devices." '5 2 Section 4(a) states that the pur-
pose of the Act was to ensure that the right of citizens of the United
States to vote is not denied or abridged on account of race or color and
that no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any election; federal,
state or local; because of his failure to comply with any test or device.
53
The Eleventh Circuit held "[t]here is no question that the sole purpose
of this legislation was to ensure the integrity of the registration and vot-
ing process by eradicating barriers which had previously prevented
blacks from voting."
'54
The court went on to examine amendments to the Act. In 1975,
amendments to the Act required official registration or election materi-
als to be published in the language of minority groups as well as in Eng-
lish, thus extending the Act's coverage to other minority groups,
including Hispanics. The Committee on the Judiciary emphasized that
minority language groups were obstructed from exercising their rights
to vote because they were unable to understand the ballot and other
49. See supra notes 43-44 & accompanying text.
50. 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (1988).
51. 861 F.2d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1988) reh g denied (December 19, 1988).
52. Id. at 1492.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(4)(a) (Supp. 1986).
54. Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1492 (11 th Cir. 1988).
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materials provided at the polls. 55 Then in 1982, Congress again
amended the Act to provide assistance at the voting booths for the blind
and the disabled who may be unable to cast their votes without help.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[oince again, it seems clear that
the purpose of Congress was to further expand access to the ballot. Sig-
nificantly, Congress has never shown any intent, either in the text of its
legislation or in the legislative history, to expand coverage of the Act to
materials distributed by private citizens." 5 6 The Eleventh Circuit was
unwilling to expand the Act to cover initiative petitions stating, "[w]hile
undertaking such an expansion in the law might be within the power of
Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment, it is an inappropriate step
for us to take."
5 7
The court then looked at the interpretive guidelines issued by the
Department of Justice regarding the minority provisions of the Voting
Rights Act. Although the Department of Justice interpretation to the
effect that petitions are electoral material is entitled to considerable def-
erence, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that these interpretations are to
be suggestive only, and that determination of what is required for com-
pliance is the responsibility of the affected jurisdiction. The guidelines
should not be used as a substitute for analysis and decision by the af-
fected jurisdiction.
58
After examining the legislative history of the Act, the stated inten-
tion of Congress, and relevant case law including Montero v. Meyer,59 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Act "does not apply to initiative pe-
titions and the involvement by the State officials in the initiative pro-
cess" 60 is ministerial and does not constitute state action for purposes of
the Act.
In a 1981 decision from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 6 1 the petitions for
placing a candidate on the ballot were circulated in English only. The
New York Board of Elections provided the notices regarding registra-
tion and location of polling places in Spanish as well as English. The
board also provided bilingual assistance for voters at the polling places
during the election. The court held that the essential services for voting
had been provided and that "[t]he failure to provide bilingual petitions
does not by itself deprive the Hispanic community [members] of their
right to vote."
'62
C. Legislative Committee Inquiry
Sixteen states have decided to preserve English as their official lan-
55. 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 774, 800-04.
56. Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1988).
57. Id.
58. 28 C.F.R. §§ 55.2(c) & 55.14(c) (1988).
59. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
60. Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1988).
61. 523 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
62. Id. at 177.
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guage through their constitutions or through statutory recognition. 63
In 1984, when the official language amendment to the United States
Constitution was introduced, Senator Orrin G. Hatch of the Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution, Committee of the Judiciary, inquired as to the
effect of amendments in states having such provisions. Nebraska re-
sponded that the State of Nebraska had the English language declared
its official language in 1875 and has had "no problems either in govern-
ment, schools, commerce or industry using English as our official
language."64
Illinois responded that its constitutional provision and the statutory
enactments of that provision did not prevent accommodations to indi-
viduals who did not know English well, such as providing translators in
court proceedings. It was Illinois' opinion that "the constitutional pro-
vision and statute may have had some tendency to persuade Americans
from various nations to learn English, an assimilation that undoubtedly
has contributed greatly to the stability and strength of this country."' 6 5
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Colorado Constitution declares, "[tihe first power hereby re-
served by the people is the initiative."' 66 This power cannot be abridged
by the state once the right has been reserved to the people. The object
of the Voting Rights Act is to make the total registration and voting
process fair to all citizens regardless of race, color, minority language, or
physical disability. In Montero v. Meyer,67 the Tenth Circuit held that the
statutory procedures are designed to make the initiative procedure fair
and clear to all people of the State of Colorado. The actions of the state
in this case are ministerial and do not constitute state action for pur-
poses of the Voting Rights Act. The Tenth Circuit also held "[tihe Act
is not written so broadly as to encompass all forms of petition."'6 8 Initia-
tive petitions are not part of the electoral process and do not need to be
circulated in different languages in bilingual counties because the peti-
tions do not directly relate to the casting of a ballot. The Voting Rights
Act does not apply until the measure is placed on the ballot.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion indicates the existence of a valid issue
as to whether the circulation of initiative petitions is protected political
speech. The Voting Rights Act cannot be construed to interfere with
first amendment free speech rights. Finally, the Tenth Circuit's opinion
63. Arkansas (1987); California (1986); Colorado (1988); Florida (1988); Georgia
(1986); Hawaii (1978); Illinois (1969); Indiana (1984); Kentucky (1984); Mississippi
(1987); Nebraska (1920); North Carolina (1987); North Dakota (1987) & South Carolina
(1987).
64. Letter from Allen J. Beermann, Secretary of State, Lincoln, Nebraska to Senator
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judici-
ary, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 29, 1984).
65. Letter from Illinois Legislative Counsel, David R. Miller, Senior Staff Attorney to
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Committee on theJudiciary (Nov. 28, 1984).
66. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2).
67. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 609.
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is in line with other case law pertaining to petitions which also held that
initiative petitions simply are not part of the electoral process such that
the Voting Rights Act would apply.
Joni E. Speirs

ANOTHER VIEW OF Montero v. Meyer and the English-Only
Movement: Giving Language Prejudice the
Sanction of Law
As whites see their power and control over their lives declining, will
they simply go quietly into the night? Or will there be an explosion.
Will Latin American migrants bring with them the tradition of the
mordida (bribe), the lack of involvement in public affairs, etc. ? I
The memorandum above is but one indication of the hidden racism
that motivates the English-only movement. Behind the facade of benign
paternalism is an effort to erase the gains made by minorities during the
civil rights era and create greater divisions within our society. Propo-
nents of English-only contend that declaring English the "official" lan-
guage of the United States will promote national unity.2 By focusing on
language, the English-only proponents can avoid addressing the real
targets of their attack, the Hispanic immigrants. Language is only the
signal to identify these people and deny their basic rights of citizenship.
3
Recently, tactics used by the proponents of English-only were chal-
lenged in court.4 In parallel cases out of Colorado and Florida, the
plaintiffs challenged the failure to print initiative petitions in a second
language where required by the Voting Rights Act. 5 In both cases, the
federal courts of appeals found that the Act does not apply to initiative
petitions. 6 The plaintiffs then petitioned for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. However, in July 1989, the Supreme Court re-
fused to hear the plaintiffs' appeals.7 For the reasons stated below, the
authors of this article believe that the Court should have addressed this
issue.
This article begins by placing the legal issues raised in the present
litigation in the proper social context. Part I examines the goals of the
English-only movement, and the immediate threat posed to minority
voting rights. Comparisons are made to this nation's dark history of
polling abuses, which Congress sought to correct by passing the Voting
Rights Act. Part II of this Note applies the Voting Rights Act to the case
1. Excerpt from a memorandum written in 1986 by Dr. John Tanton, co-founder of
"U.S. English." A. CALIFA, DECLARING ENGLISH THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: PREJUDICE SPO-
KEN HERE 1, 55 n.221 (1989) (available through Legislative Council Washington, ACLU,
122 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington, D.C. 20002).
2. For a good discussion on this point see Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language
Amendment: Shield or Sword? 3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 519 (1985).
3. CALIFA, supra note 1, at 56.
4. See Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988); Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d
1489 (11 th Cir. 1988).
5. Montero, 861 F.2d at 603; Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1489.
6. Montero, 861 F.2d at 607; Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1493.
7. Montero, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3249 (1989); Delgado,
861 F.2d 1489 (1lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3242 (1989).
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arising out of Colorado, Montero v. Meyer.8 By failing to print initiative
petitions in minority languages, the English-only defendants in Montero
effectively denied the right of minority citizens to participate in this pro-
cess of amending the state constitution. As this case illustrates, the Eng-
lish-only movement is a direct assault on the values fostered during the
civil rights era.
I. THE GOALS OF THE ENGLISH-ONLY MOVEMENT
There are two factions supporting English-only legislation: "Eng-
lish First" founded by Lawrence Pratt, a Virginia state legislator; and
"U.S. English" ("USE") founded by Dr. John Tanton and former Sena-
tor S.I. Hayakawa. 9 Public figures such as Arnold Schwarzenegger, Alis-
tair Cooke, and Walter Cronkite have all served on the Board of
Advisors of USE.' 0 Dr. Tanton was also founder of the Federation of
American Immigration Reform ("FAIR"), a group lobbying for stricter
immigration policies."
In 1986, leaders of the English-only movement met at the WITAN
IV conference. 12 In a private memorandum written for the conference
Tanton asked: "How will we make the transition from a dominant non-
Hispanic society with a Spanish influence to a dominant Spanish society
with non-Hispanic influence?"' 3 Dr. Tanton's writings indicate that the
English-only movement is not simply a struggle over language, but be-
tween races:
In the California of 2030, the non-Hispanic Whites and Asians,
will own the property, have the good jobs and education, speak
one language and be mostly Protestant and 'other.' The Blacks
and Hispanics will have the poor jobs, will lack education, own
little property, speak another language and will be mainly Cath-
olic. Will there be strength in this diversity? or [sic] will this
prove a social and political San Andreas Fault?
14
It is easy to forget that this country was built as a nation of immi-
grants. Immigrants have enriched our culture, including our language,
injecting it with vitality that is essential to our continued cultural devel-
opment. Immigrants have provided our nation with leaders, as well as
farmers and merchants, and with entrepreneurs, as well as laborers.
15
Immigrants have reinforced our belief in America as a unique land of
8. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
9. CALIFA, sUpra note 1, at 11-12.
10. Id. at 13.
11. Id. at 12.
12. "Witan" is derived from an Old English word meaning "members of a council of
wise men." CALIFA, supra note 1, at 53 n.217 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 55 n.221 and accompanying text. As a result of this publication, both Walter
Cronkite and Linda Chavez resigned from USE, fearing the impact on the Hispanic
community.
14. Id. at 56 n.225.
15. For a good discussion of immigration at the turn of the century see R. GINGER,
THE AGE OF ExCESS (1975).
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opportunity, having left their homes with the hope of finding something
better.
Numerous immigrant groups have confronted hostility upon their
arrival in America. In the last half of this century and as a result of revo-
lutions and stagnating economies in third world countries, the immi-
grants have been primarily Southeast Asians, Cubans, Puerto Ricans,
and Mexicans-all non-Anglos and most non-English speaking.
The leaders of English-only fear these newest groups of non-Anglo
immigrants. This fear is prompted, in part, by the belief that these im-
migrants have different values that are incompatible with the majority of
English-speaking Americans. 16 Furthermore, they have the opportunity
to assert these values as a formidable voting force.
A. The Voting Rights Act
Throughout our country's history different groups have demanded
greater power to influence political decision making. Initially, these de-
mands were perceived as a threat to the established political order. Per-
sons without property interests, women, and blacks all have had to
overcome difficult obstacles to obtain the right to vote.17 The history of
the enfranchisement of language minorities has been no different. Our
experience has taught us, however, that whenever a group has been ex-
tended this right, it has not weakened our system of government, but
has strengthened it. The democratic franchise provides minority groups
with a valuable outlet for political expression.
In 1870, the fifteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
extended to blacks the right to vote. iS However, states were able to
circumvent the intent of the fifteenth amendment through numerous
methods. These included grandfather clauses, property qualifications,
good character tests, gerrymandering, poll taxes, and requirements that
the applicant be able to read and interpret materials. 19
The persistence of states in seeking new means of circumventing
the fifteenth amendment is illustrated by two Texas cases. In Smith v.
Allwright, the Supreme Court declared that political parties could not re-
strict their primary elections to whites only.2 0 "When primaries become
a part of the machinery for choosing officials,. . . the same tests to deter-
mine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied
to the primary as are applied to the general election."12 1
In an effort to evade the ruling of Allwright, the whites-only Jaybird
Democratic Association held pre-primary elections; the successful candi-
16. Leibowicz, supra note 2, at 546.
17. See, e.g., L. BANNER, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON (1980).
18. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
19. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1966).
20. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
21. Id. at 664.
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date would then go on to run in the Texas Democratic primary. The
Supreme Court struck down this purportedly private action in Terry v.
Adams. 22 The Court reasoned that "the constitutional right to be free
from racial discrimination in voting 'is not to be nullified by a state cast-
ing its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization
to practice racial discrimination in the election.' ",23
As Terry illustrates, the fifteenth amendment applies to any private
actions serving an important electoral function. A state cannot delegate
a traditional state function to a private individual to avoid the reach of
the Voting Rights Act. In Montero v. Meyer, the English-only defendants
argued that the distribution of initiative petitions is a private action,
outside the purview of the fifteenth amendment. 24 However, to say that
the circulation of initiative petitions by individuals is not state action
flies in the face of Terry v. Adams.
Since Terry, Congress has repeatedly attempted to formulate legisla-
tion that would eliminate the problems of voter discrimination. The
Civil Rights Act of 1957, the perfecting amendments in the Civil Rights
Act of 1960, and Title 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were efforts by
Congress to outlaw methods used to deny minorities the right to vote.2 5
Despite the efforts of the Justice Department, these laws did little to
curtail the problem:
Even when favorable decisions have finally been obtained,
some of the states affected have merely switched to discrimina-
tory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted
difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity be-
tween white and [black] registration. Alternatively, certain lo-
cal officials have defied and evaded court orders or have simply
closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls.
26
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. 2 7 Its intent was to
remedy the use of methods, which previously denied people of color the
right to vote. 28 The Act is broadly based and written in terminology
that is general and expansive in definition. It is written to give notice to
the states that any test, device, procedure, or standard which infringes
on the voting rights of minorities, no matter how subtle, will not be
tolerated.
29
During congressional hearings, Senator Fong voiced his concern
that the word "procedure," as used in section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, would not be broad enough to cover the various abuses employed
by states to subvert the Voting Rights Act. 30 Attorney General Katzen-
22. 345 U.S. 461, 465-69 (1953).
23. Id. at 466 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).
24. 861 F.2d at 609.
25. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
26. Id. at 314.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982).
28. See id. at § 1971.
29. Id.
30. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 & n.31 (1969); Voting Rights
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, title I, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (redesignated at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
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bach, who was instrumental in drafting the Voting Rights Act, explained
that the word "procedure" should include any kind of practice that
would deny or abridge the right to vote because of color or race. Kat-
zenbach suggested substituting the word "procedure" with the phrase
"standards, practices or procedures."''s Congress adopted this broader
language to give the Voting Rights Act the scope necessary to prevent
further infringement of minority voting rights.
3 2
The Voting Rights Act also covers changes made in the electoral
process. Before making any changes, jurisdictions covered by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b) must submit their proposals to the Attorney General or ob-
tain a declaratory judgment from the district court in Washington,
D.C.3 3 Changes in voting procedures will only be approved if they do
not abridge the voting rights of minority citizens.3 4 Previous exper-
iences, exemplified by Allwright and Terry, had taught the Justice Depart-
ment that as fast as they could declare one device illegal, the states
would find another means of carrying out their discriminatory intent.3 5
In the 1969 decision, Allen v. Board of Elections, the Supreme Court
heard four cases that involved the application of the Voting Rights
Act.3 6 In Whitley v. Williams, appellants challenged a Mississippi law that
revised the nominating petition process.3 7 Although Allen was decided
pursuant to section five covering election procedure changes, ChiefJus-
tice Warren, finding support for his ruling in the legislative history, de-
termined that the Voting Rights Act was applicable to procedural
changes in the petition process.
3 8
In hearing, the Attorney General Katzenbach remarked there were
two or three types of changes that may be specifically excluded from
section five, such as changing from a paper ballot to voting machines.
He emphasized, however, that there were "precious few" changes that
could be excluded "because there are an awful lot of things that could
be started for purposes of evading the fifteenth amendment if there is
the desire to do so.1' 39 Congress chose not to include these minor ex-
ceptions in section five, indicating their intent that all changes be subject
to section five scrutiny.
40
31. Allen, 393 U.S. at 566-67 n.31.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982).
33. Id. at § 1973c.
34. Id.
35. As Attorney General Katzenbach commented:
Our experience in the areas that would be covered by this bill has been such as to
indicate frequently on the part of State legislatures a desire in a sense to outguess
the courts of the United States or even to outguess the Congress of the United
States. . . . [Als the chairman may recall . . . at the time of the initial school
desegregation .... the legislature . . . passed a law to frustrate that decree.
Allen, 393 U.S. at 567-68.
36. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
37. Id. at 551.
38. See id. at 566-68. Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, title I, § 5, 79 Stat. 439
(redesignated and amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
39. Allen, 393 U.S. at 568.
40. Id.
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In 1975, the Voting Rights Act was extended to cover language mi-
norities. 4 1 As the basis for this extension, Congress had determined,
through the use of various practices and procedures, citizens of
language minorities have been effectively excluded from partic-
ipation in the electoral process. Among other factors, the de-
nial of the right to vote of such minority group citizens is
ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational opportu-
nities afforded them resulting in high illiteracy and low voting
participation.
42
Since 1975, America has been coming to grips with a newly evolving
political and economic scene. Vietnam, Nicaragua, Third World debt,
and our declining world economic dominance have forced us to reevalu-
ate our role as a world leader. For many Americans this reevaluation
has caused anxieties and fears about an uncertain future. The move-
ment to declare English the "official" language is a product of this
fear.
43
Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress to ban bilingual
education and declare English the "official" language. Although these
efforts were soundly defeated, the proponents of English-only have not
relented. On September 15, 1988, California Representative Norman
D. Shumway introduced the latest legislation, which has been endorsed
by USE. 44 The bill contains exceptions for bilingual education, teaching
foreign languages to students proficient in English, the use of court
translators, and the use of a language other than English for health or
safety reasons.45 There is no exception, however, for multilingual elec-
tion materials. 46 The Shumway bill is one more attempt to defeat the
Voting Rights Act.
Contrary to the assertions of English-only proponents, abolishing
the use of multilingual election materials will effectively deny the voting
rights of those citizens who are not fluent in English. In fact, this is
precisely what has happened in Montero v. Meyer.4 7 By failing to print
initiative petitions in minority languages, the proponents of English-
only effectively excluded non-English speaking citizens from participat-
ing in the first step of amending the Colorado constitution. The Voting
Rights Act is intended to address precisely this kind of concerted effort
to disfranchise voters.
II. APPLICATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT TO Montero v. Meyer
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1975 to protect the
electoral privileges of language minority citizens. 4 8 The amendments to
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1982).
42. Id. at § 1973aa-la(a).
43. See CALIFA, supra note 1, at 1-13.
44. Id. at 18 n.81.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
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the Act require states to provide election materials in a second language
in every jurisdiction where the illiteracy rate is higher than the national
average and at least five percent of the voting population does not speak
English.49 This requirement applies whenever any state "provides" any
"materials or information relating to the electoral process." 50
Applying this language to the case of Montero v. Meyer raises two
issues of statutory interpretation. 5 1 The first issue is whether petitions
to initiate a constitutional amendment are "materials or information re-
lating to the electoral process." The second issue is whether the state
"provides" petitions when regulating and approving the form of those
petitions, when its officials assist in formulating the content of the initia-
tive, and when an elected state official uses state funds to promote the
initiative. In short, the issue is whether these acts are considered "state
action" for purposes of the Voting Rights Act.
A. Do the Language Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Apply to Initiative
Petitions?
To find an exemption from the Voting Rights Act, the English-only
proponents claim that initiative petitions are not "materials or informa-
tion relating to the electoral process." This assertion is untenable under
a plain reading of the Voting Rights Act.
As a prerequisite to placing initiatives on the ballot, petitions have a
clear relation to the electoral process. When deciding whether to sign a
petition, voters make an important choice that will determine whether a
proposed amendment will be placed on the ballot. The English-only
proponents would exclude from this process those citizens who are not
proficient in English.
1. Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act by the United States
Attorney General
In Montero v. Meyer, Colorado state election officials failed to comply
with the language provisions of the Voting Rights Act.52 When drafting
the Voting Rights Act, Congress chose not to leave such important
rights of citizenship to the exigencies of state and local officials. Such a
system would be ripe for abuse and was expressly rejected by Congress.
Instead, Congress gave broad enforcement powers to the United States
Attorney General.
53
On July 20, 1976, the Department of Justice promulgated regula-
tions stating that the written materials covered by the Voting Rights Act
include "petitions."' 54 Consistent with the statute, these regulations
49. Id. at § 1973c.
50. Id. at §§ 1973aa-la(c) & 1973b(f)(4).
51. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
52. Id.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
54. 28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a) (1988). The identical language was contained in a notice of
official rule making issued on April 21, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 16,773 (1976).
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place an affirmative duty on the states to interpret and enforce the Vot-
ing Rights Act: "It is the obligation of the jurisdiction to decide what
materials, must be provided in a minority language."
'55
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this language to
mean that the "jurisdiction" is vested with discretion to determine what
materials are covered by the Voting Rights Act.56 Such a reading brings
the regulations into direct conflict with the remedial goals of the statute.
When enacting the Voting Rights Act, Congress was faced with recalci-
trant state officials who sought to obstruct minority access to the electo-
ral process at every turn. Vesting these same state officials with
discretionary powers would render the Act meaningless.
The Justice Department recently reaffirmed its position in an ami-
cus brief filed in the case of Delgado v. Smith: "The Attorney General has
consistently interpreted Section 4(0(4) as covering' petitions."5 7 Judi-
cial deference to the Justice Department's regulations is appropriate in
the present case for two principle reasons. First, it is well established
that the interpretation of a statute given by its enforcing agency is enti-
tled to great judicial deference. 58 The rationale behind this rule is par-
ticularly compelling in this case, since the Attorney General played a
major role in drafting the Voting Rights Act and explaining its operation
to Congress. 59
Second, Congress had an opportunity to address this issue in 1982
when it extended the language provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
During the congressional hearings, the Justice Department provided
copies of the regulations, along with a letter stating that the bilingual
provisions applied to petitions.60 Being fully aware that the implement-
ing regulations applied the Voting Rights Act to petitions, Congress ex-
55. 28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a) (1988).
56. Montero, 861 F.2d at 608-09. The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the regulations
breaks two fundamental rules of construction. First, wherever possible, regulatory provi-
sions should be read in harmony. In this case, the regulations can be read consistently by
understanding the first provision to mean that each jurisdiction has an affirmative duty to
interpret and enforce the Voting Rights Act, and by understanding the second provision to
mean that a reasonable interpretation by such jurisdiction would include "petitions" as
material covered by the Act. The Tenth Circuit made no attempt to harmonize these pro-
visions.
Second, a specific provision in a regulation controls over a general provision. In this
case, the section listing "petitions" among election material covered by the Voting Rights
Act specifically addresses the issue of whether the Act covers petitions. Thus, even if the
disputed provisions cannot be read in harmony, the latter provision will prevail since it
directly addresses the issue.
57. Amicus brief for the United States at 1, 22, Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
59. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987); United
States v. Board of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110, 131 (1978); Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S. 379, 391-92 (1971).
60. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on the Extension of the Voting Rights Act
Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary: Hearings on S. 53, S.
1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1790 (1982).
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tended the Act without amendment. 6 1
2. What is "Voting?"
Recognizing the often elusive quality of state-sanctioned voting dis-
crimination, Congress adopted a remedial scheme consummate to the
task. The Voting Rights Act applies a broad definition of the term "vot-
ing" to include "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any pri-
mary, special or general election," including all actions "required by law
prerequisite to voting."
6 2
The proponents argue that the petition process is not an "action
required by law prerequisite to voting." To the contrary, Colorado law
prescribes in detail the steps that must be taken by the petitioner.
63
These steps are required by law and are a prerequisite to placing an
initiative on the ballot for voting. If the petitioner fails to gather a suffi-
cient number of signatures, the initiative will not be included on the
ballot. This process is clearly within the terms of the Voting Rights Act.
To advance the remedial objectives of the Voting Rights Act, the
Supreme Court has applied an expansive reading to the term "vot-
ing."6 4 In Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Court held a state reappor-
tionment plan to be within the terms of the Act.6 5 The Court stated that
"the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing
that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.' "66
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals tried to avoid this expansive
definition of the term "voting" by making reference to dictionary defini-
tions. 6 7 The court found that implicit in the definition of the concept of
voting is "the presence of choice."'68 The court, however, failed to ap-
ply this judicially contrived definition in a sensible manner when it
stated that the petition process "provides no choice."'6 9 The choice in
the petition process is clear: to sign or not to sign. It is this choice that
determines whether the initiative will be placed on the ballot.
As an example of covered activities, the Voting Rights Act lists voter
registration. 70 In Colorado, only registered voters can sign an initiative
petition.7 1 This fact is significant, first because it shows that the Voting
Rights Act reaches activities that occur prior to signing a petition. Sec-
ond, and more fundamentally, the registration requirement reflects the
importance of the constitutional initiative process. It is this process that
will determine whether a proposed initiative will be placed on the ballot.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
62. 28 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1988).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101 to -109 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
64. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969).
65. Id. at 570-71.
66. Id. at 565-66.
67. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1988).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 28 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1988).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106(2) (1973 & Supp. 1988).
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The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that this process of
amending the state constitution is conducted in a fair and orderly man-
ner. The Voting Rights Act advances this important state interest by
ensuring that the power of initiative is open to all qualified voters.
The power to amend the state constitution should not be construed
narrowly. In addition to the actual signing of a petition, the initiative
process includes public education and debate. Providing petitions in
minority languages aids this process by alerting language minority citi-
zens to the issues at stake. Once aware of the issues, these citizens can
fully exercise their democratic right to participate in the debate; they can
do so formally, through political parties and coalitions, or informally, by
discussing the issues among friends. By refusing to print petitions in
minority languages, the English-only proponents effectively excluded
minority citizens from this process.
B. Did the State "Provide" Election Material in Montero v. Meyer Within
the Meaning of the Voting Rights Act?
Admittedly, the Voting Rights Act applies to "state action" and not
private political speech such as the distribution of leaflets. 72 However,
the actions taken by the Official English Committee and state officials
during the initiative process in Montero v. Meyer are a far cry from the
private actions exempt from the Voting Rights Act.
1. Actions Taken by the State in Montero v. Meyer
To fully appreciate the issue of "state action," it is necessary to look
at the petition process in detail. The move in Colorado to put the Eng-
lish-only amendment on the ballot was initiated by State Representative
Barbara Anne Philips. In 1987, Representative Philips introduced a bill
making English the official language of Colorado.73 After the bill was
defeated in the legislature, Representative Philips and the Official Eng-
lish Committee began work toward a state-wide referendum.
74
As required by state law, Representative Philips first submitted a
draft of her proposal to the Colorado Legislative Council and the Legis-
lative Drafting Office for review and comment. 75 These two state agen-
cies sent Representative Philips a report containing their proposals and
comments, which she discussed with the staff members of the agencies.
Two days after this meeting, Representative Philips formally submitted
her initiative proposal to the Colorado Secretary of State.
76
The proposal incorporated two provisions added as a result of Rep-
72. The proponents of English-only argue that requiring petitions to be printed in a
minority language infringes the first amendment rights of petitioners. To the contrary, the
remedial tools used by the Voting Rights Act are narrowly tailored to promote a significant
governmental interest. The Act expands the political speech of language minority citizens,
while placing a minimal burden on petitioners.
73. Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540, 541 (D.Colo. 1988).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 543.
76. Id.
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resentative Philips' meeting with staff members of the two state agen-
cies. After receiving the proposal, the Secretary of State issued notices
of a public hearing to be held before a three-member state title board.
The board set the ballot title and submission clause for the initiative,
and prepared a summary of its contents. This information was included
in the printed petition forms, along with the language of the proposed
amendment. As a final step, a state elections officer corrected and ap-
proved the actual petition forms used by the Official English
Committee.
77
While Representative Philips used government resources at several
points in the petition process, a finding of "state action" should not
hinge upon this fact. The intimate involvement of state officials in the
statutory petition process should be a sufficient ground to find "state
action." The issue of whether statutorily mandated state action is
enough to bring the Voting Rights Act into play will receive its proper
focus in the parallel case from Florida, Delgado v. Smith, where the claim
of "state action" does not rely upon the spending of government
funds.
78
2. Is the Statutory Process of Amending the State Constitution "State
Action ?"
The language provisions of the Voting Rights Act apply whenever
any state "provides" any "materials or information relating to the elec-
toral process."' 79 In Montero v. Meyer, the state dictated the form, as well
as the content of the petition.80 The actual language of the proposed
constitutional amendment was reformulated as a result of discussions
with state officials. Most importantly, state officials approved the fact
that the petitions would only be printed in English.
The English-only proponents claim that these actions are merely
regulatory and, therefore, exempt from the Voting Rights Act. This ar-
gument misstates the issue. The issue is not whether these actions are
regulatory, but whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."'8 ' In the
present case, the requisite "nexus" is established by the intimate in-
volvement of state officials setting the form and content of the petitions.
The state, in effect, "provides" election materials and is therefore active
in the petition process.
The initiation of proposed constitutional amendments is tradition-
ally a function of government. In Colorado, prior to 1910, state consti-
tutional amendments could be proposed only through actions of elected
officials or delegates. In 1910, the power to propose constitutional
77. Id.
78. 861 F.2d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1988).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-la(c) & 1973b(f)(4).
80. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
81. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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amendments was given to the people.8 2 This power was given to all of
Colorado's citizens, not just those who speak English.
CONCLUSION
The political struggle over the democratic franchise did not end
with passage of the fifteenth amendment. 83 Starting with Jim Crow
laws, the white majority sought to obstruct minority voting rights
through more insidious means like gerrymandering and poll taxes.
Though more subtle, the new forms of discrimination were no less per-
nicious. When Congress sat down to draft the Voting Rights Act in
1965, it sought to engender a higher notion of democracy-an idea of
democracy based on a process of inclusion to achieve full political
equality.
The struggle over the democratic franchise continues today. The
goals of the Official English movement are not limited to amending the
constitutions of individual states. Legislation has been introduced in
Congress that would ban bilingual education and prohibit multilingual
ballots.8 4 Such legislation, if passed, would arguably violate the consti-
tutional guarantees of equal protection and substantive due process.
With this in mind, the proponents can be expected to seek an amend-
ment to the federal Constitution making English the "official" language
of the United States.
These efforts to legislate conformity will only increase the divisions
within our society. The immediate impact will be to disfranchise voters
and disadvantage language minorities. Racial and cultural animosity will
be heightened as individuals find their prejudice sanctioned by law. In
the long run, the Official English movement will lead to greater eco-
nomic and social stratification. The Voting Rights Act must now be en-
forced to uphold the democratic rights of language minority citizens and
reinstill the values fostered during the civil rights era.
Paula Ison
Brant Seibert*
82. 1910 CoLo. SEss. Laws 1, 11-12.
83. Indeed, the struggle for women's suffrage was just beginning and continued until
passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920.
84. CALIFA, supra note 1, at 18 n.81.
* The authors would like to thank National Lawyer's Guild members Berry
Roseman, Ken Padilla, Rita Montero, and Henry Feldman for their assistance and inspira-
tion in writing this article.
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No MORE TEARS: ANTI-SYMPATHY JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ATTEMPT TO DISALLOW IMPULSIVE EMOTION
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no area of criminal law where it is of more significance to
ensure fairness than in a capital punishment trial. To guarantee a just
outcome, it is crucial to guard against the influence of impermissible
factors during both the trial and sentencing stages. Post-judgment ap-
peals provide further opportunity for higher courts to correct injustice
by vacating a death sentence founded upon unconstitutional grounds.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Geor-
gia.' The Court, in a five to four margin, held that capital punishment
was unconstitutional under then-existing statutes.2  Post-Furman
Supreme Court cases have specifically addressed prosecutors' comments
which may diminish a jury's sense of responsibility and anti-sympathy
jury instructions in death penalty cases.3 These holdings provide guide-
lines for future court proceedings in order to avoid violation of constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights.
In Parks v. Brown, 4 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed two
separate issues in light of these new Supreme Court guidelines. The
first issue presented by the petitioner-appellant in Parks, claimed that
the prosecutor's remarks misled the jury by impermissibly diluting their
sense of responsibility when imposing sentence. 5 The petitioner's sec-
ond contention focused on an anti-sympathy jury charge in the penalty
phase of the trial.6 The petitioner claimed that this instruction violated
his eighth amendment rights.
7
This article examines the significance of the Tenth Circuit decision
in Parks, and the possible future affect it will have on prosecutor's com-
ments and anti-sympathy jury instructions. Furthermore, it will discuss
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness And Discrimination Under Post Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
3. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) where the Supreme Court found
that the prosecutor impermissibly mislead the jury as to its responsibility in the sentencing
decision; see also, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) where the Court, in a five to
four decision, upheld an anti-sympathy jury instruction.
4. District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CRF 77-3159, aff'd, Parks v. State,
651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, Parks v. Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 1155
(1983), cert. denied on post conviction proceedings, Parks v. Oklahoma, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984),
habeas corpus proceeding, Parks v. Brown, 823 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1987), opinion withdraum
and republished, Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1987), different results reached on
reh'g en bane, Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
After this article was written the Supreme Court granted Oklahoma's petition for cer-
tiorari and agreed to review the Tenth Circuit decisions in Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545
(10th Cir. 1988) (en bane), and Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1987). See Saffle
v. Parks, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
5. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1549.
6. Id. at 1552.
7. Id.
645
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the Parks opinion in light of the Supreme Court's position on
prosecutorial conduct and the fine line the Court has drawn in uphold-
ing certain anti-sympathy jury instructions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Caldwell v. Mississippi
s
The issue presented to the Supreme Court for review in Caldwell
was whether a capital punishment sentence could be upheld when the
jurors had been led to believe that the "responsibility for determining
the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with the jury but with
the appellate court which later reviews the case." 9
Upon review, the Supreme Court invalidated the petitioner's death
sentence,' 0 holding that the prosecutor had wrongfully minimized the
jury's sense in the importance of its role."I The prosecutor's argument
suggested to the jury that the ultimate responsibility for the imposition
of the death penalty did not rest with them, but with the appellate
court.12 The assistant district attorney had repeatedly informed the ju-
rors that their capital punishment decision was automatically reviewable
by a higher court.'
3
Another factor which affected the Court's judgment in Caldwell was
the trial court's affirmation of the prosecutor's remarks. In response to
the defense's objection to the prosecutor's closing argument, the trial
judge overruled the objection by addressing the prosecutor,". . . go on
and make the full expression so the jury will not be confused. I think it
proper that the jury realizes that it [the jury's decision] is reviewable
automatically as the death penalty commands."' 14 The Supreme Court
highlighted the trial court's mistake when it asserted, "[tihe trial judge
in this case not only failed to correct the prosecutor's remarks, but in
fact openly agreed with them; he stated to the jury that the remarks were
proper and necessary, strongly implying that the prosecutor's portrayal
of the jury's role was correct."'
5
The Supreme Court in Caldwell held that it is "constitutionally im-
permissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sen-
tencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests
elsewhere."16
8. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
9. Id. at 323.
10. The petitioner shot and killed a small grocery store owner while in the process of
robbing it. He was later convicted of murder and a death sentence was imposed. Id. at
324.
11. Id. at 328-29.
12. Id. at 323.
13. Id. at 325.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 339.
16. Id. at 329.
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B. Dutton v. Brown 17 & Coleman v. Brown' 8
Dutton v. Brown and Coleman v. Brown are two post-Caldwell cases de-
cided by the Tenth Circuit. In neither instance did the court of appeals
find the prosecutor's remarks had impermissibly violated the defend-
ant's constitutional rights. The prosecutor's closing remarks in Dutton
underscored the fact that the jury is part of the whole justice system.
The prosecutor emphasized that jurors do not "function as individuals"
but are "part of the process."' 19 The Tenth Circuit held that the com-
ments, taken in context, were permissible. The court found that "[t]he
statement was not designed to, nor did it, suggest to the jury that it was
not ultimately responsible for deciding Mr. Dutton's punishment."
20
Similarly, in Coleman, the Tenth Circuit asserted that the "dangers
the [Supreme] Court identified in Caldwell are not present in the remarks
made here."'2 1 The prosecutor in Coleman did not attempt to diminish
the jury's accountability in a capital punishment conviction. Instead, the
prosecutor emphasized that the defendant bore the burden of his pres-
ent situation. 2 2 Looking at the prosecutor's remarks as a whole, it was
evident that the he did not intend to dilute the jury's sense of duty.
Commenting on the jury's task, the prosecutor stated, "[i]t will be one
of the most serious things you've every done in your life and it won't be
easy . .. [i]t's a grave responsibility you have . . . and it's not easy to
shoulder that kind of load, but somebody's got to."
2 3
C. California v. Brown
24
In Brown, the Supreme Court held that the respondent's eighth
amendment rights had not been violated by a jury instruction. 2 5 The
instruction informed the jurors that they "must not be swayed by mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling" during the penalty phase of a murder trial.
2 6
The five to four decision, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing the
majority opinion, found that the Court's eighth amendment criteria had
been met. 27 Past Supreme Court holdings have established two prereq-
uisites for valid death sentencing. First, the jury may not act with unre-
strained discretion. This is to prevent the administration of arbitrarily
17. 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
18. 802 F.2d 1227 (10th Cir. 1986).
19. Dutton, 812 F.2d at 596.
20. Id. at 597. The defendant had been sentenced to death for killing a bar owner
while robbing the establishment. The sentence was modified to life imprisonment by the
Tenth Circuit due to error. The error was the exclusion of mitigating evidence offered by
the petitioner's mother. The trial court refused to allow her to testify because she had
remained in court after a sequestration order.
21. Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 1986).
22. Id. at 1241.
23. Id.
24. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
25. Id. at 543.
26. Id. at 539.
27. Id.
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arrived at penalties. 28 Next, the defendant "must be allowed to intro-
duce any relevant mitigating evidence"
2 9 regarding his character.3 0
In reaching its conclusion, the majority stressed the exact wording
of the jury charge at issue. "What the Rehnquist group deemed disposi-
tive was the inclusion of the adjective 'mere.' "3 1The Court found that
the respondent had incorrectly focused solely on the noun "sympa-
thy."'3 2 The Court maintained that from the inclusion of the word
"mere," a juror would understand that the jury should not rely on "ex-
traneous emotional factors" when making its death sentence
determination.
3 3
The Court reasoned that the directive would limit the jury's consid-
eration to matters introduced into evidence, while conveying the
message that the jury must "ignore ... the sort of sympathy that would
be totally divorced from the evidence."13 4 An instruction which prohib-
its the jury from consideration of extrinsic factors does not violate the
eighth amendment.
3 5
In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor concurred with the major-
ity in Brown. She noted that imposition of the death penalty involves a
"reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion."'3 6 (emphasis in original).
However, Justice O'Connor cautioned that anti-sympathy instructions
may mislead jurors "into believing that mitigating evidence about a de-
fendant's background or character ... must be ignored."
3 7
III. PARKS V. BROWN
A. History of Proceedings
The District Court of Oklahoma County by jury conviction found
Robyn Leroy Parks, petitioner-appellant, guilty of first-degree murder of
a gas station attendant. The same jury sentenced Parks to death. "Parks'
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals." '3 8 The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari with Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissenting.
3 9
28. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
29. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987).
30. The respondent in this case was convicted of forcible rape and first degree murder
of an adolescent girl. At the penalty phase, the defendant presented character witnesses to
testify to his peaceful nature. Id. at 539.
31. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 19, Parks v. Brown, 860
F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (No. 86-1400). [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner-Appellant (en
banc)].




36. Id. at 841.
37. Id. at 842.
38. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1498 (10th Cir. 1987).
39. Parks v. Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
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Parks then attempted to challenge his post-conviction proceedings
in Oklahoma. He was denied relief in state district court and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 40 The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
4 '
"Having exhausted his state remedies, Parks filed a habeas corpus pe-
tition in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma."-4 2 Parks' execution, scheduled eleven days from his date of
appeal, was stayed by the district court pending its decision. The district
court denied relief and dismissed all claims.
43
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed
to hear Parks' appeal. Circuit Judges Monroe G. McKay, Bobby R.
Baldock and Robert H. McWilliams sat on the review panel. The panel
affirmed the district court finding in a split decision 4 4 with two of the
judges, McKay and Baldock supporting a petition for rehearing. The
full court of appeals granted an en banc rehearing with respect to the
sentencing issues on which the panel had been divided.
45
B. Facts
The facts of the case presented by the state which led to Parks' con-
viction of first degree murder are as follows. Abdullah Ibrahim, a part-
time Gulf gas station attendant in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma was found
dead of a gun shot wound on the morning of August 17, 1977. There
were no signs of struggle and no money or property had been taken.
The police found an unused credit card slip at the station which led to
the discovery of a car containing Parks' possessions. 46 This link caused
Parks to become the chief suspect of the homicide. At this time Parks
was in California, but frequently called a friend of his in Oklahoma,
James Clegg. Clegg allowed the police to tape two of his phone conver-
sations with Parks.
4 7
In these two conversations, Parks admitted to shooting Ibrahim be-
cause Parks intended to use a stolen credit card to buy gas and feared
the attendant would call the police.4 8 Based on this evidence, the jury
40. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unreported order and
opinion. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1498.
41. Parks v. Oklahoma, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
42. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 2.
43. However, the district court did grant a Certificate of Probable Cause to appeal.
Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 3.
44. Judge McKay dissented in a separate opinion as to three of appellant's claims.
These claims involved, (1) the jury instruction on second-degree murder; (2) the prosecu-
tor's comments to the jury during the penalty phase; and, (3) the propriety of the anti-
sympathy jury instruction. In the second claim, the appellant claimed the prosecutor's
comments minimized the importance of the jury's role in pronouncing sentence. Parks v.
Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987). (McKay, J., dissenting).
45. Judge McKay "would have ordered a new trial for both the guilt and penalty
phases." Brief for Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 3.
46. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1498.
47. Clegg's assistance was motivated by the prospect of a $5,000 reward from Gulf,
and the possibility that the authorities might dismiss a burglary charge against him. Brief
for Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 5.
48. During the trial, Parks denied killing Ibrahim. He testified he was somewhere
1989] 649
DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW
found Parks guilty of first degree murder. After further hearing, the
same jury sentenced him to death.
4 9
C. The en banc Opinion of the Tenth Circuit
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two of the petitioner's con-
tentions. 50 The first argument claimed that the prosecutor's comments
to the jury impermissibly diluted the juror's sense of responsibility in
violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi.5 1 The second argument asserted that
the anti-sympathy jury instruction violated the petitioner's eighth
amendment rights.
52
The Tenth Circuit reversed the petitioner's death sentence. Six of
the circuit judges held that the anti-sympathy jury charge violated the
defendant's constitutional rights. While in a seven to three split regard-
ing the prosecutor's remarks, the court concluded that Caldwell was inap-
plicable to the instant case.
1. Majority Opinion - Issue I
Judge Ebel, writing for the majority, affirmed the district court's de-
cision that the prosecutor's remarks "did not violate Caldwell by improp-
other than the gas station at the time of the killing and presented a witness to corroborate
his alibi. He explained the presence of the credit card slip by stating that he had
purchased gas at that particular gas station a few days prior to the shooting but did not
have cash with him. Parks claimed that the attendant copied his license number and later
that same day he came back to the station and paid for the gas. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d
1496, 1499 (10th Cir. 1987).
However, during the first taped telephone conversation with Clegg, Parks admitted to
killing the attendant because he did not want the police to discover his use of the stolen
credit card. Also, if the police caught him they might discover that he had guns and dyna-
mite in the trunk of his car. (The reason Parks had these explosives was never explained in
the appellate court record). Id. at 1499.
49. "The jury found only one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances that
were charged-that the murder was 'committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or prosecution.' " Parks, 860 F.2d 1545, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
The other two aggravating factors which the jury rejected were, (1) that Parks would prob-
ably commit other crimes in the future which would pose a continued threat to society, and
(2) that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious and cruel." Id. at 1547 n.l.
At the time of the homicide, Parks was 22 years old. When Parks was 17, he was
charged with robbery by force and fear to which he pled guilty. "In brief, the facts were
that Parks, and two other black youths, accosted a white student in a school yard and after
a fight took six cents from the victim." A few years later Parks was convicted for attempted
burglary. This is the history of his prior convictions. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1502
(10th Cir. 1987).
50. The three member Tenth Circuit panel considered seven arguments on peti-
tioner's appeal. These included (1) an instruction on the lesser offense of second-degree
murder; (2) admission of petitioner's prior robbery conviction; (3) the prosecutor's com-
ments to the jury during penalty phase (one of the two arguments reconsidered en banc);
(4) the trial court's anti-sympathy instruction (the second contention re-examined on ap-
peal en banc); (5) instructions which addressed aggravating and mitigating circumstances;
(6) whether petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase;
and (7) whether Oklahoma arbitrarily applied the death penalty in a racially discriminatory
manner. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (1987).
51. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
52. For purposes of discussion the two arguments heard by the Tenth Circuit in the
Parks case will be referred to as issue I and issue II. Issue I refers to the prosecutor's
closing remarks while issue II involves the anti-sympathy jury charge.
[Vol. 66:4
ANTI-SYMPATHY JURY INSTRUCTIONS
erly reducing the jury's sense of responsibility for the sentencing
decision."' 53 The court approached its examination of issue I in a two-
step inquiry.54 First, it determined whether the prosecutor's statements
were the type of remarks covered by Caldwell. This means that the state-
ments must tend to alleviate thejurors of responsibility for their actions.
If the first criteria is met, then the "second inquiry evaluates the effect of
such statements on the jury. '" 5 5 The Tenth Circuit never progressed to
step two because it concluded that the comments did not violate the
petitioner's constitutional rights.
56
The court of appeals analyzed issue I in light of Darden v. Wain-
wright.5 7 This Supreme Court case elaborated on the Caldwell doc-
trine. 58 In Darden, the Court asserted that a Caldwell violation occurs
only when the comments "mislead the jury as to its role. . . in a way that
allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing
decision."'59 (emphasis added).
Although the prosecutor told the jurors in Parks that they had "be-
come a part of the criminal-justice system that says when anyone does
this [crime], that he must suffer death . . . so it's not on your con-
science," 60 the majority of the court believed that the prosecutor's
other comments had adequately stressed the gravity of the jury's
responsibility.6 1
Besides the prosecutor's statements which emphasized the jurors'
role in the process, the court found other portions of the trial protected
against the danger of diluting or trivializing the jury's sense of duty. Un-
like Caldwell,62 the judge's instructions 6 3 in Parks underscored the ju-
rors' function as the penalty assessors. The defense counsel's
statements in response to the prosecutor's arguments also served to
counteract any misunderstanding the jury members may have had as to
their function.
Last, the Tenth Circuit examined the Parks facts in light of its previ-
53. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1548.
54. Id. at 1549.
55. Id.
56. The second step would determine the effect such statements have on the jury dur-
ing the sentencing phase, possibly rendering the sentence unconstitutional. Id.
57. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
58. Supra note 16.
59. Darden, 477 U.S. at 184 n.15.
60. Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1564 (10th Cir. 1988) (McKayJ., concurring and
dissenting).
61. In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "We are sorrowful that you do
have a duty that you must perform..." and "[y]ou consider all of this evidence .... Can
you think of a more proper case ... in which your verdict assessing death would be more
proper?" The Tenth Circuit interpreted these statements as clear messages to the jury
that they had the ultimate responsibility in sentencing. Id. at 1550.
62. The misleading information regarding the jury's role was-compounded by the trial
court when it supported the assistant district attorney's remarks. The court stated, "I
think it proper that the jury realizes that it [the jury's decision] is reviewable automatically
as the death penalty commands." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 325 (1985).
63. The jury instructions stated, "It is now your duty to determine the penalty which
shall be imposed for this offense." Parks, 860 F.2d at 1551.
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ous holdings in Dutton and Coleman. In Dutton, the Tenth Circuit held
that the prosecutor's statements telling jurors that they are "part of the
process" 64 and that "you [the jurors] are not here in your individual
capacities ' 65 were not constitutionally impermissible. Instead, the court
found such comments "merely underscored that the jury was part of the
whole system ofjustice." 66 The court of appeals held that similar state-
ments in Parks were equally innocuous.
The majority in Parks also noted the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
Coleman. The prosecutor in Coleman emphasized that the defendant bore
the burden of his present plight because he was the perpetrator of the
crimes committed. The court of appeals found that these remarks did
not pose the dangers the Supreme Court identified in Caldwell.6 7 The
Coleman opinion went on to state, "[t]his method of argument does not
permit the jury to rely on someone else to make the ultimate sentencing
decision .... ",68
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit asserted that the prosecutor's com-
ments viewed in context "did not unconstitutionally diminish the jurors'
sense of authority and responsibility for the sentencing decision."
'69
Therefore, there was no Caldwell violation in the Parks case.
2. Majority Opinion - Issue II
The anti-sympathy jury instruction under attack in the Parks case
reads as follows: "You must avoid any influence of sympathy, senti-
ment, passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor when imposing sen-
tence .... ."70 Petitioner contended that this charge violated his
constitutional rights. The majority of the Tenth Circuit agreed.
7 1
The first premise which the court relied upon in reaching its conclu-
sion is found in the United States Supreme Court case of Mills v. Mary-
land.7 2 The Mills precedent holds that if there is a possibility that a
"reasonable juror could construe the instruction ... as to make its sen-
tencing decision improper . . . 73 this error is enough to require
resentencing.
74
The next question which the Tenth Circuit had to decide was
whether the anti-sympathy charge in Parks would skew a jury's decision
making process. The court approached this question by comparing a
similar jury instruction found in California v. Brown, 75 and analyzing the
Supreme Court's reasons for its holding in Brown.
64. Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1987).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 597.
67. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1550.
68. Id. at 1551.
69. Id. at 1552.
70. Id. at 1548.
71. Id. at 1552.
72. 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988).
73. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1553.
74. Id.
75. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
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The jury instructions in the two cases were similar, but not identi-
cal. In Brown, the charge cautioned the jurors not to be swayed by "mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling."' 76 On the other hand, the jury in Parks was directed not
to allow "any influence of sympathy . . .,,77 to bias its determination.
(emphasis added). The court found this difference decisive, because the
Supreme Court established the word "mere" as the crucial point in its
decision to uphold the instruction. The Court concluded that a juror
would understand "mere sympathy" as "a directive to ignore only the
sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence ad-
duced during the penalty phase." 78 Conversely, the Tenth Circuit re-
solved that "any" is an all-inclusive term, which "carries with it the
danger of leading the jury to ignore sympathy that is based on the miti-
gating evidence."
'79
Previous Supreme Court cases have held that it is a "capital defend-
ant's constitutional right to present and have the jury consider mitigat-
ing evidence" 80 and "[t]he sentencer . . . may not be precluded from
considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence.' "81 Based on these
precepts, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Parks jury charge had
"improperly undermined the jury's ability to consider fully petitioner's
mitigating evidence" in making its sentencing decision, thereby violat-
ing the defendant's constitutional rights. 82
3. Issue I: Dissenting Opinion
Both Chief Judge Holloway and Circuit Judge McKay concluded
that there was a Caldwell violation in the Parks trial. In his dissent, Mc-
Kay asserted that the prosecutor's remarks were improper "because they
diffuse the juror's sense of responsibility for the death sentence by inti-
mating that the jury is performing a dispassionate, mechanical"
function.
83
In the opinion of both judges, the absence of any corrective instruc-
tion by the court, combined with the damaging effect of the prosecutor's
remarks resulted in an unreliable jury verdict which could not be
sustained.
84
4. Issue II: Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Anderson criticized the majority for its limited
focus on the modifier "any" in the anti-sympathy charge. 8 5 Judge An-
76. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
77. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1552.
78. Brown, 479 U.S. at 542.
79. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1553.
80. Id. at 1554.
81. Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)).
82. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1556.
83. Id. at 1564. (McKayJ., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1560. (Holloway C.J., concurring and dissenting).
85. Id. at 1566. (Anderson J., dissenting).
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derson believed the majority's assumption that the jury could miscon-
strue the charge and thus ignore mitigating evidence was fallacious.
Instead, he argued that the anti-sympathy instruction "sensibly cautions
the jury against imposing sentence simply on the basis of arbitrary
emotions." 8 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Prosecutor's Comments Concerning the Jury's Responsibility
From the trilogy of Tenth Circuit decisions, comprised of Coleman,
Dutton, and Parks, it appears egregious prosecutorial remarks will not
invalidate a death sentence if the court believes the defense counsel ade-
quately counteracted the remarks, or the trial court corrected any mis-
conception the comments may have caused.8 7 In short, the defendant's
eighth amendment rights are violated only if the remarks render the trial
fundamentally unfair. The court of appeals justified its holdings in Dut-
ton and Coleman by resolving that the prosecutorial comments did not
impermissibly taint the trial. However, the court's rationale in Parks is
less convincing.
The Supreme Court, in Caldwell, announced the principle that "it is
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determina-
tion made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsi-
bility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests
elsewhere." 8 8 Nevertheless, that is exactly what has occurred in Parks.
The challenged portion of the prosecutor's argument reads, in part, as
follows:
[Y]ou know, as you as jurors, you really, in assessing the death
penalty, you're not yourself putting Robyn Parks to death. You
have just become a part of the criminal justice system that says
when anyone does this, that he must suffer death. So all you're
doing is you're just following the law, and what the law says,
and on your verdict-once your verdict comes back in, the law
takes over. The law does all of these things, so it's not on your
conscience. You're just a part of the criminal justice system
that says when this type of type [sic] of thing happens, that
whoever does such a horrible, atrocious thing must suffer
death. 89
This argument "offers jurors a view of their role which might fre-
quently be highly attractive." 90 Perhaps this view is highly attractive,
but its basis is incorrect. The prosecutor's remarks here are in direct
violation of Caldwell and are designed specifically to undermine the
jury's sense of responsibility for the "life-or-death determination" 9 1
86. Id.
87. It appears the Tenth Circuit adheres to the Supreme Court's permissive position
on prosecutorial remarks. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
88. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
89. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1503 (10th Cir. 1987).
90. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 332-33.
91. Brief for Petitioner-appellant (en banc) at !1.
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they make. Instead, the prosecutor furnished the jury with the comfort-
ing notion that "the law" commanded the jury to find Parks guilty and
"the law" would be answerable for his execution. 9 2
To further alleviate each juror's conscience, the prosecutor invoked
God in his argument. "Now that's man's law. But God's law is the very
same. God's law says that the murderer shall suffer death. So don't let
it bother your conscience, you know."
9 3
Unlike Parks, the challenged comments in Dutton and Coleman were
not aimed at reducing the jury's sense of duty. In Dutton, the remarks in
dispute simply placed the jury's role in the context of the judicial system.
While the prosecutor in Coleman did maintain that the defendant was
responsible for his plight, he also stressed that the jury alone bears the
burden of imposing judgment.
Both ChiefJudge Holloway and Judge McKay raised a crucial point
in their dissents. 9 4 In Parks, the record is devoid of any curative lan-
guage by the court. The trial court did not attempt to remedy any mis-
leading remarks, or supply additional instructions to the jury after the
prosecutor spoke.95 In disagreement with the majority, both dissenters
believed the prosecutor's comments were improper. Therefore, the ab-
sence of any corrective instructions by the trial court to "effectively neu-
tralize the prosecutor's impermissible remarks," 9 6  resulted in
constitutional error.
97
The omission of judicial clarification was one reason for the
Supreme Court's holding in Caldwell.9 8 The Court stated in Caldwell,
"the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate de-
termination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger
that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its
role." 99
In their brief, respondent-appellees argued that the prosecutor's
comments were constitutional because they did not actually mislead the
jury into believing that an appellate court or some other authority would
decide whether to impose the death penalty.' 0 0 This is fallacious rea-
soning. Although the prosecutor did not specifically ascribe sentencing
authority to another body, his remarks did relieve the jurors of their
92. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
93. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1503.
94. Supra note 84.
95. Parks v. Brown 860 F.2d 1545, 1560 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Holloway, C.J.,
dissenting).
96. Id. at 1565.
97. For a study on the impact of judicial instructions and the effect of nullification
information to a jury see Horowitz,Jury Nullification: The Impact ofJudicial Instructions, Argu-
ments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988).
98. Also, the opinion noted that the trial judge supported the prosecutor's remarks,
thus sending a strong message to the jurors that the statements by the prosecutor were
correct. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 339 (1985).
99. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333.
100. Brief for Respondent-Appellees on Rehearing (en banc), Parks v. Brown, 860
F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (No. 86-1400). [hereinafter, Brief for Respondent-Appellees
(en banc)].
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personal responsibility by claiming that "the law" required the jury to
find Robyn Parks guilty. The prosecutor asserted, "all you're doing is
you're just following the law, and what the law says ... once your verdict
comes back in, the law takes over. The law does all of these things, so it's
not on your conscience." 10' (emphasis added). The prosecutor's descrip-
tion of the jury's role reduces it to a mechanical performance of adjudi-
cation. The jurors are stripped of their free choice by the implicit
message that they must find Parks guilty, because this enigmatic crea-
ture, "the law," requires the death penalty.
A worrisome aspect of the Tenth Circuit opinion in Parks is the ma-
jority's partial reliance on the defense counsel to counteract any of the
prosecutor's misrepresentations. The court stated that "defense coun-
sel, in his closing argument, responded directly to the prosecutor's com-
ments, thereby underscoring to the jury the full scope of its
responsibility."'10 2 This approach reduces a constitutional question to a
contest of persuasion. If the court allows the opposing parties to debate
the responsibility of the jury, or manipulate the jury's understanding of
its responsibility, a juror could end up believing whichever side is most
convincing, or most appealing.' 0 3 When this occurs, the court is no
longer adequately guarding against impermissible comments. This ap-
proach could potentially allow an eighth amendment violation to occur
because the court mistakenly believes any inappropriate statements have
been adequately corrected by opposing counsel.
B. The Anti-Sympathy Jury Instruction
The Tenth Circuit rightfully concluded that the anti-sympathy jury
instruction in Parks was unconstitutional. Interestingly, the court used
the Supreme Court's reasoning in California v. Brown 104 to arrive at an
opposite holding in the instant case. Like Brown, the outcome of the
Parks appeal hinged on the court's interpretation of one word. This key
word distinguished the Parks jury charge from the Brown precedent.
The pivotal word in the Parks jury charge was the adjective "any."
Since the purpose of mitigating evidence is to humanize the defendant,
the court concluded that the use of the word "any" as a modifier was
overly inclusive, virtually prohibiting any sympathetic response from the
jury, even a response predicated on mitigating evidence. The defend-
ant's background and character information are intentionally presented
to the jury to invoke feelings of compassion.' 0 5 Thus, the inclusion of
the word "any" could easily cause the jury to incorrectly believe that no
101. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1503.
102. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1550. Granted, the Parks opinion acknowledged that the
judge's instructions re-emphasized "that the sentencing responsibility rested with this
jury." Id. at 1551.
103. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1985). The Court recognizes
that an impermissible argument may be "highly attractive" to a juror, since it errone-
ously relieves the jury of its responsibility to impose judgment.
104. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
105. Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1555 (10th Cir. 1988).
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feelings of sympathy for the defendant were acceptable. As Justice
Brennan stated in his dissent in California v. Brown, 10 6 "forbidding the
sentencer to take sympathy into account, this language on its face pre-
cludes precisely the response that a defendant's evidence of character
and background is designed to elicit .... 107
What is disturbing about the Parks decision, in light of future cases,
is that it appears the use of one word instead of another will be decisive
as to whether the charge is deemed constitutional or not.' 0 8 Such atten-
tion to semantics is understandable within the legal community, how-
ever, it is doubtful that a juror will dissect an instruction as keenly as
persons in the legal profession might.' 0 9 Also, it is not ascertainable
whether a juror will comprehend the purpose of the charge, even if she
is attentive to the wording of the instruction. In Brown, Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent that, "[ilt is simply unrealistic to assume that
an instruction ruling out several emotions in unqualified language
would be construed as a directive that certain forms of emotion are per-
missible while others are not.""i 0 Both the majority and dissent in
Brown attempt to make educated guesses regarding a juror's synthesis of
the instruction. But well thought out assumptions are small comfort to a
capital offense defendant.
The majority in Parks highlighted another important caveat to anti-
sympathy jury charges. During voir dire and closing arguments the
prosecutor made statements to the jury about sympathy and its relation
to the jury's determination."' In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit only
briefly discussed these remarks due to its previous determination that
the anti-sympathy instruction had violated the petitioner's eighth
amendment rights. However, the court commented strongly about the
prosecutor's behavior when it stated, "ft]he prosecutor's use of the
[anti-sympathy] instruction demonstrates how a general anti-sympathy
instruction may be used to reduce improperly the jury's consideration of
106. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
107. Id. at 548.
108. On June 13, 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
an anti-sympathy jury instruction in Byrne v. Butler, 847 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988). The
instruction directed that the jurors should "not be influenced by sympathy, passion, preju-
dice, or public opinion." Id. at 1137. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court found in
State v. Copeland, 530 So. 2d 526 (La. 1988), that a jury charge which read, "You are not
to be influenced by sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public opinion. You are to reach a
just verdict," was constitutional. Id at 537.
109. Justice Brennan in his dissent in Brown, noted that it can not be expected that
jurors will engage in the "tortuous reasoning process necessary to construe it [sympathy]
as 'unfettered sympathy.' " Brown, 479 U.S. at 550-51.
110. Brown, 479 U.S. at 550.
111. The prosecutor told the jury during voir dire that they would be given an anti-
sympathy instruction which would prohibit their sympathy, sentiment or prejudice to influ-
ence their decision. Then in closing the prosecutor stated, "[h]is [the defense counsel's]
closing arguments are really a pitch to you for sympathy-sympathy, or sentiment ... and
you told me in voir dire you wouldn't do that . . . .You leave the sympathy, and the
sentiment and prejudice part out of it." Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1559 (10th Cir.
1988). In direct response to the prosecutor's behavior, the Tenth Circuit asserted, "Thus,
the prosecutor relied on the antisympathy [sic] instruction to overcome the defense coun-
sel's arguments regarding mitigation and mercy." Id. at 1559.
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mitigating circumstances."' 12
V. CONCLUSION
Obviously, prosecutorial statements which will corrupt the funda-
mental fairness of a trial are forbidden. However, recognition of an im-
permissible comment is not always easy, and it is the gray areas of the
process that cause difficulty. In order to assure the defendant a fair
judgment, the courts should not rely on the defense to equalize the pro-
ceedings. Instead, the judiciary must become more assertive about nul-
lifying any misconceptions created by the opposing counsel's
statements.
Although it is crucial for prejudice to be banned from the court-
room, it seems unlikely that a jury charge will accomplish this task. It
appears, however, the trend for the future will include similar charges.
Therefore, courts should endeavor to explain the intent of an anti-sym-
pathy instruction to the jury when such a charge is applied in the sen-
tencing phase of a trial. Unfortunately, this precaution will not remedy
the danger of misleading the jury as to the role emotion may play in




113. There has been strong criticism that criminal law is racially biased. For a detailed
study of the affect of racial bias in capital punishment verdicts see White, Juror Decision
Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 113 (1987); Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capi-
tal Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
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I. Introduction
In this survey period the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit's analysis of vertical nonprice restraints. The
Tenth Circuit had ruled in Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart International,
Inc. I that a manufacturer's refusal to grant a dealership to a distributor
was not a per se violation of section one of the Sherman Act,2 even
though the refusal came at the urging of a competing distributor. The
Tenth Circuit held that " 'in the absence of any evidence of intent to
raise prices .. .an agreement whereby a supplier of some good or ser-
vice refuses, at the behest of one of his distributors, to deal with a com-
petitor of that distributor is not illegal per se.' -3 This approach to
vertical nonprice restraints had been used in the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits; it was in contrast to the approach of the Third and
Ninth Circuits, which had held that such refusals were per se violations.
4
This conflict between the circuits was resolved when the Supreme Court
decided Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
5
II. WESTMAN COMMISSION Co. v. HOBART INTERNATIONAL, INC.:
A SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. Background
Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart International, Inc. arose out of a dis-
tributor's claim that a manufacturer's refusal to grant it a dealership was
an illegal restraint of trade.6 Hobart International, Inc. ("Hobart"), a
manufacturer of food service equipment, sells its products through ap-
proximately 540 independent dealers in the United States and is consid-
ered to be "the preeminent manufacturer" in the industry. 7 Hobart had
eight dealers in the Denver, Colorado area at the time it refused to grant
Westman Commission Company ("Westman") a dealership.
8
Westman, a wholesale grocery supplier, had entered the food ser-
vice equipment supply business in 1973 by purchasing the assets of the
WE-4 division of Wilscam Enterprises, Inc.9 The WE-4 division had dis-
I. 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988). At the district
court level, Westman was bifurcated into liability (Westman I) and damages (Westman II) seg-
ments. Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. 627 (D. Colo. 1978), is discussed in this article.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1223 (quoting Products Liability Ins. Agency v. Crum & For-
ster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982)).
4. See Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Zidell
Exploration, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
5. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
6. 461 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D. Colo. 1978), rev'd, 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
7. Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. at 628.
8. Id. at 629.
9. Id. at 628.
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tributed Hobart products on an informal basis' ° before it was acquired
by Westman. Westman also distributed Hobart products on this basis
after it acquired the WE-4 division and attempted to conclude a formal
dealership agreement with Hobart." I However, after complaints by an-
other Hobart dealer in the area, Hobart ultimately informed Westman
that it did not intend to offer Westman a dealership.'
2
Westman brought a private action under section one of the Sher-
man Act, 13 alleging that Hobart and Nobel, the competing distributor,
had conspired to keep Westman out of the food service equipment sup-
ply market.14 Nobel was Hobart's most successful dealer in the area and
had urged Hobart to deny Westman a dealership, claiming that the addi-
tional dealership would jeopardize Hobart's relationship with Nobel. 15
The district court determined that the relevant market was "one-
stop shopping,"' 16 and held that Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a
dealership had the effect of excluding Westman from the market.17 The
court held that this refusal to deal, at Nobel's prompting, was a conspir-
acy in restraint of trade and thus a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 18
Although the court had found a per se violation, it went on to per-
form a 'rule of reason' analysis of Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a
dealership.19 In applying a 'rule of reason' analysis, a court must con-
sider what procompetitive benefits are made available as a result of the
alleged anticompetitive practice.2 0 Hobart claimed that its refusal to
grant Westman a dealership was based on several reasons: that it "had
doubts about Westman's ability to pay for Hobart purchases," that it
10. "Although Hobart had been accepting orders from the WE-4 division as if it were
a formal Hobart dealer, a sales agreement form had never been signed by Wilscam Enter-
prises." Id. at 629.
11. Id. at 630.
12. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.
14. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1219.
15. Id.
16. This is "a recognized distinct market wherein a purveyor can supply a customer in
the institutional food service or restaurant business with all requisite equipment and sup-
plies." Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. 627, 628 (1978), rev'd, 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
17. Id. at 636.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The 'rule of reason' was first stated by justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
Id. at 238.
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"had adequate coverage in the [Denver] area," and that it "doubted
Westman's loyalty to the Hobart line."'2 1 The court determined that
these reasons for denying Westman the dealership were but a pretext
for an anticompetitive purpose.
22
B. Analysis: The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The district court's opinion was appealed by Hobart to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 23 The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Monroe McKay, reversed the lower court without remanding.
24
At the outset of its opinion the court stated that the purpose of the
antitrust laws was "the promotion of consumer welfare" 25 and that it
would consider Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a dealership in terms
of its effect on consumers rather than competitors. 26 The court ex-
amined the district court's conclusion that Hobart had excluded West-
man from the market and determined that the lower court had
misidentified the relevant product and geographic markets. The prod-
uct market was not strictly "full-line distribution"; nor was the geo-
graphic market limited to the Denver area. 2 7 The appellate court held
that these conclusions were the result of identifying the market from the
perspective of the distributor rather than the consumer.
28
Although Hobart had not excluded Westman from the market, it
had terminated Westman as a distributor in response to Nobel's threat
that making Westman a dealer would "jeopardize" Hobart's relationship
with Nobel. 29 The appellate court thus had to consider the agreement
between Hobart and Nobel, and determine whether Hobart's refusal to
deal was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
The court noted that other circuits had split on the question of
whether a manufacturer's refusal to deal with a distributor was a per se
violation when the refusal came at the urging of a competing distributor.
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had held that refusals to deal
were not per se violations; the Third and Ninth Circuits had held that
they were. 30 The court stated that it agreed with those circuits that re-
jected the per se approach.
3 1
After reviewing the basis for various circuit rulings, it pointed out
that the rationale for applying the per se approach was almost always the
21. Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. at 637.
22. Id. at 636.
23. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
24. Id. at 1228.
25. Id. at 1220.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1220-22.
28. Id. at 1220-21.
29. Id. at 1221.
30. Id. at 1223.
31. "After weighing the conflicting authorities, we choose to align ourselves with the
Seventh Circuit." Id. at 1222-1223. The Fifth Circuit had also rejected the per se ap-
proach. Id. at 1223.
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presence of price-fixing motives.3 2 The court stated that its rejection of
the per se approach was supported by the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 3 3 "In Monsanto, the Court
held that a plaintiff could not survive a directed verdict by merely estab-
lishing that a manufacturer terminated a price-cutting distributor in re-
sponse to complaints of a competing distributor. ' 34 Quoting from the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.,35 the court emphasized that "[n]othing in Monsanto suggests that
liability can be found without any evidence of a price fixing agreement.
Rather the language of Monsanto can only indicate the Court's belief that
a pricefixing agreement is a requirement for per se liability in distributor termi-
nation cases."
3 6
Applying this approach to Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a
dealership, the Tenth Circuit stated that "[s]ince the record reveals not
the slightest hint of price maintenance or price fixing, Hobart's refusal
to deal cannot be illegal per se."
3 7
The court then explained why a 'rule of reason' analysis was partic-
ularly appropriate to refusal-to-deal cases. It pointed out that "sound
economic theory" supported "allow[ing] suppliers wide latitude in se-
lecting their distributors" 38 and that the Supreme Court had recognized
this in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.3 9 "[E]ven though these re-
fusals to deal may limit intrabrand competition, they are likely to benefit
consumers by increasing interbrand rivalry."' 40 Some of the procompe-
titive effects of refusals to deal are "allowing each distributor to achieve
economies of scale and to spread out fixed costs over a large amount of
products," "facilitat[ing] the entry of new manufacturers into the mar-
ket," "encourag[ing] distributors to provide promotional activities, con-
sumer information, and product service," and "reduc[ing] transaction
costs .... "41
III. BUSINESS ELECTRONICS CORP. V. SHARP ELECTRONICS CORP.
In its rationale for rejecting the per se approach to vertical nonprice
restraints, the Tenth Circuit cited the Fifth Circuit's "extensive and well-
reasoned" opinion in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
4 2
Business Electronics was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court and the
Court's opinion was dispositive not only of that case, but also of Hobart
32. Id.
33. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
34. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
35. 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986), afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
36. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1224 (quoting Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780
F.2d 1212, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986), afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1226.
39. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
40. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1227.
41. Id.
42. 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986), ajfd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
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Business Electronics Corporation was the sole retailer of Sharp
electronic calculators and business equipment in the Houston area until
1972, when Sharp appointed Gilbert Hartwell as a second retailer. After
Hartwell had sold Sharp products for a while, he began to complain to
Sharp about Business Electronics' price cutting: Hartwell complained
that Business Electronics was " 'free riding' on Hartwell's investment in
product promotion and other sales-related services."' 44 Eventually
Hartwell gave Sharp an ultimatum: terminate Business Electronics as a
retailer, or Hartwell would cease to sell Sharp products. Sharp termi-
nated Business Electronics.
4 5
Business Electronics brought an action alleging that Sharp had vio-
lated section one of the Sherman Act 4 6 by agreeing with Hartwell to
terminate Business Electronics. 4 7 Sharp responded to these allegations
by claiming that it had terminated Business Electronics for several rea-
sons not related to any attempt to set resale prices. These included dis-
satisfaction with Business Electronics' failure to meet sale quotas, as well
as its discounting practices.
48
The issue of liability was submitted to the jury as an instruction that
there is a per se violation of the Sherman Act when a supplier agrees to
terminate a price cutting dealer at the prompting of another dealer.
49
The jury found that there was an agreement between Sharp and Hart-
well to terminate Business Electronics because of its price cutting.
50
B. Analysis: The Fifth Circuit Opinion
On appeal Sharp presented several issues to the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. In addition to whether the trial court's application
of a per se standard was correct, there were also evidentiary questions
and a question regarding the computation of damages. 5 1 Chief Judge
Clark, writing for the court, began this analysis by pointing out that the
trial court's finding, "which [did] not require an agreement between
43. McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323, 329 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
44. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1215 (5th Cir. 1986),
afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988). "Free riding" is a practice that allows one distributor to take
advantage of a competing distributor's expenditures on promotion and services for a
product. The free riding distributor is able to sell the product at a lower price because it
does not have the cost of the promotion and services it can rely on its competitor to
provide.
45. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (5th Cir.
1986), afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
46. See supra note 13.
47. Business Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1214.
48. Id. at 1215.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1214.
51. Id.
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Sharp and Hartwell to maintain resale prices, is an incorrect one." 5 2
The court noted precedent within the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere
that supported its reversal of the district court. 53 It then addressed the
fact that two other circuits had taken a contrary view. In Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp. ,54 the Third Circuit held that a manufacturer's termi-
nation of a dealer in order to protect a requesting dealer was per se
illegal.5 5 ChiefJudge Clark pointed out that the rationale for the Cernuto
decision was that "if the manufacturer and dealer wish to protect the
dealer from price competition then they must intend that prices be
higher once the price cutting dealer is terminated."'56 Chief Judge
Clark then delineated his reasons for disagreeing with this standard. He
began by stating that the effect of terminating a price cutter "may be to
raise prices but this is equally true of the granting of an exclusive dealer-
ship, which we have held not to be per se illegal." 5 7 He next showed
how this fit in with recent Supreme Court decisions in Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp. 58 and Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania.59
The court concluded by stating that "in order for a manufacturer's
termination of a distributor to be illegal per se, it must be pursuant to a
price maintenance agreement with another distributor."1
60
IV. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE SPLIT
The Supreme Court opinion by Justice Scalia began with the Court
acknowledging that certiorari was granted to hear Business Electronics "to
resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals regarding the proper dividing
line between the rule that vertical price restraints are illegal per se and
the rule that vertical nonprice restraints are to be judged under the rule
of reason."'6 1 The opinion then proceeds to draw that line, yet all the
while draw away from it.
After recounting the history of the case, the Court stated that the
Sherman Act "prohibit[ed] only unreasonable restraints of trade" 62 and
that "per se rules are appropriate only for 'conduct that is manifestly an-
ticompetitive.' ",63 It pointed out that in its Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylva-
nia decision, it had refused to apply a per se rule to a manufacturer's
termination of one dealer in connection with an exclusive territory
52. Id. at 1215.
53. See Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980); Aladdin Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1979); St. Petersburg Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Morgan
Yacht, Inc., 457 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
54. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 170.
56, Business Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1216 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. (emphasis in original).
58. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
59. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
60. Business Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1218 (emphasis in original).
61. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1517 (1988).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)).
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agreement with another dealer. 64 Application of a per se standard was
to be "based on demonstrable economic effect rather than ... formalis-
tic line drawing."'65 In GTE Sylvania the Court determined that vertical
nonprice restraints did not facilitate cartelization. Rather, "they had
real potential to stimulate interbrand competition, 'the primary concern
of the antitrust laws.' ,66
The Court emphasized the importance it gave to the GTE Sylvania
decision: "We have been solicitous to assure that the market-freeing
effect of our decision in GTE Sylvania is not frustrated by related legal
rules."'6 7 It then stated that applying a per se rule in the circumstances
of Business Electronics "would threaten to dismantle the doctrine of GTE
Sylvania" as well as "discourage conduct... recognized as beneficial to
consumers." 68 The Court concluded by stating that the Fifth Circuit
was correct in applying the 'rule of reason' to refusals to deal when there
has been no agreement as to price or price levels.
6 9
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Business Electronics accomplishes
more than the resolution of a split in the Courts of Appeal. Vertical
nonprice restraints will now be considered under a 'rule of reason' anal-
ysis unless there has been some showing of an agreement as to price or
price levels. 70 Along with narrowing the application of per se analysis,
the Court has provided a method of analysis for approaching vertical
nonprice restraints. This method, as stated in Business Electronics, is as
follows:
[T]here is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard;
departure from that standard must be justified by demonstrable
economic effect, such as the facilitation of cartelizing ... inter-
brand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws;
and that rules in this area should be formulated with a view




65. Id. (quoting Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)).
66. Id. (quoting GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)).
67. Id. at 1520.
68. Id. at 1521, 1523.
69. Id. at 1525.
70. Id.





Andrews v. Veterans Administration, 838 F.2d 418
The president of the union local representing nurses employed at
the Veterans Administration (VA) Medical Center requested copies of
proficiency reports for all registered nurses at the center. Appellees, all
registered nurses at the center, brought an action seeking to enjoin the
VA from releasing these personnel records in an improperly sanitized
condition, and sought damages, citing an intentional and willful viola-
tion of the Privacy Act of 1974. The district court found that the VA
erred in failing to balance the interest of the parties prior to disclosure
and found the nurses' privacy interests were substantial and the union's
interest in obtaining the documents was minimal. Reversed.
The Tenth Circuit held that even if the Privacy Act is violated, no
punishment may be imposed unless the agency acts in a manner that is
intentional or willful, and the action is so patently egregious and unlaw-
ful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it to be un-
lawful. Applying this standard, the VA's conduct fell short of not only a
willful or deliberate standard, but also the gross negligence standard
applied by the district-court.
Brock v. R.J. Auto Parts and Service Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 677
Appellant Department of Labor appeals a district court decision dis-
missing its cause of action against the appellee as a discovery sanction.
Reversed and remanded.
The Department of Labor brought suit against R.J. Auto Parts
under the Fair Labor Standards Act for violations of minimum wage,
overtime, and record keeping provisions. During discovery, R.J. Auto
Parts requested the names of all the individuals who had made com-
plaints to the Dept. of Labor. When the Dept. failed to provide these
names, the district court dismissed the action. In reversing, the court of
appeals noted that R.J. Auto Parts demonstrated no need for such a list,
and that absent this showing of need, the Deptartment of Labor was not
required to prematurely identify the witnesses it was planning to call at
trial.
Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs v. Kaiser Steel Corporation,
860 F.2d 377
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 liberalized eligibility
requirements. The Act provided that if a miner had been denied bene-
fits prior to March 1, 1978, he could reapply to have his eligibility deter-
mined under new criteria. The burden of paying benefits to such miners
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was shifted from the employer to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied on affidavits from a claimant
and transferred liability from the claimant's employer to the Fund.
Finding that the transfer of liability was in error because there was no
record of an earlier claim, the Director modified the ALJ's ruling. After
a hearing, a new ALJ ruled that the Director had no authority to modify
the previous decision.
The Tenth Circuit held that under 33 U.S.C. § 922, the Director is
without authority to modify a compensation order for any mistaken de-
terminations of fact other than his own. Since the ALJ made the mis-
take, and not the Director, there was no authority to modify the order.
Gatson v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 379
Plaintiff, who had originally been denied social security benefits,
brought suit and won the right to those benefits. In this action, plaintiff
brought suit under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412, to recover her attorney's costs from the previous action.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the EAJA standard to re-
cover litigation costs from the United States had been met by the plain-
tiff. The court held that the Social Security Administration's total
reliance upon the Administrative LawJudge's application of a subjective
pain evaluation test was not substantially justifed.
Hill v. Department of Air Force, 844 F.2d 1407
On appeal, defendant-appellant argues that the district court erred
in granting appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction ordering ap-
pellant to restore appellee's security clearance and prohibiting appellant
from releasing information on appellee's suitability for a security
clearance.
The panel concluded that the district court improperly based its ju-
risdiction on constitutional grounds and evaluated the merits of the ap-
pellant's actions with respect to appellee's security clearance on those
grounds. Based on Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 108 S. Ct. 818 (1988), fed-
eral courts have no authority to review the merits of the grant or denial
of security clearances; instead, these matters are within the discretion of
the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.
The panel found that the court did have general jurisdiction to re-
view whether agency procedures were followed, but had no power to
order a reinstatement of appellee's clearance or to grant the additional
relief contained in the preliminary injunction granted to appellee.
Moreover, the panel held that a further review of the procedures fol-
lowed in suspending appellee's clearance and of the agency's refusal to
continue to adjudicate the matter following appellee's removal for mis-
conduct is unnecessary and inappropriate. The case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
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Johansen v. The City of Bartlesville, 862 F.2d 1423
Appellants appeal the dismissal of their civil rights claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 and 1985(3). Appellants in district court al-
leged violation of rights to due process and equal protection due to in-
adequate notice of a meeting at which a rezoning settlement agreement
was approved by less than the super majority vote required by statute.
After the district court dismissed the case below, appellants were given
adequate notice of and attended a meeting at which the rezoning of the
property was approved by the requisite super majority vote. Subsequent
to that meeting, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals invalidated the zoning
change due in part to insufficient notice of the initial meeting. Address-
ing the issue of mootness, the Tenth Circuit held that appellants' claims
fail to survive the test of mootness since this is not a class action and
appellants fail to meet the two-part test of (1) a challenged action of
duration too short to permit full litigation and (2) that there be a reason-
able expectation that the same party will again be subjected to the same
action. Here, there was full litigation of all matters and the court found
nothing in the record to indicate that appellants had any reasonable ex-
pectation of a recurring controversy to which they would be parties.
The court also held that appellants were not entitled to punitive
damages because they failed to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) threshold test of
proving any facts to support a section 1983 claim entitling them to re-
lief. Appellants' mere allegations of due process and equal protection
violations are not sufficient to substantiate the required evil motive or
intent or reckless indifference that underlie punitive damages.
Vacated and remanded for dimissal on mootness.
Mustang Energy Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm 'n. (FERC), 859
F.2d 1447
Appellant Mustang petitions for review of orders of the FERC es-
tablishing "fair and equitable" rates for the transportation of natural
gas. At issue is the FERC's determination of "fair and equitable" rates
for intrastate transportation service. Affirmed in part, modified in part.
Mustang is an intrastate pipeline, transporting natural gas in
Oklahoma. In 1981, Mustang entered into a Transportation Agreement
with El Paso Natural Gas Company. The agreement provided for the
initial transportation rate to be charged, and for any subsequent rate
changes to be submitted to the FERC for approval. The agreement also
included a "minimum bill" provision, wherby El Paso was required to
pay for the transportation of a "minimum daily quantity" whether or not
that volume was actually transported. On Septmeber 30, 1982, and
again on May 23, 1983, Mustang filed a petition for approval of trans-
portation rate increases. Both increases were collected from El Paso,
subject to refund upon any disapproval by the FERC at the rate review
proceeedings. On June 4, 1985, the FERC issued an order setting fair
and equitable rates to be charged by Mustang which were below those
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requested. In addition, the FERC invalidated the minimum bill provi-
sion and ordered Mustang to make refund payments to El Paso.
Mustang appealed, alleging that (1) the rates approved by the FERC
were not fair and equitable, (2) elimination of the minimmum bill provi-
sion was not fair and equitable, (3) the FERC applied an improper meth-
odology in reaching a fair and equitable transportation rate, (4) the
refund was improperly ordered, and (5) the FERC's procedures denied
Mustang due process of law. The court determined that under the stat-
ute, the transportation rate is fair and equitable if it is initially con-
structed to recover costs and allow for a profit. The risk of financial
losses resulting from any variance from design projections and underu-
tilization must be upon the intrastate pipeline. Accordingly, the rate or-
dered by the FERC was fair and equitable. FERC's use of actual cost
data was also determined to be a proper methodology for determining
transportation rates. However, the FERC's selective use of the actual
cost data was deemed arbitrary and as a result the case is remanded.
Republic Airlines v. United States Dep' of Transportation, 849 F.2d 1315
Plaintiff airlines are seeking to overturn a decision by the Civil Aer-
onautics Board (CAB) refusing to apply recaptured subsidy overpay-
ments for 1982-83 to their unmet "need" requirements of Federal
Aviation Act section 406(b), (which provided federal subsidies to airlines
flying unprofitable routes). The airlines would have to refund any tax
subsidies paid which were in excesss of actual liabilities at year's end.
Plaintiffs are seeking to have such refunds applied against unmet need
created by congressional appropriation limitations.
As part of the process of airline deregulation, Congress substan-
tially amended and then terminated the airline subsidy program, limit-
ing in the process the CAB's authority to pay subsidies for 1982 and
prohibiting subsidies for fiscal 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that the
CAB's refusal to apply overpayment refunds to unmet "need" of section
406(b) was in accord with law, and not an arbitrary or capricious abuse
of discretion.
Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068
A Utah County planned to widen a road to accommodate more traf-
fic through scenic wilderness and park lands. The Sierra Club sued the
Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) and the county for an injunction, asserting
that: (1) the county's proposed improvement would extend the roadway
beyond the existing right-of-way; (2) such extension would encroach on
federal land without the approval of the BLM as required; (3) the im-
provements will degrade the adjacent wilderness; and (4) the BLM vio-
lated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) by failing
to study the environmental impact of the construction. The district
court enjoined the county's project pending trial, after which it author-
ized the construction. The court found that all but a portion of the con-
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struction would not extend beyond the present right-of-way. For the
portion extending beyond, the court required that the county seek a
Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) permit. Furthermore,
the court ordered the BLM to conduct studies in order to locate and
preserve plant life and archaeological sites. The court denied county's
request for damages resulting from construction delays. Both sides
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the following jurisdictional issues: (1)
whether BLM's refusal to act under FLPMA was committed to agency
discretion and therefore exempt from judicial review and (2) whether or
not the Sierra Club has rights of action against BLM and the county.
The court also addressed the following issues: (1) whether and to what
extent the county's plans fall within the existing right-of-way; (2)
whether and to what extent the plans affect adjacent wilderness areas;
(3) whether and to what extent major federal action as defined in NEPA
is involved by BLM's activities or responsibilities under FLPMA; and (4)
whether and to what extent BLM must conduct further environmental
studies under NEPA. Last, the court addressed the validity of the dis-
trict court's decision to: (1) order the county to apply for a permit to
relocate part of the road; (2) make the BLM conduct an inventory of
plant life along the trail; and (3) deny the county damages of the con-
struction delays.
On the jurisdictional issues, the court held that Congress has pro-
vided applicable law in the form of standards imposed on BLM via
FLPMA and therefore BLM's refusal to act is judicially reviewable; and
Plaintiff may sue BLM under section 702 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act which permits actions against an agency even when no implied
right of action exists and Plaintiff may also sue the county since under
F.R.C.P. 19 the county would have been joined anyway as a third-party
defendant. Regarding the issues pertaining to the merits of the case, the
court held that: (1) the county's plans fell within the parameters of the
existing right-of-way; (2) unless the BLM moves for reconsideration
based on a showing of the road's degradation of adjacent wilderness
areas, the district court's order will stand; (3) major federal action as
defined in NEPA is involved by BLM's activities under FLPMA and that
BLM has the duty to determine if there are less degrading alternatives
and impose them if so; and (4) that BLM on remand must issue an envi-
ronmental assessment and either a finding of no significant impact or an
environmental impact statement. Regarding the denial of damages, the
Tenth Circuit held that Sierra Club's claims had high public interest and
were litigated in good faith, thus making the denial of damages within
the district court's discretion.
Texaco Producing Co. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 776
Appellant Texaco appeals a district court order upholding a deci-
sion by the Interior Board of Land Appeals to vacate a prior approval to
drill in a national forest. Affirmed.
1989]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
In affirming, the court of appeals noted that a failure to consider a
"no action" alternative in the original environmental impact statement
warranted the preparation of a supplemental environmental impact
statement.
Torix v. Ball Corporation, 862 F.2d 1428
Appellant applied for, and was denied, disability benefits under a
pension plan organized by appellee corporation under the provisions of
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). After administrative review of the denial,
appellant filed this action. The district court granted judgment for the
appellees, finding that appellant failed to sustain his burden of showing
that the Plan's Pension and Insurance Committee had proceeded
improperly.
On appeal, the panel followed the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit
as expressed in Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1984),
and held that a reasonable interpretation of a claimant's entitlement to
payment based on a claim of "total disability" must consider the claim-
ant's ability to pursue gainful employment in light of all the circum-
stances. The panel instructed that the standard to be applied will
require the claimant to establish a physical inability to follow any occu-
pation from which the claimant can earn a reasonable income. Although
the income may be less than the amount earned prior to the disability,
the panel specified that the earnings possible must rise to the dignity of
a livelihood. The panel stated that if appellant meets this burden, he
may not be denied recovery based on overly restrictive interpretation of
the plan's language. Because the committee may have used an unduly
restrictive interpretation of the plan's provisions to deny an award of
benefits, the panel reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
Twin Pines Coal Company v. United States Department of Labor, 854 F.2d
1212
In this appeal the Twin Pines Coal Company (Twin Pines) chal-
lenges the Benefits Review Board's decision affirming the grant of Black
Lung Benefits to Charles L. White, an employee.
Twin Pines was assessed liability for black lung benefits by the De-
partment of Labor. They challenge on four grounds: First, because
White already receives total disability benefits from the Social Security
Administration and the State of Colorado, he cannot also receive total
disability benefits under the black lung program. Second, the interim
regulations under which White was awarded benefits had expired and
were thus improperly invoked by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Third, the interim presumption was improperly invoked on the basis of
a doctor's study of White. Finally, the determination that White is to-
tally disabled due to pneumoconiosis is not supported by medical
evidence.
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The Tenth Circuit held that the ALJ failed to consider adequately
the doctor's opinion. Moreover, the court held that miners who are
disabled due to pneumoconiosis whether or not they are disabled from a
different cause may still claim benefits.
The court rejected the argument that the case was wrongfully adju-
dicated because the ALJ applied the interim regulations, rather than the
final regulations. The court held that the requirement that final regula-
tions be published within six months does not require that the final reg-
ulations become effective six months after the passage of amendments.
The court concluded that the ALJ failed to consider the doctor's opinion
before determining whether invocation of the interim regulations based
on the qualifying ventilatory study was proper. The court remanded the
case to the Benefits Review Board.

ARBITRATION
Communication Workers v. U.S. West District, 847 F.2d 1475
The Communication Workers of America filed a grievance with ap-
pellant over whether certain accounting employees were covered by a
collective bargaining agreement negotiated before the divestiture of
AT&T. U.S. West claimed that the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) was the proper forum for resolution of the issues, not an arbi-
trator. The district court ordered arbitration. This court held that dis-
putes over arbitration clauses are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.
If the arbitrator finds in favor of the union and U.S. West believes this is
an illegal extension of the represented unit, it is free to petition the
NLRB for redress.
Peterson v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 849 F.2d 464
Shearson appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitra-
tion of plaintiff's claims against it. The Tenth Circuit held that the bro-
kerage firm had not waived its right to arbitration of the Rule lOb-5
claims, since Shearson could not have obtained an order for arbitration
prior to the McMahon decision which held Rule 1Ob-5 claims to be arbi-
trable. (Shearson/lmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct 2332
(1987)). The McMahon decision would be applied retroactively to cases
pending on appeal. There is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration
for dispute resolution and when a contract mandates arbitration, courts
will generally enforce the arbitration clause absent a waiver. The court
held, however, that the brokerage firm had waived its right to demand
arbitration of the state law claims. In determining whether a party has
waived its right to arbitration various factors are considered, such as
whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate,
whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the
parties were well into preparation of the lawsuit, whether the party has
requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date, and whether
important intervening steps had taken place. The court held that where,
as here, Shearson prepared for scheduled trial without objecting on the
grounds of arbitration, the parties would have gone to trial had the dis-
trict court not rescheduled prior to the time the arbitration request was
made, arbitration was sought close to the trial date and important inter-
vening steps had taken place, the right to arbitrate the state law claims is
waived. Trial of the state law claim may proceed; the federal claim is
subject to arbitration. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

ATTORNEY FEES
Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266
Appellee Hadden filed a claim for attorney fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA) after successfully litigating her entitlement
to Social Security disability benefits. Under the EAJA, the government
must prove its position was substantially justified to avoid an award of
attorney fees to a successful claimant.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the award of attorney fees, holding that
the district judge erred by equating a lack of substantial evidence on the
merits with a lack of substantial justification under the EAJA. The court
stated that to do so would result in an automatic award of attorney fees
in all Social Security cases in which the government was unsuccessful on
the merits.
GHK Exploration Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 857 F.2d 1388
GHK Exploration sued Tenneco Oil for oil drilling costs allegedly
owed by defendant under an election to participate in a forced-pooling
order. At trial, the court addressed the issue of whether an election to
participate occurred. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding
that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to plaintiff's failure
to exhaust its administrative remedies in the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission (Commission). Dismissed.
On plaintiff's petition for rehearing and upon defendant's motion
for award of attorneys' fees, the appeals court held dismissal of the ac-
tion was proper, since the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to de-
termine if a party has elected to participate in a forced-pooling order.
The district court has jurisdiction only to enforce payment of any costs
owing due to a determination by the Commission that an election ex-
isted. The court denied attorneys' fees to the defendant. Only a pre-
vailing party, and not merely a party for whom a cause of action has
been dismissed on grounds other than the merits, may win attorneys'
fees.
Glass and Phelps-Chartered v. Pfeffer, et al., 849 F.2d 1261
In an earlier appeal in this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a judg-
ment dismissing a civil rights action brought against defendant police
officers. The district court ordered plaintiffs and plaintiff's counsel to
pay defendant Forster's attorney's fees. The district court ruled that
from the deposition it was clear that Forster was not present at the time
of the mistaken arrest and found no excuse for plaintiff's failure to vol-
untarily dismiss Forster from the action.
This appeal addresses only the propriety of the attorney's fee award
and its amount. The court found that award of fees against the plain-
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tiff's counsel was justified under the district court's inherent power and
was supported by finding that counsel willfully continued to advance
groundless and patently frivolous litigation against Forster after it was
determined he was not present at scene of alleged unlawful arrest and
that counsel's conduct was tantamount to bad faith. The court affirmed
that upon remand of the initial award, the district court was justified in
awarding additional monies for fees incurred in litigating entitlement to
original fee award where plaintiff's counsel, in opposing award, went
well beyond scope of remand order, greatly multiplying proceedings af-
ter remand. Additionally, the court affirmed it was appropriate to levy
attorney's fees against a firm that is responsible for the pleadings signed
by its employees. The court held the sanctions be applied against plain-
tiff's law firm as opposed to the individual attorney employed by the
firm.
The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal
to recuse itself on remand, warning that such a change is serious in na-
ture and an affidavit seeking refusal is insufficient if it merely states con-
clusions, rumors, beliefs and opinions. Remand was required on the
limited issue of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded against plain-
tiff's law firm for time spent by defendant's counsel in defending appeal.
Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256
Plaintiff appeals the district court's order dismissing his complaint
and imposing fees for refiling. Additionally, plaintiff appeals the denial
of his motion for reconsideration and vacation of the foregoing order.
Affirmed.
Plaintiff filed a civil rights action which was set for preliminary hear-
ing on August 12, 1986. Due to a conflicting court case, plaintiff's attor-
ney did not attend this hearing. (Plaintiff contends counsel merely
arrived twenty minutes late.) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) allowing
sanctions for failure to comply with pretrial orders, the district court
dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, and mandated that re-
filing a $500 per attorney fee be paid to each attorney present at the
hearing. Finding a conflicting court appearance insufficient to justify
missing a scheduled pretrial hearing, the Tenth Circuit held the imposi-
tion of sanctions here was no abuse of discretion.
Velasquez v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 844 F.2d
738
Attorney petitioned, pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), for attorney's
fees incurred while representing a client on an appeal arising out of re-
covery for black lung disability benefits.
In granting the petitioning attorney only part of the amount re-
quested, the Tenth Circuit set forth the following factors to be consid-
ered in determining the proper amount of such fees: Time and labor
required; novelty and difficulty of issues; preclusion of other employ-
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ment due to client's case; skill required; customary fee (whether fixed or
contingent); amount of damages awarded; experience and reputation of
attorney; undesirability of case; nature and length of relationship be-
tween attorney and client; and amount of fees awarded in similar cases.
Burkhart v. The Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512
Plaintiff-appellee brought suit against defendant-appellant and
Cimarron Cooperative Equity Exchange, alleging that the two defend-
ants conspired to convert, and did convert, to their own use, wheat be-
longing to appellees. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. Along with the motion for summary judgment, defend-
ants filed a motion seeking sanctions against appellees and their attor-
ney. The district court denied this motion on the grounds there was no
"subjective bad faith" by the appellees or their attorney.
The appellants appealed this finding, and the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the district court, holding that subjective bad faith was not a pre-
requisite to an award of sanctions under Rule 11. On remand, the
district court again denied appellant's motion for sanctions. Affirmed.
The court of appeals first determined that the Tenth Circuit is com-
mitted to an "across the board" use of the "abuse of discretion" stan-
dard, rather than de novo review as argured by appellants. Referring to
comments by the district judge, the panel noted that decisions by a
judge in Kansas did support the appellees' legal position, thereby indi-
cating that appellees' complaint was warranted by existing law. Thus,





Glenpool Utility Services Auth. v. Creek County Rural Water Dist. No. 2., 861
F.2d 1211
Appellant Water District No. 2 appeals a district court decision de-
nying it declaratory and injunctive relief in a suit to determine the rights
to furnish water to an annexed area of land. Reversed in part and
remanded.
Water District No. 2 is a rural district which was constructed using
funds borrowed from the Farmers Home Administration (FHA). By us-
ing this method of financing, the court of appeals held that the water
district came under the provisions of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), which states
that the service area of an entity owing money to the FHA cannot be
reduced by an act of a municipal corporation or similar public body.
The court of appeals noted that since the state of Oklahoma had allowed
for the acceptance of the federal loan money which was given, all of its
political subdivisions, including the Glenpool Utility Services Authority,
were bound and limited by the terms of § 1926.
United States v. Central Bank, 843 F.2d 1300
Appellant Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) appeals the district
court's refusal to enforce an I.R.S. administrative levy on taxpayer prop-
erty held by Central Bank. Reversed.
The thrust of Central Bank's argument was that under Colorado
law, it had a perfected security interest in the accounts of the delinquent
taxpayer which would take precedence over subsequent executions, in-
cluding I.R.S. levies. In reversing, the court of appeals noted that while
state court interpretations of lien priority are due some weight, they are
not binding under the terms of the Federal Tax Lien Act. Here, the
court of appeals held that Central Bank's interest in the taxpayer's ac-
counts was only an unperfected setoff right, and the I.R.S. levy took pri-
ority over it.
FDIC v. Galloway, 856 F.2d 112
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), plaintiff below,
appeals the finding of the district court that guarantors were not liable
on certain promissory notes of the bank to which it was the successor in
interest. Reversed and remanded.
Defendants signed unconditional guarantees for any and all indebt-
edness of the borrower to the bank which were to be valid until can-
celled by written notice. Contrary to the district court's finding, the
panel held that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) bars defendants' reliance on fraud
in the inducement due to the bank's misrepresentations. The agree-
ment failed to meet section 1823(e) requirements of a writing approved
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by either the bank's board or loan committee, kept with bank records.
The panel further found the FDIC's knowledge of such fraudulent mis-
representations at the time it acquired the notes did not prevent applica-
tion of this section as a bar to defendants.
The panel also determined the six year federal statute of limitations
applied to this action on a continuing guaranty. Applying the Peterson
rule, the panel held a new cause of action accrues under the guaranty as
each underlying debt becomes due. Hence, only the first two notes in
this case were time-barred. Finally, the panel found defendants' guar-
anty of payment at maturity waived any requirement that the bank look
first to the borrower for payment. Therefore, the FDIC's right to en-
force the guaranty accrued at maturity of the note.
FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 865 F.2d 1134
Upon the insolvency of the Dominion Bank of Denver, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver, entered into a
Purchase and Assumption agreement, whereby it sold the "acceptable".
assets of the insolvent bank to an assuming bank and purchased, as a
U.S. insurance corporation, the remaining "unacceptable" assets.
Among the "unacceptable" assets was a letter of credit issued by one
bank to the insolvent bank. When the FDIC tried to draw on the letter
of credit, the issuing bank refused to honor it. The FDIC sued in district
court to obtain payment on the letter, but the court dismissed, holding
that Colorado law, the law to be applied, only allows the transfer of a
letter of credit where the letter is expressly designated as transferable or
assignable.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, applying 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(A) and
by creating a new federal common law rule. The court held that there is
a need for a nationally uniform rule allowing the FDIC to acquire non-




In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55
Appellant's collection efforts on a judgment obtained against the
Listers were stayed when the Listers filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy peti-
tion. Subsequent thereto, appellant gave to the bankruptcy trustee the
information he had gathered on the Listers' assets and developed a re-
organization plan regarding the Listers, which was never approved. The
district court affirmed the denial of appellant's application for adminis-
trative expenses.
The Tenth Circuit stated that under 11 U.S.C. § 503
(b)(3)(D)(1982), a creditor may be reimbursed for administrative ex-
penses if they were incurred by the creditor in making a substantial con-
tribution in a Chapter 9 or 11 case. A "substantial contribution" is
made when the applicant's efforts result in an actual and demonstrable
benefit to the debtor's estate and the creditors. Pre-petition expenses
are compensable only if they were incurred in efforts that were intended
to benefit, and that did directly benefit, the bankruptcy estate.
The court held that appellant's pre-petition expenses are not com-
pensable because they were incurred solely for the purpose of collecting
his judgment against the Listers. Moreover, appellant's post-petition ef-
forts only minimally benefitted the estate and did not amount to a "sub-
stantial contribution" justifying compensation of post-petition expenses.
In re Ruti-Sweetwater Inc., 836 F.2d 1263
Ruti-Sweetwater and seven other related entities (debtors) were en-
gaged in the business of vacation time-sharing. The debtors filed for
relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and prepared a plan of
reorganization. Appellants are judgment lien creditors of the debtors.
Their lien attached to a parcel of real estate known as the "Ferrell Spen-
cer" property. The appellants did not file written objections to the plan,
nor did they exercise their right to vote on the plan. The bankruptcy
court held a confirmation hearing but the appellants did not appear. At
the hearing the court approved a sale of the Ferrell Spencer property
free and clear of the appellants' lien. At a hearing on the distribution of
the proceeds of the Ferrell Spencer sale, the appellants appeared and
challenged the plan. The bankruptcy court ruled that appellants were
bound by the plan, and on appeal the district court affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the ap-
pellants' inaction constituted acceptance of the plan. A creditor may not
sit idly by and not participate in the formulation and adoption of such a
plan and, thereafter challenge the plan for the first time. Such an ap-
proach would relieve creditors from taking an active role in protecting
their claims under the Bankruptcy Code.
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In re Herd, 840 F.2d 757
Appellant Herd filed for reorganization under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The notice to the creditors listed an erroneous date
as the last day for filing a proof of claim. Citing Bankruptcy Rule 3003
(c), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district judge's order, stating that a
creditor is not responsible for interpreting a notice, and therefore more
than inquiry notice of the bar date is required. The court asserted that
formal notice must be given to creditors that reasonably conveys the
required information. In this case, the erroneous date of March 9, 1983,
was listed, instead of the correct date of March 9, 1984. Thus, the court
held that the proof of claim filed by creditor-appellee Rowe Interna-
tional, Inc. was timely because it was filed by the only alternative bar
date (August 31, 1984) in the notice that had not expired before the
notice was even issued.
Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Co., 853 F.2d 1540
Debtor-appellant appeals the district court's decision to grant an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy on the grounds that there was not
three bona-fide creditors filing the petition as is required by 11 U.S.C.
303(b)(1). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The Tenth Circuit interpreted a guaranty signed by Bartmann as
being unambiguous, and because of this, found the guaranty was a
bona-fide claim. Regarding an American Express debt which Bartmann
paid after the filing of the petition but before the bankruptcy hearing,
the Tenth Circuit held the post-petition payment of a debt does not alter
a creditor's status as a petitioning creditor.
The case was remanded to bankruptcy court for the resolution of
disputed factual issues.
In re Shah, 859 F.2d 1463
Debtor appealed the district court's failure to consider his motion
for rehearing. The district court had issued an order on June 30th af-
firming a previous bankruptcy court ruling declaring certain debts ex-
empt from discharge. Debtor's counsel did not appear but the district
court indicated that it would review counsel's reasons for its absence.
The following day, debtor's counsel filed a motion for rehearing. No
action was taken by the district court regarding the rehearing motion.
Debtor then filed a notice of appeal 29 days later.
Finding that the district court should consider the debtor's motion,
the Tenth Circuit held that the July motion suspended the finality of the
June 30th order and tolled the running of the appeal period prescribed
by federal law. Relying on prior Seventh Circuit case law, the court con-
cluded that a petition for rehearing may be treated as a tolling motion
under federal law. The district court's action on a rehearing motion may
eliminate the need for an appeal or clarify the basis of the district court's
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action, therefore, the district court was required to reconsider the mat-
ter. Reversed and remanded.
In re Amarex, 853 F.2d 1526
Debtor Amarex, Inc. hired Appellee Isaac, compensating him with a
salary and a $10,000 bonus payable at the year end. Amarex declared
bankruptcy and never paid Isaac the bonus. The Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court and held that when a bonus is earned day-by-day rather
than on completion of the year, only that portion related to services per-
formed post-petition is an administrative expense.
In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 838 F.2d 1133
Appellant Oklahoma Refining filed a voluntary petition for Chapter
11 bankruptcy. The district court approved a plan whereby debtor
would be able to use a lender's cash collateral for funds and items in an
approved budget during the shutdown of its plants. The lenders, believ-
ing appellant was involved in certain questionable transactions, moved
for and were granted the appointment of a trustee by the district court.
Affirmed.
The court of appeals held that a history of transactions with affili-
ated companies is sufficient cause for the appointment of a trustee
where the best interests of the creditors require it.
In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405
Appellant debtors purchased furniture on credit from a store, and
gave a purchase money security interest in the furniture as a part of the
transaction. The store then assigned the obligation to appellee creditor.
At the request of the appellee creditor, the parties cancelled the old note
and substituted a new note and security agreement. The back of this
agreement stated that appellee creditor would retain the purchase
money security interest. Appellant debtors made one payment under
the new agreement and then filed for bankruptcy. Appellants claimed
that refinancing automatically extinguishes a purchase money security
interest. The bankruptcy court rejected this argument, and the district
court affirmed. Affirmed.
The court of appeals held that the appellant debtors did not show
that the parties had intended the new note to extinguish the original
debt and purchase money security interest, and that lacking this show-
ing, the bankruptcy and district courts correctly decided the issue.
In Re Schneider v. Nazar, 864 F.2d 683
Appellant participated in a crop reduction and diversion program
administered through a governmental agency. He filed a request for an
eligibility determination to participate in the payment-in-kind (PIK) en-
titlement program before a bankruptcy petition was filed. The bank-
ruptcy court characterized the PIK entitlement as an inseparable part of
1989]
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rights established by the debtor in his pre-petition farming operations
and concluded that the entitlement was property of the estate. The dis-
trict court agreed. Reversed.
Agricultural entitlement payments which result from the actual dis-
position of a planted crop are proceeds of that crop while entitlement
payments based on an agreement not to plant crops arise from accounts
or general intangibles. At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, the
contract had not been signed by the appropriate government represen-
tative, therefore, the Tenth Circuit held the agreement was not part of
the debtor's estate. This holding is narrowly limited to its facts because
there was no suggestion that the sequence of events was planned to de-
feat a trustee's claim. In other instances payments-in-kind may be part
of the bankruptcy estate.
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Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439
Plaintiff appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for a
new trial on the section 1981 claim because the jury's verdict was grossly
inadequate. Defendant appeals from the district court's judgment in
favor of the plaintiff on the Title VII claim, alleging that the district
court was bound by the jury's determination of damages, and yet the
court awarded damages in excess of that determination. Defendant also
appeals from the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss the Title
VII claim for untimely filing, and the plaintiff's section 1981 claim. Af-
firmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Plaintiff brought suit against his employer, Total Petroleum, charg-
ing violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The charges arose out of the alleged unlawful termination of the
plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff's assistance with an Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claim brought by Mr. Skinner's
black co-worker. Plaintiff demanded a jury trial on his section 1981
claim. His Title VII claim was tried to the court. Thejury's findings are
binding on all common issues. Therefore, the district court erred in
awarding damages in excess of $40,000 when the jury awarded damages
of only $3,945.48. However, the district court's denial of plaintiff's mo-
tion for a new trial is also reversed because the jury's award of damages
was grossly inadequate and the result of jury compromise. This consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Finally, the
decision of the district court to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss
is affirmed.
Huxall v. First State Bank, 842 F.2d 249
Appellee First State Bank had obtained a default judgment against
appellant Huxall in a debt action. Following a sheriff's sale of property
seized to satisfy the judgment, Huxall filed an action under § 1983 alleg-
ing that she had been deprived of her property without due process of
law.
The Tenth Circuit found that Huxall had chosen not to take advan-
tage of the opportunities available to invoke the state judicial procedure
to protect her property; therefore, the facts did not support her claim.
Affirming the district court's order, the court held that Huxall's failure
to show a denial of due process was a proper basis for dismissing her
action for failure to state a claim under § 1983.
Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414
The parents of an inmate killed in an Oklahoma prison brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three Oklahoma corrections offi-
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cials. The officials appealed the district court's denial of their motion
for summary judgment and protection from discovery, invoking quali-
fied immunity from liability.
The Tenth Circuit stated that prison officials are not immune from
suit for intentional wrongful conduct under the eighth amendment or
the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The court found that
the pleadings and affidavits fairly raise the possibility of a violation of a
clearly established right under the eighth amendment. The record
shows that the deceased plaintiff's mother had requested protection for
her son from other inmates, that a separation order had been issued but
ignored, and that access to evidence had been denied. The court held
that the unique facts warrant denial of the motions for summary judg-
ment and protection from discovery.
Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713
Plaintiff appeals the granting of summary judgment by the district
court in favor of defendants pursuant to suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff, a conceded fleeing felon, alleged that defendant used
deadly force, pursuant to a policy of defendant police chief and the City
of Sapulpa. Defendants base their action on Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 193
which in essence allows the officer to use all necessary means to effect
the arrest of a fleeing felon. This cause of action arose prior to the deci-
sion of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment prohibits use of deadly force to arrest
apparently unarmed felons unless there is probable cause for belief the
suspect poses significant threat of death or serious injury to the officer
or others and is necessary to prevent escape. Specifically challenged in
this appeal is the district court's holding that Garner should not be ap-
plied retroactively.
The panel relied on the Supreme Court's three-prong Chevron Oil
test in determining when.a case should apply retroactively. Chevron Oil v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Additionally, the panel recognized the "clear
break" test of United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), as the thresh-
old test for making a decision. The panel held that while at times deter-
rence may be furthered by retroactive application, there was not such a
case since the municipality acted pursuant to a state statute on whose
legitimacy it had little reason to question. The panel also held that
although compensation to victims is one of the purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, it is not the primary purpose and where, as here, there would be
compensation without any benefit from deterrence, retroactive applica-
tion is unwarranted.
Since defendants relied on policies of police conduct which had
been long established, retroactive application would be inappropriate.
The panel also held the plaintiff lacked standing to have Oklahoma's
statute declared unconstitutional and further that plaintiff failed to




Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374
Plaintiff appeals the district court's granting of summary judgement
based on defendants' qualified immunity. The court also dismissed
plaintiff's pendant state claims since no valid action for 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims existed. Affirmed.
Plaintiff's constitutional claims are threefold. He claims abridge-
ment of his first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights. Addition-
ally, plaintiff claims abrogation of a fifth amendment property right.
The panel held defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in de-
fense of plaintiff's first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment claims since
defendants' actions were objectively reasonable. To avoid summary
judgment on his first amendment claim, plaintiff must with specificity
demonstrate factual allegations that the defendants' actions were guided
by impermissible motives, which he failed to do here. The panel also
upheld the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to establish a prop-
erty right in his § 1983 claim based on freedom from libel (this to be
determined under Wyoming law) since, under that state's law, no prop-
erty interest in freedom from libel exists. Lastly, the panel upheld the
district court's dismissal of plaintiff's pendant state claims.
Setliffv. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan, 850 F.2d 1384
Plaintiff appeals the granting of summary judgement on his first
amendment claim and also appeals dismissal of his numerous state
claims. Plaintiff alleges defendant hospital's investigation of his medical
practice and its ultimate decision that he obtain second opinions prior to
performing certain surgeries was retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of
protected first amendment speech. The Tenth Circuit found the record
contained plaintiff's mere conclusory allegations which are insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgement. Affirmed.
Plaintiff also alleges deprivation of due process regarding his hospi-
tal privileges. This court affirms the district court's finding that plaintiff
failed to demonstrate the existence of a recognized property right,
which the Tenth Circuit defined as an individual entitlement grounded
in state law. While plaintiff may have such a property interest, the facts
of this case establish that his privileges were not restricted nor modified
until after plaintiff had received a formal hearing. Therefore, plaintiff
suffered no deprivation of any property right without the requisite due
process. The Tenth Circuit also held that despite the fact that plaintiff's
reputation and attractiveness to their employers may have been dimin-
ished as a result of the hospital's investigation he had not been deprived
of a liberty interest. The court upheld the district court's exercise of
discretion in dismissal of the state law claims.
DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714
Plaintiff, lacking vision in one eye, was denied a position as inspec-
tor by a private employer on grounds that a regulation governing their
1989] 689
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
federal contract specifically disqualified such persons from the position.
Plaintiff sued alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The lower court denied a motion for summary
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit held that a private contractor acting under fed-
eral law was accorded qualified immunity for civil rights violations.
When a private party acts in accordance with duties imposed by a gov-
ernmental contract, performs a governmental function, and is sued
solely on the basis of those acts performed pursuant to the contract, it is
entitled to qualified immunity.
Procedurally, the court found that a private party acting solely pur-
suant to contractual duties and not in concert with government employ-
ees or pursuant to an unconstitutional law may bring an interlocutory
appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Neither the fact that plaintiff
sought both legal and equitable relief from appellant nor the existence
of a factual dispute barred the interlocutory appeal.
Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603
Meyer appeals from an order of the district court preliminarily en-
joining the Secretary of State of Colorado from conducting an election
on a proposed amendment to the state constitution initiated by mem-
bers of the appellant Official English Committee. Reversed and
remanded.
Appellants circulated petitions printed exclusively in English
throughout counties designated as bilingual for purposes of the Voting
Rights Act (Act). As a result, the district court invalidated the petitions
by finding that the Voting Rights Act, which requires printed election
material to be bilingual, applies to initiative petitions. The injunction
thus ordered by the district court was reversed by this court on a
number of grounds. First, the statutory language of the Voting Rights
Act precludes inclusion of "petitions" as falling under its auspices since
"petitions" are not synonomous with the statutory terms of "voting"
and "electoral process." Therefore, the Act only applies to measures
already qualified for placement on the ballot, and not efforts taken to
initiate a measure for future placement on the ballot. Second, the view
of the Attorney General relied upon by the district court to support its
conclusion, was not authoritative since the administrative interpretation
resulted in a construction of the statute beyond its limits. And third, the
district court erred in qualifying this initiative action as "state action"
because the Colorado Constitution specifically reserves this right of ini-
tiative to the people.
Watson v. The City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690
Plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action against Kansas City, its po-
lice chief, and a number of officers claiming failure to provide protection
to a victim of domestic violence and her son. The district court granted
690 [Vol. 66:4
CIVIL RIGHTS
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. To sur-
vive summary judgment, the plaintiff must go beyond her pleadings and
show evidence of specific facts demonstrating that it is the policy or cus-
tom of the defendants to provide less police protection to victims of do-
mestic assault than to other assault victims. Since the plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to support such a jury finding, this court overrules
the lower court's grant of summary judgment. To the extent plaintiff's
lawsuit asserted a claim of class-based discrimination based on sex, the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant is af-
firmed. Since the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that a policy
which discriminated against victims of domestic violence adversly af-
fected women, she failed to state a prima facie case for sex-based
discrimination.
Facteau v. Sullivan, 843 F.2d 1318
Plaintiff brought a prison civil rights action, alleging poor condi-
tions at the state prison. The district court dismissed the action, but
referred it to a special master due to an existing consent decree ren-
dered in a pending class action suit that involved the conditions at the
same prison. The consent decree provided that an appointed special
master would review all collateral actions and dismiss those that would
be covered by the pending class action. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal and referral, holding that if the special master found that the
plaintiff's case did not fit within the class action suit, the plaintiff's ac-
tion should be transferred back to the district court.
Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631
Appellant Phillips Petroleum closed its Kansas City refinery and en-
tered into a closure agreement with a union whereby Phillips agreed to
consider qualified employees for employment at other refineries under a
bidding procedure. During this bidding procedure, appellee Anderson,
in his capacity as union president, filed age discrimination claims with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of
certain union members. Later, Anderson was not transferred to any of
the jobs on which he had bid. Alleging that Phillips had failed to trans-
fer him as retaliation for his having filed the earlier age discrimination
claims, Anderson sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA). The district court found that Phillips had discriminated
against Anderson and had willfully violated the ADEA. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part.
The Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support
the claim of retaliation but insufficient to establish a willful violation of
the ADEA. A finding of "willfulness" requires evidence that age was the
predominant factor in the employer's decision. Because there was evi-
dence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Phillips' failure to
transfer Anderson, Phillips' actions were not "willful."
1989]
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McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249
Defendant appeals from a jury verdict granting damages to plaintiff
in a racially discriminatory discharge claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
the district court's order reinstating plaintiff to his employment with
United. Affirmed.
McAlester, an employee at United, was summoned for jury duty but
was excused from duty for two days. He did not report for work either
of those days. After following the grievance procedures, plaintiff was
terminated. Plaintiff then filed a claim with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission to no avail and subsequently filed the present
complaint, asserting that United failed to apply its system of progressive
discipline to him as it does with white employees. First, United asserts
that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) precludes the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's § 1981 claim. This court disagreed
and found that while courts have no jurisdiction to hear airline em-
ployee claims based solely upon a contract under the RLA, they do have
jurisdiction over claims based on federal statutes. Further, the RLA
does not repeal or preempt this § 1981 claim because the RLA cannot
be construed as irreconcilable with § 1981, nor does it cover the "whole
subject matter" in such manner so to be "clearly intended as a substi-
tute." Second, United contends that the district court erred in admit-
ting certain statistical evidence of the termination of minorities. But this
court found that statistics alone may be used to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination in a disparate treatment case. Third, United
argued that the court erred in failing to admit certain exhibits into evi-
dence as they were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Since
the balancing of their probative value against their potential of prejudice
is a discretionary decision for the trial judge, the decision will not be
overturned absent clear error.
Schwenke v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 858 F .2d 627
Schwenke appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment
entered in favor of defendant. At issue is whether defendant demon-
strated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and its entitle-
ment to judgment as a matter of law. Affirmed.
In January, 1985, Schwenke resigned from her position with the de-
fendant and secured employment with one of the defendant's competi-
tors, but reserved the right to confer with the defendant to determine if
whe would be considered for a supervisory position. During the subse-
quent selection process, Schwenke was among several applicants consid-
ered, but the position was awarded to Roy Baron based upon his
performance review, recommendations, educational background, and a
company policy to "promote from within" when possible. Schwenke, a
Polynesian, brought a civil rights action claiming she was denied the job
promotion because of her race. The district court concluded that the
defendant had a valid business purpose for offering the supervisory po-
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sition to Baron and did not discriminate against Schwenke. The court
also held that summary judgment in Title VII actions is appropriate
where the court identifies a suit as without merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
United States v. Reedy, 845 F.2d 239
Defendant Reedy appeals the district court's denial of his motion to
dismiss his indictment on grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) is unconsti-
tutional because of overbreadth and vagueness. Affirmed.
In July, 1985, defendant took nineteen photographs of his step-
daughter, age nine, and her friend, age 11. The photographs were taken
while the girls were naked and posing in such a manner as to expose
their genitals. The defendant sent the film to a processing lab, where-
upon lab employees contacted the police. Defendant now appeals on
grounds that the Child Protection Act is impermissibly overbroad, in vi-
olation of the first amendment, and vague, in violation of the fifth
amendment.
This court holds that the overbreadth doctrine, an exception to the
general rule that one cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute
as applied to third parties, is not operative in this case. The statute in
question does not reach beyond the unprotected activity of child por-
nography. The statutory language is not unconstitutionally vague, be-
cause it provides sufficient warning as to the proscribed conduct.
Vandehoef v. National Transportation Safety Board, 850 F.2d 629
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) suspended plaintiff's
commercial pilot certificate, (Lighter than Air Free Balloon rating), for
90 days due to violations of the FAA regulations relating to minimum
safe altitudes for flight and for careless or reckless operation of his bal-
loon. Plaintiff appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). His appeal was heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ),
who reduced the suspension to 30 days. The decision of the ALJ was
appealed to the NTSB, which reinstated the 90-day suspension. The
plaintiff appealed for a review of the NTSB action. He conceded that
the findings of the ALJ, which were adopted by the NTSB, were sup-
ported by substantial evidence. He urged as grounds for relief that sec-
tion 91.79(b) of FAA regulations was unconstitutionally vague and that
the ALJ failed to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. § 821.42,
which state that the credibility of witnesses should be included in the
statement of findings. Since all witnesses testified to the same facts
which were not actually in dispute, it was not necessary that the ALJ
assess the credibility of each witness. The FAA regulation clearly pro-
vides parameters for operation and the words "except when necessary
for takeoff or landing" are not vague. Affirmed.
Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers and Pacheco v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642
This appeal involves two lawsuits consolidated for trial, Pueblo and
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Pacheco. The panel reviewed the district court's denial of the appellants'
motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
The plaintiffs in both lawsuits are patients who dispute the seizure,
inspection, copying, and retention of medical records from two facilities
operated by Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. (PNHC) in
Pueblo, Colorado. Suspecting Medicaid fraud, Losavio (then state dis-
trict attorney), other state officials and employees of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services entered the two PNHC facil-
ities and conducted searches and seizures pursuant to warrants issued.
Medical records concerning the patient-plaintiffs and others were in-
spected and microfilmed.
Initially, the panel holds the district court's denial of the defend-
ants' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
constitutes an appealable decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Then,
the district court failed to apply the proper standard in resolving the
qualified immunity issue. An objective test is used to determine whether
qualified immunity applies.
In Pacheco, the appellees claim that the search and seizure of PNHC
medical records violated their right to privacy. However, the appellees
did not meet their burden under the objective test, because they fail to
cite precedent that demonstrated that appellants encroached on a
clearly established privacy zone. The panel reverses the district court in
Pacheco. Summary judgment should have been granted.
In Pueblo, appellees allege that the federal appellants acted under
color of state law to abridge appellees' first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth
amendment rights when they participated in the search and seizure of
PNHC records. The panel finds that the valid search warrant made it
reasonable for appellants to believe that the search and seizure was law-
ful. Qualified immunity shields these appellants from fourth and fifth
amendment claims.
Appellees needed more than conclusory, nonspecific allegations to
overcome the motion for summary judgment. The panel remands the
case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining if spe-
cific, nonconclusory evidence before the court when the summary judg-
ment motion was made was sufficient to support the appellees'
unconstitutional motive claim.
Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789
Appellant was an electrical inspector for Kansas City. He refused to
approve a baseball field as operational because of dangerous electrical
violations. Overruled by a supervisor, he filed a report criticizing the
supervisor's order and was thereafter fired for insubordination. He filed
suit claiming he was fired in retaliation for his criticisms. The district
court granted summary judgment for the city.
The Tenth Circuit held appellant's criticism was protected speech
under the first amendment. His speech was not motivated by personal
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interest, but was primarily for the purpose of informing his superiors of
improper and illegal conduct and was of public concern. The evidence
indicated appellant's termination may have been partially motivated by
his constitutionally protected speech. Reversed.
United States v. Soto Hernandez, 849 F.2d 1325
Defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute and actual distribution of heroin. Defendant argues that he was
denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. He
bases this on an allegation that a conflict of interest exists, arising out of
his counsel's prior representation of, in an unrelated matter, the individ-
ual that defendant claims coerced him into committing the crime. He
seeks a new trial on this ground. Judgment affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that no conflict of interest existed. Further-
more, it held that the lack of communication between the defendant and
his counsel based on defendant's alleged distrust did not render the at-
torney's performance ineffective per se, especially since the alleged lack
of confidence did not prevent defendant from talking to the attorney
about the essentials of the defense.
American Petrofina Company of Texas v. Nance, 859 F.2d 840
Appellant members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission appeal the
district court's finding that the 1984 amendments to the Uniform Dispo-
sition of Unclaimed Property Act (Act), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, sections
651-687 (1971), violate the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution, and that the Oklahoma amendments' scheme for the custodial
taking of unclaimed property is preempted by federal common law.
Affirmed.
The 1984 amendments require the plaintiffs to transfer proceeds
from unlocated owners' mineral interests to the state tax commission
where money is placed in the Abandoned Mineral Interest Revolving
Fund. The money is invested to generate interest income for the state.
After seven years, the money is deemed abandoned and is subject to the
strictures of the Act. The statute fails because of the Supreme Court
decision in Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965), which limited that
states' power to take custody of unclaimed property in order to ensure
thc free flow of commerce.
United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467
Appellants Clark, an accountant, and Thibodeau, an attorney, ap-
peal a district court order enforcing an Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.)
summons for the production of various documents pertaining to the tax
liability of one of their clients. Clark and Thibodeau alleged the act of
producing the documents would have testimonial aspects violative of the
fifth amendment's prohibition against self incrimination, and that the
documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district
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court found that the act of producing documents was not self incriminat-
ing, and issued an order which enforced and broadened the I.R.S.'s
summons. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The court of appeals found that the requested documents would
not have been privileged in the hands of Thibodeau's client, and be-
cause of this, Thibodeau could not use the attorney-client privilege to
protect them. But the court of appeals did find that part of the district
court's order which broadened the I.R.S.'s summons to cover all of the
client's financial records to be impermissibly broad.
Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042
Appellant was an inmate of the Colorado Department of Correc-
tions. He brought a civil rights action, alleging that various defendants
deprived him of equal protection and due process by failing to include
the time he served prior to sentencing in the computation of "good
time," as required by Colorado case law. Even though defendants stipu-
lated that appellant was held for two months longer than he should have
been due to error in the complutation of "good time," the district court
dismissed his case for damages on eleventh amendment immunity
grounds. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but held that the defendants who
had been sued in their individual capacities were only qualifiedly im-
mune from suit. The court found that appellant failed to clearly estab-
lish constitutional rights when the pre-sentence good time credit was
withheld.
Dichenson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435
Appellants, Dickenson and Weaver, had been appointed as head
jailer and administrative assistant to the former sheriff. The sheriff was
defeated for re-election by appellee, Quarberg, who shortly discharged
both appellants. They filed suit alleging violations of their constitu-
tional rights under the first and fourteenth amendments, asserting that
they were discharged because of their association with the former sheriff
and that their terminations violated their due process rights. The dis-
trict court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's finding as to the
allegations of violations of the appellants' property and liberty interests.
However, the court held that it cannot be said that political party affilia-
tion is an appropriate requirement for effective performance as a head
jailer or administrative assistant. Since the appellee offered no sufficient
justification for demanding political loyalty from the appellants, the
court found a genuine issue of material fact as to the actual motivation
of Quarberg in discharging the appellants. Therefore, the issue of moti-
vation was remanded for determination by the district court.
Rowley v. Board of Education, 863 F.2d 39
Appellant Board of Education appeals the district court's order
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granting appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellee sued
for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982) seeking to enjoin appellants from
preventing him from participating in interscholastic volleyball competi-
tion solely because of his sex. Appellee alleges that the absolute prohi-
bition on male participation violates his fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection and his rights under Title IX. Reversed.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court applied a test
for this gender-based classification which was more stringent than was
constitutionally required in its determination of appellee's likelihood of
success on the merits of his equal protection claim.
Brown v. Hartshorne Public School Dist. No. 1, 864 F.2d 680
Appellant Brown filed a civil rights action against appellee school
district under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982) (Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) after the school district
had turned down her application for employment for ten straight years.
Appellant alleges that appellee discriminated against her, and refused to
hire her in the 1985-86 school year in retaliation for her previous suits.
The district court granted the school district's motion for a summary
judgment and dismissed Brown's entire complaint because she had not
filed an EEOC charge for the 1985-86 school year. The district court
failed to address Brown's § 1983 claim. Reversed.
The Tenth Circuit held that aside from appellant's claims for the
1985-86 school year, the district court ignored the appellant's discrimi-
nation claims made in 1984. The court also concluded that appellant's
1985-86 related claims would be properly before the district court if
either of Brown's claims were true: That the school district's decision
not to hire her for the 1985-86 school year was (1) in retaliation for her
EEOC filing and (2) part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination. The
court held Brown should have the opportunity to prove her allegations
and the propriety of jurisdiction. Finally, the court found that the dis-
trict court ignored Brown's § 1983 claim by dismissing her Title VII ac-
tion. Claims under § 1983 and Title VII differ significantly in their
statutes of limitations, exhaustion requirements, and available remedies.
The court of appeals noted the district court should apply these differ-
ing standards to the seperate causes of action in this case on remand.
Milo v. Cushing Municipal Hospital, 861 F.2d 1194
Appellant doctors alleged that the defendant-appellee hospital sus-
pended them because of reported misconduct by a fellow physician,
thereby infringing upon their rights to free speech and due process.
The district court granted defendent hospital's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that suspension of a physician's medical staff
privileges do not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Reversed.
The court of appeals held that the hospital was a public institution,
1989]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
and that its suspension of appellants' medical staff privileges could con-
stitute the requisite state action needed to support a § 1983 claim.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cargill, 855 F.2d 682
Appellee Cargill maintains a life insurance benefits plan that treats
employees age 60 and over differently than younger employees. The
plan was instituted years before the passage of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) sued Cargill alleging the plan violated the Act.
The district court granted Cargill's motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Cargill's plan was ex-
empt from the ADEA because it had been in existence prior to the act's
passage. For this reason, the court noted Cargill's plan could not be a
subterfuge to evade the ADEA.
Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512
Appellant Meade had been arrested and placed in a cityjail. Meade
requested medical attention and was told he would have to wait until he
arrived at the county facility. At the county facility, Meade alleged he
bent over to avoid passing out and was kicked by a deputy sheriff, appel-
lee Grubbs. Appellant then filed, pro se, a § 1983 action against
Grubbs, his supervisor, the agency which trained him, and the county
commissioners. Grubbs and the other defendants filed a motion to dis-
miss, to which Meade responded to with a motion for an extension of
time in which to file. The district court denied the motion for an exten-
sion of time, and dismissed the action with prejudice. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
The court of appeals noted that to dismiss a cause of action with
prejudice was a severe sanction reserved for exteme circumstances. In
this case, there was no showing that the defendants were prejudiced by
Meade's failure to comply with the local rule, and as a result, such a
severe sanction was unwarranted in this instance.
The court also held that if Meade's allegations of excessive force
were true, sufficient grounds for a valid constitutional claim existed
against not only Deputy Grubbs, but also his supervisor and the agency
that trained him. But the court held that the County Commissioner
could not be properly joined in this cause of action, since they had no
statutory controls over the deputies.
Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250
Petitioner, prior to being convicted and sentenced, spent 284 days
in jail because he was indigent and unable to post bond. The district
court denied petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he
asserted that the judge improperly refused to credit his sentence for the
time he spent in custody prior to sentencing. Petitioner appealed to the
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Tenth Circuit, asserting that his equal protection rights had been vio-
lated in that his indigency resulted in a greater sentence than would
have been imposed on a wealthier person.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. In holding that petitioner's equal pro-
tection rights were not violated, the court found that petitioner did not
show that he is a member of a class denied a benefit that is available to
others similarly situated. Petitioner's arguments erroneously assumed
that only indigents are unable to post bond. Furthermore, the court
found that the judge had considered petitioner's pretial confinement in
setting the sentence, which placed petitioner in the same position as
those released on bail. The court also held that due process fairness was
met by the judge's consideration of petitioner's presentence confine-




Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Kansas Gas and Electric Co., 862 F.2d 796
Petitioner entered an agreement with respondent railroad to main-
tain in return for rail services safe working conditions on petitioner's
property for the benefit of respondent's employees. The agreement
stated petitioner would indemnify respondent for losses resulting from
its obligation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) to pay
claims on its employee's injuries sustained from petitioner's failure to
maintain a safe work environment. Petitioner permitted a dangerous
obstruction to be placed on the railroad tracks on petitioner's property
and one of respondent's trains derailed. While re-railing the train, one
of respondent's employees was injured. Respondent negotiated with its
employee to settle the injury claim. Petitioner, however, refused to
either negotiate or settle the claim. Respondent settled the claim and
filed suit for indemnity. The district court, on summary judgment,
found (1) that petitioner caused employee's injury by permitting the ob-
struction that caused the derailment; (2) that respondent's settlement
was reasonable; and (3) that respondent was entitled to ten percent pre-
judgment interest as well as reasonable attorney's fees. Petitioner ap-
pealed, asserting that issues of fact existed, precluding summary
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the presence of causation be-
tween petitioner's permittance of the obstruction and the employee's
injuries, since the language of the parties' contract based liability for
indemnity on any injury merely "arising out of or connected with" the
failure to keep the track clear of obstructions. Second, the court held
respondent's settlement reasonable, as a matter of law, since any deci-
sion to settle based on potential liability is valid and the district court
can rule summarily that the settlement amount is reasonable where peti-
tioner fails to establish an issue of fact on the amount of damages.
Third, prejudgment interest was properly awarded, since interest is re-
coverable on liquidated claims. Claims are liquidated when both the
amount due and the date on which it is due are fixed and certain. Fi-
nally, attorney's fees were properly awarded, since the language in the
parties' contract specifically contemplated liability for them.
Nunn v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 856 F.2d 1464
Both plaintiffs and defendants appeal the district court's findings in
a breach of contract suit involving the sale of an industrial waste disposal
company. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the plain-
tiffs breached warranties contained in the sales agreement which trans-
ferred the stock of National Industrial Environmental Services, Inc., to
Chemical Waste Management. The district court correctly found the
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sales agreement to be ambiguous, and its construction of the agree-
ment's warranty provision in light of this finding of ambiguity was up-
held using a clearly erroneous standard of review.
Part of the district court's damage award was intended to compen-
sate Chemical Waste Management for its lost profits due to the defend-
ants breach of warranty. The Tenth Circuit overturned this portion of
the award, noting that National Industrial Environmental Services
(NIES) was the party that lost profits, not Chemical Waste Management.
Since NIES was not named in the defendant's counterclaim, no lost
profit damages could be awarded - despite the fact NIES was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Chemical Waste Management.
The court of appeals also determined that despite the state law rem-
edies available to both parties, the case necessitated remand to better
determine the liability of both parties under the terms of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq.
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. UOP, Inc., 861 F.2d 1197
Plaintiff appeals from the damages award and denial of attorney's
fees, and defendant appeals the finding of liability.
HOVIC and UOP entered into several contracts related to the de-
velopment of a distillate desulphurizer (DD4). The Engineering Agree-
ment obligated UOP to furnish engineering specifications which HOVIC
was required to follow, and contained a limitation on UOP's potential
liability. This action was brought by HOVIC as subrogees to recover
damages for an oil refinery fire. HOVIC asserted three theories of re-
covery: breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence. After
the damages trial, the jury found UOP 70% negligent, and HOVIC 30%
negligent. This court rejected UOP's argument that HOVIC's negli-
gence claims were negated by the contract and stated that a party may be
liable in tort for breaching an independent duty, even where the rela-
tionship creating such a duty originates in the parties' contract. HOVIC
argued that the trial court erred by reducing the total damages recov-
ered by HOVIC by its percentage of negligence, and then applying the
amount of credit for its settlements with other parties. The Tenth Cir-
cuit agreed with HOVIC and remanded so that the credit be first sub-
tracted from the total award prior to the plaintiff's percentage of
negligence.
Crawford v. 733 San Mateo Co., 854 F.2d 1220
Appellant Gattas appeals the district court's finding that she is
jointly and severally liable on a promissory note that was executed in
conjunction with a loan agreement between one of the plaintiffs, Tick-
etmaster Corp., and the defendant partnership, of which her husband is
a member. Affirmed.
The court of appeals held that despite the facts the original promis-
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sory note was: (1) lost by plaintiff Crawford; and (2) modified without
Appellant's approval, New Mexico law would allow Crawford to enforce
the note since he proved its existence and terms with clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.
Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 847 F.2d 631
Plaintiff appeals from a district court order affirming an arbitration
decision of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. The Arbitration panel
found for defendant and plaintiffs allege error in the review of the arbi-
tration award. The role of the courts in reviewing arbitral awards is lim-
ited to the determination of whether the arbitrator's award draws its
essence from the contract of the parties. Courts are not to interfere with
an arbitrator's decision unless the contract to be interpreted is not sus-
ceptible to the arbitrator's interpretation. The parties have agreed to
accept the arbitrator's view of the facts and have authorized him to give
meaning to the language of an agreement. Since this court cannot say
that the arbitration panel ignored the plain language of the contract, it
affirms.
Chaparral Resources v. Monsanto, 849 F.2d 1286
Plaintiff, as assignee of Geophysical Systems (GEO), is bringing an
action to recover damages for breach of a contract to purchase seismic
survey data by Monsanto. After failure by GEO to make timely delivery
and disappointment with the quality of the data, Monsanto rescinded
the contract. The district court awarded plaintiff damages for the cost of
the survey data delivered prior to repudiation, and both parties
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held the district court applied the wrong stan-
dard for determining damages. Because Monsanto's recision of the con-
tract amounted to wrongful repudiation, the proper measure of
plaintiff's damages is its expectation rather than its restitution interest.
Since Chaparral was compelled to complete its survey, despite Mon-
santo's breach due to obligations to other parties, it is entitled to dam-
ages for data completed after repudiation as well.
Osgood v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141
Appellant Osgood appeals a district court order dismissing a claim
alleging fraud and requesting punitive damages. The claim arose from a
disputed insurance contract, and was dismissed on the grounds it failed
to state a cognizable claim under Kansas law. Affirmed.
The court of appeals held that under Kansas law, damages in a
breach of contract action are limited to the pecuniary losses sustained;
exemplary and punitive damages are not recoverable in the absence of
an independent tort causing additional injury. Here, all Osgood's dam-
ages flowed from State Farm's breach of contract. There was no in-
dependent tort to serve as a basis for punitive damages. The only
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possible tort upon which Osgood could have based her claim was the
tort of "bad faith," which has yet to be recognized by the Kansas courts.
Telum Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835
Plaintiff-appellee Telum brought suit against defendant-appellant
E.F. Hutton to rescind an oil and gas lease and personal guaranties al-
leging breach of contract and fraud. Following a jury verdict for Telum,
the district court rescinded the lease and the personal guaranties and
dismissed E.F. Hutton's counterclaims. Reversed.
The lease signed by the parties contained a provision that any litiga-
tion arising from the lease would not be tried to a jury. The trial court
found that there was a waiver of this provision. The court of appeals
disagreed, holding that general allegations of fraud are insufficient to
invalidate lease provisions stated in conspicuous print which are agreed
to by sophisticated parties. The court Of appeals also held that the trial
court erred in not admitting evidence offered to prove the existence of a
joint venture between the parties.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. Dutton, 844 F.2d 726
Dutton and Merrill Lynch entered into an employment, contract
which provided that upon leaving the employ of Merrill Lynch, Dutton
would not remove client lists from her files and would not solicit her
former Merrill Lynch clients for a period of one year. The contract also
provided for Dutton's consent to a temporary restraining order in the
event she violated the terms of the agreement. Dutton left Merrill
Lynch, and immediately began contacting her former clients. Merrill
Lynch sought, and was granted, a temporary restraining order by the
district court. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The court of appeals held that since Rule 347(b) of the New York
Stock Exchange provides for mandatory arbitration between its mem-
bers and their employees, the temporary restraining order would be
valid only until the parties' dispute was considered by an arbitration
panel.
Petromanagement v. Acme-Thomas, 835 F.2d 1329
Appellant Petromanagement filed two separate actions against ap-
pellee Acme-Thomas. The first complaint sought rescission and restitu-
tion, and the second complaint sought damages as well as rescission and
restitution. Appellant's motions to consolidate the actions were denied.
Rather than go to trial on both complaints, Appellant stipulated to dis-
miss the first complaint with prejudice. Appellee then moved to dismiss
the second complaint on grounds of claim preclusion. This motion was
granted by the district court. Affirmed.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court's finding that the
two actions brought by the appellant arose from a related series of trans-
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actions, and that because of this, claim preclusion barred the piecemeal
litigation of this dispute.
APC Operating Partnership v. Mackey, 841 F.2d 1031
Appellants, as lessors, signed oil and gas leases covering certain
parcels of land in Oklahoma. The leases, through various assignments,
came to be owned by Appellee APC. The leases had a primary term of
five years and provided that delay rentals would be paid to a depository
bank. Before the expiration of the primary term, one of APC's prede-
cessors in interest stopped paying the delay rentals to the named deposi-
tory banks, and started delivering the rental payments directly to the
individual lessors at their home addresses via registered mail. Appel-
lants argured that this method of payment did not constitute "tendering
to the Lessor" as was required by the leases since the leases did not
explicitly authorize tender by mail, and that the leases had therefore
expired.
The Tenth Circuit held that the leases had been maintained
through the payment of delay rentals directly to the individual lessors by
registered mail. The court held that a lessee must in good faith intend
to make timely payment of delay rentals, and must take such steps as
would accomplish timely payment in due and orderly course but for the
intervention of something beyond the lessee's control. Applying this
standard, the court held the actions of APC's predecessor in interest did
not result in the termination of the oil and gas leases.
Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439
Defendant appeals from the jury verdict and award of damages to
the plaintiff, and from the award of attorney's fees. The jury verdict is
affirmed, but the decision is reversed and remanded for a recalculation
of damages.
This action was prompted by the gas purchase contracts entered
into between the parties. Specifically at issue was the determination of
the custom in the oil and gas industry as to whether the purchasers or
sellers draft the contract. In this case, the defendant gas purchaser drew
up the contract which the plaintiff alone signed. Consequently, the
plaintiff commenced building a pipeline to facilitate the forthcoming gas
purchase requested to comply with the contractual obligations. The de-
fendant claimed that a binding contract never existed. Defendant argued
on appeal that its motion for judgment n.o.v. should have been granted
because of insufficient evidence that the parties had entered into a con-
tract. Under state law, the question of the existency of a contract is a
question of fact for the jury. Here, there was sufficient evidence upon
which the jury resolved that question. The award of damages was re-
manded however, on the basis that the district court misinstructed the
jury on the computation of damages. The district court should have ad-
hered to the mandate of U.C.C. § 2-723 to calculate market price at the
time plaintiff learned of the breach.
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COPYRIGHT, PATENT & TRADEMARK
Marker International v. DeBruler, 844 F.2d 763
0
On appeal, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, which permanently enjoins defendant-appellants from selling
or advertising for sale any product bearing the Marker name with the
sloping 'M' logo.
In this trademark infringement case, the panel found the appellant's
statements constitute an admission that appellee's trademark has a sec-
ondary meaning and thus is protectable under the Lanham Act.
Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268
Hallmark appeals the district court's grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion, which restrains Hallmark from manufacturing and marketing its
"Personal Touch" line of cards during the pendency of this action.
Affirmed.
Blue Mountain alleges in the pending action that Hallmark's "Per-
sonal Touch" line of greeting cards is deceptively and confusingly simi-
lar to Blue Mountain's "AireBrush Feelings" and "Watercolor Feelings"
lines. As such, Blue Mountain asserts that Hallmark's "Personal Touch"
cards infringe the trade dress, i.e., the overall look of Blue Mountain's
cards, in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1982).
The panel finds no error or abuse of discretion by the district court.
The district court could issue a preliminary injunction if Blue Mountain
established four elements, including a substantial likelihood that it will
eventually prevail on the merits. It is this finding by the district court
that is the subject of Hallmark's appeal.
The panel concludes that the district court was correct in finding
that the combination of the features comprising the trade dress of Blue
Mountain's lines of greeting cards is nonfunctional and thus protectable
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The issue of functionality
turned on whether protecting a combination of features would hinder
competition. The district court properly relied on the availability to
Hallmark of alternative appealing designs as a key factor in determining
that the trade dress of Blue Mountain cards is nonfunctional. Thus, the
feature-by-feature functionality analysis encouraged by Hallmark was
unnecessary.
San Juan Products v. San Juan Pools, 849 F.2d 468
Plaintiff, San Juan Products, Inc., is suing San Juan Pools and
Dwight Lien (collectively Lien) for common law and federal trademark
infringement as a form of unfair competition.
The district court found that San Juan's registered trademark was
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never exclusive and that its failure to so notify the patent office made the
trademark void from the outset, and the claim for violation of common
law trademark was "utterly frivolous" since San Juan had never done
business in Kansas (where defendant conducted business) and was pur-
sued "for no other reason than to intimidate defendants." The court
then denied plaintiff's claims, exercising its "inherent equitable power"
to award Lien all expenses and attorney's fees incurred in defense of the
case. Both parties appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the voiding of the trademark by holding
defendant Lien failed to properly plead and prove the elements of fraud
in the procurement of the federal trademark. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees for bringing an un-
founded action in bad faith.
CRIMINAL LAW
United States v. Lance, 848 F.2d 1497
Defendant, a former county commissioner, was indicted and con-
victed on charges that he took kickbacks in connection with county
purchases in violation of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. In
light of the Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483
U.S. 350 (1987), defendant asserts his mail fraud convictions are invalid.
The district court ruled that McNally should not be given retroactive ef-
fect and denied relief. This court differentiates between 1) split deals,
where the county is billed for items it never receives and the money ob-
tained through fraud is split 50-50 between the suppliers and the de-
fendant and 2) kickbacks where the county did receive materials and the
defendant received cash payments for placing orders with various ven-
dors. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Lance failed
to establish prejudice with respect to the counts involving split deals and
affirmed the denial of relief on those counts. On the remaining counts,
they held that the mail fraud convictions are invalid because either the
indictment failed to charge a crime or the jury instructions and evidence
permitted Lance to be convicted on the basis of conduct that is not a
crime. Remanded with directions to vacate the convictions, fines, and
sentences on those counts.
United States v. Minanda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d 1211
Appellant Minanda-Enriquez was deported from the United States
to Mexico. The next year, when he returned to the United States to visit
his family, the border patrol agents allowed him to cross the border. He
was subsequently arrested and convicted of illegal entry after deporta-
tion under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Appellant contends that the conviction re-
quired proof of intent to violate the law and that he would be allowed to
base his defense on the mistaken belief that he was lawfully present in
the United States.
The Tenth Circuit held that the government does not need to show
that the defendant willfully and knowingly engaged in criminal behavior,
but only that the defendant's acts were willful and knowing. Appellant
voluntarily reentered the United States. Therefore, the court affirmed
his conviction for illegal entry after deportation.
Chavez v. Kerby, 848 F.2d 1101
Petitioner Chavez, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Chavez had been convicted of criminal sexual penetra-
tion of a child under the age of 13. Chavez claims his right to due pro-
cess was violated because testimony by the victim of another sexual
encounter with the defendant was admitted. Defendant also alleges the
DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW
trial court refused to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense.
Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the admission of testimony by the seven
year old victim of the prior act of sexual intercourse with defendant in
prosecution of defendant for criminal sexual penetration did not result
in fundamental unfairness that would warrant habeas corpus. Addition-
ally, variance between the victim's testimony at trial and her testimony
before the grand jury was insufficient to require instruction on a lesser
included offense.
United States v. Jones, 841 F.2d 1022
While executing a search warrant, law enforcement officials seized
nine firearms at Jones' residence. Four of the guns had been reported
stolen and Jones was charged with receipt of firearms by a convicted
felon. The government could not establish exact dates as to when the
guns were stolen. The other five guns were used on a separate charge
against Jones for possession of firearms by a convicted felon. Jones was
convicted on both counts. On appeal, Jones .contends that the two con-
victions represent duplicate convictions.
The Tenth Circuit held that because the government could not es-
tablish dates or specific acts or transaction of receipt, it cannot divide
the collection of firearms into separate receipt and possession offenses.
Because the prosecution has only one conviction and one sentence, one
of the convictions must be vacated.
United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408
A narcotics defendant filed a collateral attack on his conviction, ar-
guing that his continuing criminal enterprise conviction should be va-
cated. The district court denied the motion and the defendant
appealed. The court of appeals held that a felony in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (Controlled Substances Act) is a felony for purposes of es-
tablishing a continuing criminal enterprise under § 846, even though
such conspiracy is a lesser included offense under § 848.
United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 933
Appellant Barrett appeals his felony conviction of forging and utter-
ing a treasury check of $236.88 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 495. Affirmed.
Following an adverse jury verdict and six-year jail sentence, Barrett
moved to correct his sentence on the grounds 18 U.S.C. § 510 treats
forgery of a treasury check of less than $500 as a misdemeanor, and that
this provision repealed by implication 18 U.S.C. § 510. In affirming the
conviction and sentence, the court of appeals noted that prosecutors
have long had the discretion of prosecuting under different statutes, and
that barring "positive repugnancy" between statutes, repeals by implica-
tion will not be found.
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United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421
Defendant was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal en-
terprise, using a communication facility in connection with the commis-
sion of a felony and unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant argues
the evidence was insufficient to support the continuing criminal enter-
prise charge in that it failed to show he organized, supervised or man-
aged five or more persons. Further, he argues the court committed
reversible error by allowing the government to introduce evidence of
predicate offenses not specifically alleged in the indictment. Last, he ar-
gues that the trial court abused its discretion and abridged his right to a
fair trial by permitting the marshall to secure his legs with a chain during
the trial. Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that evidence supported the jury's finding
that defendant occupied the position of organizer, superviser or man-
ager of metamphetamine drug dealers in addition to managing middle-
men. Additionally, it held that an indictment is not constructively
amended when admission of uncharged acts does not create substantial
likelihood that defendant was convicted of an offense other than that
charged in indictment. Last, the court held that securing defendant
with a leg chain was not an abuse of discretion in light of defendant's
past dangerous acts and the marshall's belief that restraints were abso-
lutely necessary. Furthermore, visibility of these restraints were mini-
mized in that defendant was brought into and removed from the
courtroom while jury was not present.
United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357
The United States government appeals from a district court deci-
sion dismissing the RICO counts of a racketeering indictment. Re-
versed and remanded.
The defendants were charged with violating Colorado's commer-
cial bribery statue for conspiring with a Mr. Lee, of the Public Service
Company of Colorado, in racketeering activity. Mr. Lee and the defend-
ants agreed that Mr. Lee would accept money in exchange for awarding
public service contracts to the defendant's supply business. Additional
charges against the defendants were sought by the government under
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). The RICO
charges were dismissed by the district court because the provisions of
the Colorado statute, which served as a predicate for establishing RICO
charges, were held void for vagueness, both facially and as applied in the
case at bar.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the finding that the Colorado penal
statue at issue did define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness.
The statute also provided for adequate enforcement standards and did
not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Furthermore,
the facial challenge as to the constitutionality of the statute is inappro-
priate since (1) the statute itself did not threaten to chill constitutionally
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protected conduct, and (2) the challenge did not take place in a
declatory judgment action where no one had yet been charged.
United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485
Appellants Shelton and James appeal their convictions under the
mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, on the grounds the Supreme
Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), inval-
idated their convictions. The district court refused to give McNally ret-
roactive effect, and denied relief for the defendants. Reversed.
The defendants were once Oklahoma County commissioners, and
were convicted of mail fraud committed in the course of a kickback
scheme involving country purchases. The government never proved
this scheme deprived of money or property; rather, the only loss was the
citizens intangible right to honest government. Since the McNally deci-
sion limited applications of the mail fraud statute to deprivations of
money or property, the court of appeals found that the defendants
would not have been subject to the laws which they were convicted of
violating. Thus, the defendants were entitled to the habeas corpus relief
they sought.
United States v. Maranzino, 860 F.2d 981
Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dis-
miss an indictment against him. Affirmed.
Defendant was indicted in 1985 for three counts of making materi-
ally false statements to federally insured banks. Count III of that indict-
ment charged the defendant with falsely representing his existing debts
in a credit application. Count III is the only count at issue in this appeal.
The defendant was later indicted in 1987 on a count similar to Count III
of the 1985 indictment. Defendant argued that the indictment arose out
of the same transaction as Count III of the 1985 indictment which was
dismissed as part of a plea bargain.
The court found that Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) does not require the
government to charge all related offenses in the same indictment. The
district court's refusal to apply the "same transaction" test was affirmed
since this indictment did not allege a conspiracy to defraud a financial
constitution. Finally, this court determined that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to see his
presentence report for purposes of proving his allegation that the cur-
rent charges were included in his 1985 plea agreement which dismissed
similar charges in Count III.
United States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625
Appellant appeals his conviction by jury under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
for knowing possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the en-
hanced sentence he received under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) for a
conviction involving more than 500 grams of cocaine. Affirmed.
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Appellant first contends that the district court improperly admitted
for impeachment purposes evidence that a black bag found in his motel
room contained traces of cocaine. The panel held that the cross-exami-
nation of the appellant concerning the black bag was "reasonably sug-
gested" by the appellant's direct examination and was therefore proper.
The panel also held that the district court properly exercised its discre-
tion by taking steps to limit any unfair prejudice resulting from the co-
caine's admission to impeach.
Appellant contends that the district court erred in failing to sup-
press the cocaine found under the motel room mattress. The district
court found that the search was within the permissible scope of appel-
lant's consent, and the panel concluded that the finding was not clearly
erroneous.
The appellant next contends the evidence was insufficient to show
specifically that he possessed the cocaine seized with an intent to dis-
tribute and therefore his conviction is invalid. The panel found that a
reasonable jury could find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the significant circumstantial evidence and the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom.
Finally, the appellant raised two constitutional challenges to the en-
hanced sentencing provision under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (B)(ii). The
due process challenge fails because the panel found the government met
its burden of alleging and proving the quantity of cocaine possessed by
the defendant. The panel also found, however, that all defendants sen-
tenced under § 841(b) (1)(B) from October 27, 1986, when the en-
hanced sentencing provisions became effective, to November 1, 1987,
the effective day of the statute, received identical treatment under the
statute. Thus, there was no equal protection violation.
Lastly, the panel found that the appellant's sentence is not so
grossly disproportional to his crime as to violate the eighth amend-




United States v. Gattas, 862 F.2d 1432
Before sentencing, petitioner's trial counsel objected to statements
made in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI). The district judge
orally disclaimed reliance on the statements and sentenced petitioner.
Petitioner's new counsel filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming the district court failed to
comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, which requires a sentencing court to attach a written record of its
resolution of contested matters concerning the PSI to the report.
The Tenth Circuit held that the judge failed to include a written
statement of his nonreliance on disputed statements to the PSI as re-
quired. Because the PSI is important in the correction process of crimi-
nal defendants, the court held that the petitioner has a valid § 2255
claim. The court stated that resentencing is not an appropriate remedy
when the sentencing judge did not rely on disputed facts in the PSI.
Instead, the court remanded for attachment of the proper record to the
PSI.
United States v. Mar, 856 F.2d 1471
Defendant moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court
summarily denied Marr's motion and he appeals asserting that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing his motion without conducting an eviden-
tiary hearing on his claim.
The Tenth Circuit held that an evidentiary hearing is not required
when the district court finds that the record conclusively shows the de-
fendant is entitled to no relief. However, the district court's order deny-
ing relief upon a motion for ineffective assistance of counsel must
indicate that the court reviewed the records before concluding that de-
fendant's counsel was competent. The district court judge should enu-
merate the issues raised by the prisoner and explain the reasons for
actions taken. Such reasoned decision provides a basis for appellate
review.
Since the order failed to indicate whether the records of the case
were reviewed, the court vacated the decision and remanded to allow
the district court enter appropriate findings.
Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323
Plaintiff was detained in prison indefinitely for civil contempt when
he filed for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The government responded
after the required time for filing, but before the scheduled hearing. The
court granted plaintiff's writ and ordered him released.
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The government argues on appeal that the court's order is
equivalent to a default judgment which should not be permissible in
habeas corpus proceedings. The Tenth Circuit declined to decide
whether a default judgment could 'ever be granted in such proceedings.
It found that when the actual delay is not sufficiently extensive or egre-
gious so as to violate due process considerations, a default judgment is
inappropriate. Reversed and remanded.
United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425
Fadel was indicted by a federal grand jury with conspiracy to pos-
sess and distribute cocaine and two counts of distributing cocaine.
Fadel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of outra-
geous governmental misconduct and entrapment, allegedly arising out
of the government's undercover investigation. In response, the govern-
ment stated that Fadel's motion was premature and inappropriate for
pretrial consideration. The district court rejected this position. The
government presented Hafen's testimony to rebut Fadel's allegations
and to create a factual issue for the jury. The government presented the
testimony of Hafen, an undercover officer with whom Fadel had dis-
cussed future drug dealings. The district court finally dismissed the in-
dictment with prejudice stating that the government had not disputed
Fadel's affidavit as to his lack of predisposition to engage in criminal
activity. The government contends this decision on appeal.
The Tenth Circuit held that the defense of entrapment is inter-
twined with the issue of intent and is based on credibility determina-
tions, an area traditionally reserved for the jury. The court held that
Fadel's admissions in his motion to dismiss read in conjunction with
Hafen's testimony clearly created a factual dispute that precluded pre-
trial findings of entrapment by the district court as a matter of law.
United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992
Appellant Keiswetter was charged with a felony of knowingly con-
verting property. He agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor of con-
version in exchange for a dismissal of the felony charge. The district
court accepted the plea. However, Keiswetter later moved to withdraw
his guilty plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him.
Appellant appealed the sentence.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for clarification of the district
judge's reasons for finding that a factual basis existed for the charge to
which appellant pleaded guilty. A guilty plea will not be invalidated
when the evidence is clear that a defendant voluntarily and knowingly
pled guilty. The court held that there is adequate evidence that Keiswet-
ter understood that a guilty plea was in his best interest. However, it is
unclear whether the court found that the evidence on which the judge
relied to reach his conclusion was adequate to believe that Keiswetter
possessed the requisite intent for the crime of conversion.
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United States v. Jones, 852 F.2d 1275
After a jury verdict convicting appellant Jones of conspiracy to pos-
sess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, Jones unsuccess-
fully sought a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He
claimed that his attorney had failed to call witnesses who could have
substantiated Jones' actual physical and mental need for powerful drugs
because of his chronic back problems.
The Tenth Circuit held that Jones received assistance of effective
counsel, and although there were some deficiencies, they did not result
in prejudicial error. The court held that an error, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside ajudgment if the error had
no effect.
United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194
Appeal from trial court's order to suppress all evidence seized in a
search of appellee's home including evidence specifically described in a
valid search warrant. The court found that additional goods seized were
beyond the scope of the search warrant and unsupported by the govern-
ment's claim that the appellee's consent obviated the need for an addi-
tional search warrant.
The court held that where a search pursuant to a valid warrant is
executed in a manner exhibiting "flagrant disregard" for the terms of
the warrant (here, 667 items outside the scope of the warrant were
seized) the suppression of all evidence seized under the warrant is
required.
United States v. Guiterrez, 839 F.2d 648
In 1965, Guiterrez pleaded guilty to a federal offense. In 1980, he
was convicted again under New Mexico law and was given a life sentence
due to the prior federal offense. He then filed a motion to vacate or set
aside his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his 1965
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The United States moved to
dismiss the motion stating that Guiterrez understood the plea. In the
alternative, the government contended that the motion should be dis-
missed pursuant to Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceeding
because the government had been prejudiced in its ability to respond to
the motion by the twenty-year delay in bringing it.
A magistrate recommended dismissal of the motion under Rule
9(a), and the district court adopted the recommendation. The Tenth
Circuit held that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be filed at any
time. However, Rule 9(a) does require that before considering matters
outside of the pleadings in dismissing a section 2255 motion, the district
court must provide notice to the movant. The district court erred in
dismissing Guiterrez's motion without giving him notice that it intended
to treat the government's motion as a motion for summary judgment
and for failing to provide Guiterrez with an evidentiary hearing before
1989]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
summarily denying his motion on the merits. Vacated and remanded in
part.
United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323
Following indictment, appellant Gipson sought removal of the trial
judge because the judge had been the United States attorney when Gip-
son had been convicted of an offense similar to that for which he stood
charged. Thejudge claimed impartiality. The trial court denied the mo-
tion to recuse. Gipson entered an unconditional guilty plea, was sen-
tenced, and now appeals the denial of his motion to recuse.
The Tenth Circuit held that entry of an unconditional plea of guilty
generally constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in the pro-
ceeding. When Gipson entered his plea, he waived his right to appeal
the denial of recusal based on the judge's appearance of impartiality.
The court affirmed Gipson's conviction.
United State v. Mora, 845 F.2d 233
Appellants were tried jointly and convicted of distributing cocaine
and conspiracy of distributing cocaine. At trial, the prosecutor made
statements in his closing argument about appellants' post arrest silence
in contrast to another defendant's statement the night of the arrest after
being given her Miranda rights. Appellants appeal their conviction stat-
ing that the prosecutor improperly commented on their post-arrest si-
lence and thus violated their Miranda rights.
The Tenth Circuit held that when reviewing a comment about a de-
fendant's right to remain silent, the court must look at the context in
which the statement was made to determine its manifest intent and its
impact on the jury. Manifest intent will not be found if some other ex-
planation for the prosecutor's remark is plausible. The court held that
the statements were neither manifestly intended to be a comment on
appellants' silence nor would the jury necessarily take them to be.
United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816
Friesen, an attorney, was found not guilty of intentionally manufac-
turing cocaine. He moved to expunge all records related to his arrest.
Without taking evidence, the district court found that the arrest on drug
related charges resulted in a stigma that acquittal alone would not re-
solve. The United States appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court could not exercise its
discretion to order expunction without a showing of extreme circum-
stances. Noting lack of any findings of fact, the court remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing.
United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026
Pursuant to an investigation, fifteen people were indicted on vari-
ous cocaine possession and distribution charges. Six co-conspirators
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entered guilty pleas and testified for the government. Dunn was con-
victed and sentenced. He appealed following denials of his motions for
judgment of acquittal and a new trial. Dunn contended that the district
court's denial of his pre-trial motion for a bill of particulars caused prej-
udicial surprise and impeded his ability to present a defense.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it denied Dunn's motion for a bill of particulars. A defend-
ant must show that he was actually surprised and incurred prejudice.
Dunn's counsel failed to make known to the district court what he con-
sidered prejudicial surprise until after the verdict. He should have
brought the matter to the district court's attention when it occurred.
Additionally, Dunn contends that each time a co-conspirator testi-
fied thejury should have been instructed that the testimony could not be
used as substantive evidence of another's guilt. The court held that
although that instruction is preferable per se, plain error cannot be found
on this error alone.
United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387
Second degree murder and aiding and abetting second degree mur-
der convictions, resulting from incidents of child abuse, were affirmed.
There was no Brady violation because the prosecution gave autopsy re-
ports to the defense. There was, therefore, no suppression of material
evidence favorable to the defendants. The court also upheld the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators exception. Declar-
ant was not a member of the conspiracy, but was testifying as to
statements the co-conspirator had made. The district court had made
sufficient findings of a conspiracy to allow the exception and it was
harmless error that one of the statements made was "more narrative"
and not in furtherance of the conspiracy.
United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction for voluntary
manslaughter. An FBI agent handed a business card to the suspect and
his subsequent voluntary interview was not held an improper continua-
tion of interrogation. The ultimate confession was not suppressible
where the suspect voluntarily waived his right to an attorney.
An accused's invocation of his right to counsel is not a bar to fur-
ther interrogation as long as the accused himself initiates further con-
versation and the government carries the burden of proof that he
subsequently waived his right to counsel.
White v. Meachum, 838 F.2d 1137
An Oklahoma state prisoner initiated a civil rights action challeng-
ing on ex poste facto grounds the state's method of computing good
time credits. The district court construed the complaint as a petition for
writ of habeas corpus and dismissed it for failure to exhaust administra-
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tive remedies. The court of appeals affirmed the holding that White
must give the appellate court the opportunity to grant relief.
Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179
Worthen claims his guilty plea was involuntary. The district court
held he could not challenge his guilty plea because he had not shown
cause and prejudice after his failure to raise the issue properly in state
court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating a defendant may not appeal
from a conviction on a guilty plea if he does not apply to withdraw the
plea within ten days ofjudgment or sentence. The district court applied
the wrong test for holding that Worthen could not obtain federal habeas
review. The appropriate test is the deliberate bypass test of Fay.
A remand was not necessary because the court held that even if he
had established sufficient cause for failure to appeal, Worthen had not
demonstrated actual prejudice.
Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553
Defendant Hannon appeals the denial of his petition to the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus some 25 years after being sentenced
for murder. The court of appeals held that state allegations that the trial
judge and court reporter had died, and that the prosecutor couldn't re-
member the case were not enough to show prejudice (undue delay) suf-
ficient to bar retrial on the grounds that defendant was denied due
process, since his attorney had never perfected his appeal. On remand,
the court should make a determination whether equitable considerations
mandate substantive review, even if burden of showing prejudice is sus-
tained by the prosecution.
United States v. Barrera, 843 F.2d 1576
Appellant Barrera appeals his conviction of manufacturing
methamphetamine and possession of the same with intent to distribute.
Affirmed.
The grounds of Barrera's appeal was the refusal of the district court
to allow an examination of the government's informant, and the exist-
ence of misstatements in the affidavit used to secure the search warrant.
The court of appeals held that the testimony of the informant in an in
camera examination gave the district court a sufficient basis on which to
deny the motion to examine the informant, and that a search warrant
affidavit is not rendered fatally flawed by misstatements when there is
ample showing of probable cause in the affidavit despite them.
United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371
Appellant United States makes an interlocutory appeal of the dis-
trict court's decision to suppress a quantity of cocaine which was evi-
dence of narcotics laws violations. Reversed.
In deciding to suppress the evidence, the district court held that the
[Vol. 66:4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
affidavit on which the search warrant was based did not establish suffi-
cient probable cause. The affidavit had been reviewed by an assistant
district attorney and a state judge, both of whom approved it. Given
these facts, the court of appeals held that a well trained officer would not
have known the search was illegal, and that because of this, the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.
United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401
Appellant Cronic appeals his conviction of mail fraud violations on
the grounds of inadequate representtion. Reversed and remanded.
In its case, the government alleged mail fraud violations for a
"check kiting" scheme. The government based its case on the incorrect
belief that writing a check on an account with insufficient funds is auto-
matically fraud. It has long been held, however, that good faith is a
complete defense under the mail fraud statutes. Cronic's counsel never
discovered this, and instead based his defense on a questionable strat-
egy of "clouding the issues." The court of appeals found this level of
incompetence clearly prejudiced the defendant, and that a new trial was
warranted.
United States v. Daniels, 857 F.2d 1392
Appellant Daniels makes an interlocutory appeal of the district
court's denial of his motion to dismiss conspiracy charges on double
jeopardy grounds. Affirmed.
Daniels was indicted and charged with conspiracy to manufacture
amphetamine. In making his motion to dismiss, he claimed he had ear-
lier pled guilty to another charge of conspiracy to manufacture ampheta-
mine, and the current indictment charged the same offense. The
testimony on this issue was conflicting, which presented an issue of fact
to the judge. The court of appeals noted that when factual issues such
as this are presented, the district judge has a right to resolve issues in a
fashion adverse to a defendant.
United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d 1249
Defendant appeals conviction in district court of making false decla-
rations under oath before a grand jury. The Tenth Circuit held that the
delay of one year between the perjury before the grand jury and the
indictment charging perjury did not constitute denial of due process,
despite defendant's contention that the perjury related to state illegal
kickback charges which the government allegedly knew of several years
before the perjury indictment. Perjury to which preindictment delay re-
lated had not been committed until the grand jury testimony was given.
The court held that defendant's statements before the grand jury were
material. For testimony to give rise to perjury under statute, it need not
have the actual effect of influencing, misleading or hampering the grand
jury; rather, testimony merely must be capable of influencing the grand
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jury. Finally, the court held that the trial court error in conducting the
materiality hearing in front of the jury was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. Convincing evidence was presented that defendant, despite
his denials in front of the grand jury, was offered and received cash pay-
ments. The evidence adduced at the materiality hearing was only a
small part of the trial. Affirmed.
Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612
Appellants Shillinger and McClintock (the state of Wyoming) ap-
peal a district court's ruling which granted Kevin Osborn's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Affirmed.
In 1982, Osborn pled guilty to a series of crimes which included
felony murder. He was later sentenced to death. Osborn petitioned for
post conviction relief at the state district court level, primarily on the
basis of ineffectiveness of counsel. This petition, and a later petition for
reconsideration, were denied for procedural reasons, and neither was
directly appealed. When Osborn later petitioned the federal district
court for habeas corpus, the state of Wyoming argued Osborn had not
exhausted the state remedies, and that his claims were resolved on in-
dependent state procedural grounds. Affirming the district court deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit noted that Osborn's state remedies had been
exhausted prior to the district court's decision, the state procedural
rules did not bar later federal review where a petitioner is not reason-
ably aware that a violation of the rules will prevent a court from address-
ing the merits of his claim, and that the district court's finding of
ineffectiveness of counsel was amply supported by the record.
Reyes v. Quintana, 853 F.2d 784
Reyes, convicted of second-degree murder, was sentenced to nine
years for the homicide, plus three under a New Mexico enhancement
provision for aggravating circumstances. Reyes claimed the enhance-
ment provision exposed him to double jeopardy since the trial court im-
properly injected the issue of premeditation into the sentencing even
though the jury had already found to the contrary when it convicted him
of only second-degree murder.
Upholding the enhancement provision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
the record contained no indication that the trial court relied on a delib-
erate intent to kill when applying the enhancement provision. It merely
found that Reyes had pursued his victim. Pursuit is not tantamount to a
deliberate intent to kill. Such consideration by the trial court did not
violate Reyes' rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Reyes simply
confused the process of proving elements with that of weighing circum-
stances. Dismissal of the habeas corpus petition affirmed.
United States v. Billings, 858 F.2d 617
Defendant Billings appeals the district court's denial of his motion
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to suppress observations by two Denver police officers. The district
court denied the motion because the defendant had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. Affirmed.
In June 1987, two Denver police officers assigned to the narcotics
unit, observed Billings disembark from an arriving Miami flight at Den-
ver Stapleton Airport and followed him through the terminal and into a
public restroom, whereupon they observed (through the open area be-
tween the stall and the floor) him remove a clear bag full of white sub-
stance taped to his left ankle. Thereafter, the police officers followed
him back into the terminal, identified themselves and asked him for
identification. Billings verbally identified himself and permitted the of-
ficers to search his baggage where they found two plastic bags of white
powder. The defendant then fled the scene but was subdued, and later
placed under arrest. A search incident to the arrest revealed two more
bags of cocaine taped to his ankles. Billings contended at trial that the
request for identification and subsequent search were invalid because
they stemmed from the officer's initial sighting of cocaine while the de-
fendant was inside a bathroom stall which violated defendant's reason-
able expectation of privacy. The district court concluded that there can
be no reasonable expectation of privacy within that area of the bathroom
stall observable by the ordinary patron of a public lavoratory.
United States v. Theron, 849 F.2d 477
Defendant was indicted and pleaded guilty to charges of mail fraud
and conspiracy. Although the district court advised him it was not
bound by any recommendations, it failed to advise, in violation of the
mandatory requirements of Rule 1 l(e)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P., that in this
event defendant would not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
Prior to sentencing, defendant unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his
plea. Defendant appeals.
The government argues that defendant failed to raise a Rule 11
claim before the court and that the court's action was harmless error.
The Tenth Circuit determined defendant had raised the substance of
this claim and that in these circumstances, where defendant was not fa-
miliar with procedure, counsel withdrew immediately prior to the hear-
ing, and new counsel was left with inadequate preparation time,
defendant's failure was understandable. The Tenth Circuit found that
even if defendant and his counsel failed to detect the court's error he
could nonetheless be affected by it. The record supports defendant's
confusion as to his plea, and indicates defendant believed he could with-
draw his plea if recommendations were not followed. The Tenth Circuit
held that there was a reasonable possibility defendant was confused and
that Rule 11 compliance could have avoided the violation and was there-
fore not harmless error. Conviction and sentencing vacated; reversed
and remanded.
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United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059
The government claims abuse of discretion in excluding testimony
or the report of its expert due to its failure to comply with a motion to
compel discovery. Rule 16(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure gives the court broad discretion in imposing sanctions on one who
fails to comply with a discovery order, including prohibiting the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed. The Tenth Circuit found the
three criteria of United States v. Euceda-Hernandez, 768 F.2d 1307 (11 th
Cir. 1985), applies as a guideline when considering sanctions under this
rule. Although the district court did not discuss bad faith, the Tenth
Circuit found no abuse of discretion in its finding that negligence on the
part of the government's expert in not providing the report until imme-
diately prior to trial where only one request for the report was made did
not justify delay. The district court also found there would be prejudice
to defendants here because the deal in providing the report left defend-
ants' counsel with inadequate time to prepare for trial. Lastly, the Tenth
Circuit found the district court was justified in its sanctions where the
demands of the court's calendar disfavor a second continuance.
Affirmed.
United States v. Maynes-Ortega, 857 F.2d 686
This court affirmed a previous decision that evidence of drugs
found in plain view in the trunk of a car can be used as evidence even
though they were discovered accidentally by officers conducting a search
for evidence of a different type of offense; in this case, transportation of
illegal aliens. To require prosecutors to use only evidence related to a
particular offense of which they had specifically suspected the defendant
and had consequently obtained in the course of searches and seizures
aimed at that particular crime would be a grotesque parody of efficient
law enforcement.
Also at issue was whether newly discovered evidence was sufficient
for a new trial. The newly discovered evidence must be more than im-
peaching or cumulative; it must be material to the issues involved and
must be such that it would probably produce an acquittal. A new trial is
not warranted if the new evidence is such that it could have been discov-
ered and produced with reasonable diligence at the original trial. Since
defendant's evidence was merely impeachment on an immaterial issue
and could not possibly have resulted in a different verdict, a new trial
was denied.
Johnson v. Riveland, 855 F.2d 1477
Plaintiff filed an application for post conviction relief requesting
credit for the time he had spent in pretrial confinement. The Colorado
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court lacked juris-
diction to modify the sentence after it had been commuted by the Gov-
ernor. The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
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While Johnson's habeas petition was pending in the United States
District Court, he was released on parole. On its own motion the court
of appeals addressed the issue of mootness. Finding no live controversy
because of the parole, the court vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded with directions to dismiss for mootness.
United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d 636
Defendant claimed the United States Attorney's office breached a
plea agreement through its participation in the preparation of the prose-
cutions's version and the culpability ranking in the presentence investi-
gation report. The Tenth Circuit looked at information the U.S.
Attorney's office provided ranking defendants with respect to culpability
in the scheme.
Disclosure of information as to the nature of the offense, and each
defendant's role, is proper and within the Government's duty to provide
despite a premise that the Government would make no recommendation
as to sentence. Since the record showed no breach of the plea agree-
ment, this court affirmed the lower court.
Defendant further alleged the presentence report was unreliable,
that its preparation violated 32(c)(1) Fed. R. Crim. P., and that there was
such bias in the presentencing procedure that his due process rights
were violated. The probation officer may include statements by the gov-
ernment as well as those by the defendant; otherwise, critical informa-
tion concerning such a large-scale scheme, cannot be made available
with the result of depriving sentencing judges of information which
would undermine modern phenological procedural policies. The judg-
ment and sentence were affirmed. Judge Seymour dissented because he
believes when viewed in totality, the government's inclusion of the cul-
pability rankings in the pre-sentence report constituted a breach of the
plea agreement.
Moore v. Dubois, 848 F.2d 1115
Appellant Moore was sent to prison for armed robbery and then
paroled. Parole was revoked after he stabbed a former girl friend with a
knife. Paroled for a second time, his parole officer recommended parole
revocation after being told by appellant's sister that he had been forcing
her to have sex with him for a month, finally culminating in an assault
and rape when she refused. At the revocation hearings, however, she
testified that she lied to keep her mother from thinking she engaged in
sex willingly. The hearing officer, crediting her testimony, recom-
mended no parole violation for sexual harassment or assault. On review
the parole commission, concluding that her revised testimony was the
result of fear of appellant, revoked parole and Moore appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that in administrative proceedings, such as
parole hearings, decision makers do not violate due process when they
reject the findings of hearing examiners without personally hearing and
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observing key witnesses. When only conditional liberty interests (such
as parole) are at stake, the full procedural rights of criminal trial are not
needed (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592
The government appeals from the district court's decision granting
defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant.
Affirmed.
Based on an affidavit alleging defendant Kleinberg was attempting
to illegally export equipment to the People's Republic of China, a war-
rant was issued to search the Kleinberg offices and seize certain specified
property. After two officers at Kleinberg were subsequently indicted for
conspiring to violate the Export Administration Act, the district court
granted a motion to suppress all evidence seized by the search, finding
that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause and that the war-
rant did not sufficiently specify the evidence to be seized.
The government contended that because the defendants had no
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim, the claimant must show a
subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and the expecta-
tion must be one that society will recognize as reasonable. The court of
appeals found that individual defendants have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in corporate offices. Absent a statutory scheme authorizing
warrantless searches, there is no waiver of constitutional rights by the
mere fact that the defendants chose to participate in an activity regu-
lated and licensed by the government. Therefore, the defendants had
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim.
The appellate court found the warrant to be facially overbroad be-
cause it authorized a general search in conjunction with a federal crime.
Reference in their warrant to two export statutes does not sufficiently
limit the scope of the warrant. This warrant did not meet even the mini-
mum requirement of allowing executing officers to distinguish between
items that may and may not be seized. In addition, while an affidavit
may cure an overbroad warrant, it can only do so where the affidavit and
the search warrant constitute one document. The Kleinberg warrant did
not incorporate the affidavit and there is no reference to the affidavit on
the face of the warrant. The Kleinberg warrant was also flawed because
information was available to provide a more particular description of the
items to be seized. Finally, the scope of the warrant was invalid for fail-
ure to contain limitations on its scope, and its extension beyond the
scope of the supporting affidavit. The court further held the evidence
inadmissible under the "good faith" exception because suppression of
the evidence in this case was appropriate to deter government miscon-
duct. The court did not review the probable cause issue.
Sanchez v. Mondragon, 858 F.2d 1462
Petitioner Sanchez appeals from the district court order denying
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with prejudice his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the
trial court's inquiry into his decision to waive his right to counsel and
represent himself was inadequate and a violation of his sixth amendment
right to counsel. The district court affirmed that the state judge met the
constitutional requirements necessary to comply with sixth amendment
dictates. Reversed and remanded.
In June 1984, Sanchez was indicted on several counts related to a
residential burglary, and was later convicted of battery and possession of
a burglary tool, but acquitted of aggravated burglary and larceny. Prior
to the commencement of trial, Sanchez expressed dissatisfaction with his
public defender's performance and sought either a new attorney or the
opportunity to represent himself. The trial court permitted Sanchez to
serve as his own counsel whereupon he pled not guilty and proceeded to
trial. Upon conviction, he appealed in state court and lost, then filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Sanchez alleged that the trial court
conducted an insufficient inquiry into his request to proceed pro se.
The state trial judge failed to ensure that Sanchez's waiver of counsel
was not exercised as a means of choosing between incompetent counsel
and appearing pro se. Under the Faretta standards enumerated in United
States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987), two inquires as to waiver
of counsel must be conducted on appeal in a collateral proceeding.
First, it must be determined that the defendant voluntarily chose to ap-
pear pro se; second, the defendant must knowingly and intelligently
have waived his right to counsel. The district court held that the state
trial judge did inform Sanchez of his rights under the sixth amendment
and adequately advised him of the disadvantages inherent in self-repre-
sentation, and further that Sanchez waived his right to counsel volunta-
rily and intelligently. This court reversed on the grounds that the trial
judge's inquiry into Sanchez's reasons for waiving his right to counsel
was inadequate and there is reasonable doubt that had he been repre-
sented by competent counsel, he would not have been found guilty.
United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040
Defendant was indicted in Oklahoma and charged with two counts
of assisting in the preparation of a false income tax, one count of con-
spiracy and one count of perjury. Defendant was found guilty of con-
spiracy and acquitted on the remaining counts. Defendant appeals on
Che grounds that he should have been granted a new trial because of
juror misconduct and argues the district court impermissibly amended
the indictment in its charge to the jury.
The court's questioning of a juror who is the recipient of extrane-
ous information is limited to the circumstances, nature, and extent of
the improper contact because Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) precludes the court
from delving into the subjective effect of the contact on the juror's deci-
sion-making. An objective test should be applied to determine whether
the defendant was prejudiced by the extrinsic information.
The Tenth Circuit court agrees with the district court that informa-
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tion imparted to a juror pertained to matters before the jury and deem
the contact to be presumptively prejudicial. However, the presumption
is overcome by the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt on
the conspiracy court. In deleting the year 1981 in its instruction on the
conspiracy charge, the district court did not change the meaning of the
charge from that presented to the grand jury or alter the government's
theory of the case, and did not result in any prejudice to the defendant.
United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304
Defendant, Robert Estrada, was seeking to overturn his conviction,
pursuant to a guilty plea was involuntary and that he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel, was denied by the district court without an
evidentiary hearing, and he appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 a prisoner is enti-
tled to a prompt evidentiary hearing to determine the issues and make
fact findings unless this motion and the record clearly indicate the pris-
oner is entitled to no relief.
Since defendant's contentions are not unsupported by specifics or
"incredible in the face of the trial record" he has the right to attempt to
prove his claims at an evidentiary hearing.
Remanded to district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether
Estrada's plea was voluntary.
Hurd v. Mondragon, 851 F.2d 324
Plaintiff filed a pro se petition, later amended by the federal public
defender, which alleged two causes of action based on violation of his
fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. Upon review, the U.S. Magis-
trate found plaintiff had exhausted his state remedies and therefore was
not entitled to collateral relief. Additionally, the Magistrate found plain-
tiff's trial counsel's decision not to pursue a third cause of action based
on impermissible "show-up" was a tactical one not resulting in revers-
ible error. The Magistrate recommended dismissing the petition with
prejudice.
After the Magistrate filed his proposed findings and recommenda-
tion, the federal public defender filed a motion to withdraw without
prejudice, which the district court denied. The Magistrate's recommen-
dation was upheld. Plaintiff appeals this decision, charging the district
court erred in dismissing with prejudice since he had not exhausted all
state remedies. The Tenth Circuit held that simply because Plaintiff un-
covered a third possible ground for relief which had not been litigated
did not create error in dismissing with prejudice. Plaintiff also claims a
change in law which permits him to withdraw without prejudice. How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit found that where, as here, the change in law
occurs prior rather than after the Magistrate's recommendation is filed




Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244
A minor refused to testify against its parent before a grand jury,
asserting parent-child and family privileges. The district court issued a
contempt citation against the minor and the minor appealed. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed, refusing to expand the scope of testimonial priv-
ilege to include the parent-child and family privileges. The court held
that these privileges are not fundamental enough to be constitutionally
protected on privacy grounds. Furthermore, the court held that the
government's compelling interest in investigating crimes and enforcing
federal laws outweigh the appellant's free exercise of the Mormon reli-
gion, which would prevent the minor from testifying against the parent.
United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d 436
Appellants, Smith and Bailey, received a loan from the Stockman's
Bank and Trust Company, of Gillette, Wyoming, to finance the con-
struction of a condominium complex. The loan was approved only for
preliminary work on the site. Invoices were submitted by the subcon-
tracting companies formed by the appellants, and the money received
was then used by the appellants for purposes other than the condomin-
ium complex. The federally insured bank lost $225,000 in the
transaction.
A jury convicted the appellants on charges of conspiracy and mak-
ing false statements. To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1014,
the prosecution had to prove that the defendants misrepresented their
intentions by the submission of the invoices. The Tenth Circuit held
that the prosecution's evidence that the appellants did not use the dis-
bursements for the stated purposes, and the ongoing nature of the in-
voice submissions, supported the jury's finding of intent to deceive the
bank.
The court also found that the jury verdict form which required the
jury to find the defendants guilty or not guilty "of making false state-
ments and aiding and abetting" was allowed under United States v. Cook,
745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1985). A
defendant may be convicted as an aider and abetter even if that same
defendant was indicted as a principle for commission of the underlying
offense and not as an aider and abettor. However, the underlying of-
fense must be proven in either case.
United States v. Songer, 842 F.2d 240
Songer, the appellant, was indicted for his participation in a contin-
uing criminal enterprise. Songer posted bond, then broke off communi-
cations with his lawyer, and was assumed to have fled the country. A
trial in abstentia was held in which the jury returned a guilty verdict on all
counts, and required forfeiture of Songer's interest in certain real and
personal property under 21 U.S.C. § 853. As part of this judgment, the
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district court vested title to the forfeited property in the federal
government.
Forfeiture of property is considered a sentence under § 853. Ap-
pellant's counsel argued that sentencing in abstentia violates Fed. R.
Crim. Proc. 43. The Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment and order of
forfeiture and remanded the case with instructions that the sentence
could be imposed only when Songer is personally before the court.
United States v. Steven W, 850 F.2d 648
The appellant, Steven W., a juvenile, admitted to a violation before
a magistrate on March 20, and was adjudicated delinquent by a district
court on May 14. The appellant brought a motion to dismiss under 18
U.S.C. § 5037, asserting a failure to hold a disposition hearing within 20
days after the juvenile delinqueincy hearing was denied.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court and recognized that
the language of the statute clearly provides for the 20-day period to be-
gin to run when the court finds a juvenile to be delinquent in a juvenile
delinquency hearing. Therefore, the appeals court held that the judg-
ment and conviction in court, not the tender and acceptance of a plea
constitutes the determination of delinquency.
United States v. Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262
Appellant Strayer was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent
to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. One month later, before
Strayer's arraignment, the government filed for a motion to dismiss the
indictment in "the interests of justice." Several months later, another
indictment was returned against Strayer. This indictment included
three alleged co-conspirators and charged the group with conspiracy
and possession with intent to distribute.
Strayer moved to dismiss the second indictment under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a), stating that the first indictment was dis-
missed without good cause. The Tenth Circuit held the dismissal of the
first indictment was for good cause since it was defective in not naming
the co-conspirators. The facts of this case were less compelling than
those in United States v. Derr, 726 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1984), in which the
court dismissed a second indictment when the first indictment was dis-
missed one day prior to trial over the defendant's objections and a sec-
ond indictment was not filed for two years. In the Strayer case, the
government dismissed the first indictment before Strayer was even ar-
raigned and the reindictment followed closely in time.
Strayer's allegation that the trial court imposed upon him the bur-
den of proving the accuracy of disputed materials in a sentencing report
is irrelevant. The court found that under Rule 32, when a defendant
alleges factual inaccuracy in a sentencing report, two options are avail-
able. The record did not indicate any violation of these options and the
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transcript clearly shows the judge stated he would not consider the al-
leged inaccurate factual statements.
United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682
Robert Smith, the appellant, was convicted on charges of distribu-
tion of controlled substances. Smith appealed based upon the wording
of the Allen charges, and the denial of the disclosure of a confidential
informant.
Allen charges have been allowed by the Tenth Circuit. The instruc-
tions to the jury in the Smith case were objected to because the instruc-
tions stated that the parties "will" be put to the expense of another trial
if unanimity is not reached. The Tenth Circuit found that the instruc-
tion as a whole conveys the possibility that the case might not be retried
and therefore upheld the wording of the instructions in this case.
The court also held that the law is clear in its intent to keep the
identity of a confidential informant concealed unless the circumstances
of the case require disclosure. The court suggested that fairness or a
specific need for information by the defendant might allow for disclo-
sure in certain situations.
United States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 1014
Rodriguez-Pando (Pando) was stopped on the highway by a New
Mexico law enforcemnt officer. Pando was weaving erratically, and the
the officer suspected an intoxicated driver. When Pando was stopped
the officer requested his driver's license. Pando opened the glove box
and began pulling out a gun. The officer arrested him, searched his ve-
hicle, and found 1100 pounds of cocaine.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that the initial stopping of
Pando's vehicle was justified because of a reasonable suspicion that he
was intoxicated. Pando's arrest was lawful as well since he assaulted the
officer by pulling out a gun from his glove compartment. The automo-
bile exception to warrantless searches was valid in this case because the
preceeding events provided probable cause to reasonably believe that
the truck contained illegal drugs.
Pando made a tape-recorded statement to police that he had been
coerced into transporting the drugs by threats made upon his family. At
trial this statement was excluded as hearsay. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the trial court because the statement was not made under oath and was
not subject to cross-examination. The tape was hearsay since it was of-
fered to prove that Pando had been threatened. In addition, a search
warrant was obtained to conduct a urinalysis examination. In order to
attack this warrant for urinalysis, Pando must make a substantial prelimi-
nary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally was in-
cluded by the affiant and the false statement was necessary for a showing
of probable cause. Pando failed to show these things. Pando's objection
to the magistrate's lack of expert knowledge on drugs was rejected, and
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the trial court's discretion that the probative value of the urinalysis was
greater than the prejudice it created was upheld.
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485
Appeal from the district court's order to exempt assets otherwise
subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853, to the extent necessary to
pay reasonable attorney's fees and holding the criminal forfeiture stat-
ute invalid. Reversed.
Appellee was charged with a drug felony subject to criminal forfei-
ture. Nichols asserted that the forfeiture statute violated his right to
choice of counsel since application of the statute to him would finan-
cially limit his choice. The ownership of the property is not known at
the time the restraining order is sought, and freezing the assets may pre-
vent the defendant from using assets in a manner which could prove
his/her innocence. Nevertheless, the court determined that Congress
acted within its authority in applying a relation back provision to create a
governmental interest in the property involved in criminal activity. The
defendant does not have a constitutional right to use assets subject to
forfeiture and this limitation does not infringe on the defendant's right
to counsel. There is no constitutional right to chosen counsel and the
possibility of prosecutors using criminal forfeiture to influence a defend-
ant's choice of counsel does not render the statute unconstitutional. If
forfeiture results in the defendant not being able to hire counsel then an
attorney will be appointed.
United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280
Law enforcement officers tapped the residential telephone of appel-
lant McPherson. The recordings became the basis of indictments charg-
ing McPherson and Savaiano with conspiracy to manufacture
amphetamine, using a telephone to further the conspiracy, and attempt
to manufacture amphetamine.
The validity of the wiretap was challenged under the Kansas Elec-
tronic Surveillance Act, but the court of appeals found no violation
which would require suppression and no constitutional rights were in-
fringed. Probable cause existed to issue orders to wiretap as evidenced
by surveillance, testimony of officers, and an earlier pen register. Nor-
mal investigating techniques were shown not to work in these circum-
stances since McPherson could not be tailed and no surveillance could
take place within one-half block of the residence. Assistant district attor-
neys conducted proceedings for application of the orders instead of dis-
trict attorneys as stated in the statute, however the district attorney
personally appeared, was sworn, and was available during the proceed-
ing for examination by the judge. Thus, the assistant district attorneys'
activities did not violate the requirements of the statute.
The Tenth Circuit also held that a variance between the wiretap or-
der and the indictments concerning the type of drug (amphetamine or
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methamphetamine) was not a violation of the Act, nor was the failure to
furnish an inventory within 90 days. The statutory requirement of an
inventory was fulfilled, by giving timely notice and including all the in-
formation that would have been in the inventory to McPherson, despite
claimed deficiencies in the service of the inventory. The appellants were
properly convicted on both conspiracy and attempt charges since the
crimes are separate and contain separate elements. Enough acts in fur-
therance of the crimes had been taken to fulfill both sets of elements.
United States v. Murray, 843 F.2d 1582
Appeal from a denial to sever appellant's trial from that of the two
codefendants in prosecution for possession of amphetamines with intent
to distribute. Affirmed.
The refusal to sever the trials was a harmless error because the
statements made by a codefendant, which tended to incriminate Murray,
pertained to matters that were incidental to the case against Murray.
The evidence against Murray was so overwhelming that any incriminat-
ing statements that might have been made by a codefendant were trivial
in comparison.
United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474
Appeal from a conviction for consumer fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 and an enhancement of the sentence at a second trial. Affirmed
in part and remanded in part.
Appellant, Peterman, was indicted for various fraudulent practices
in the advertising and sale of meat from his store. He was convicted at a
1981 trial but the conviction was reversed for failure to give a good faith
instruction. The second trial, from which this appeal was taken, also
resulted in a conviction.
Peterman first alleged that the court's jury instructions defining
"bait and switch" tactics improperly expanded the scope of the indict-
ment, allowing the jury to reach a guilty verdict on the basis of a theory
not relied upon by the grand jury. The Tenth Circuit decided that jury
instructions are invalid only if their deviation from the indictment in-
fringes on the defendant's rights. That was not the situation in this case.
The court also found that evidence of a codefendant's prior conviction
was admissable to impeach the codefendant's testimony in the second
trial under F.R.E. 607. This evidence was not unduly prejudicial as the
trial court properly limited its use. Finally, Peterman challenged the en-
hancement of his sentence at the second trial. Even though a court has
almost unlimited discretion in determining what information to hear
and rely on for sentencing, the court must affirmatively reflect its rea-
sons for enhancing the original sentence. On remand, the trial court
must permit Peterman to explain why the report upon which the court
relied was incorrect, and then the court must reflect any reasons for en-
hancing Peterman's sentence.
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United States v. Green, 847 F.2d 622
Appellant Green appeals the district court's refusal to dismiss his
indictment for the armed robbery of a federal savings and loan associa-
tion on the grounds that the government did not properly alert him to
his right to a speedy trial. The government argued that Green's notice
of appeal, which was filed after Green's conditional plea of guilty but
before sentencing, was premature and thus did not confer jurisdiction
upon the court of appeals. The court of appeals initially accepted the
government's argument, but upon this rehearing, it decided Green's no-
tice of rehearing, though premature, was an inconsequential irregularity
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) and was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Earlier judgment withdrawn with orders to parties to brief the merits of
the appeal.
United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505
Appellant Logan appeals his conviction for conspiracy to file false
income tax returns on the grounds the district court failed to suppress
illegally obtained evidence, and improperly admitted evidence of prior
acts of misconduct. Affirmed.
The court of appeals noted that probable cause does not require
certainty, and upheld the district court's finding that a contested search
warrant was valid. The court also upheld the district court's admission
of evidence of prior misconduct since it helped prove key elements of
the conspiracy charge (knowing participation in the scheme). Since this
use of the evidence did not make it "extrinsic" to the behavior on trial, it
did not have to be admissable under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
United States v. Jimenez, 864 F.2d 686
Appellant Jimenez appeals the district court's denial of a motion to
suppress evidence seized from the trunk of his car, which was involved
in a serious traffic accident. Affirmed.
Albuquerque police investigating a traffic accident spotted a sawed-
off shotgun in the trunk of Jimenez's car, which had been forced open
due to a collision with another automobile. The court of appeals held
that the motion to suppress had been properly denied, since the shot-
gun, though in the trunk, was nonetheless in plain view, and that it
would have eventually been discovered by police as they inventoried the
items in Jimenez's totalled automobile.
United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808
Petitioner was convicted of conspiring to defraud the government
by filing fraudulent income tax returns. Petitioner moved to vacate sen-
tence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on allegations that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel and that the trial court committed
error in refusing to subpoena additional witnessess for the evidentiary
hearing on the allegation of denial of effective assistance of counsel, in
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requiring petitioner to testify at the beginning of his case in chief in the
event he decided to testify, denying petitioner an opportunity to read
the presentence report, and in not resolving objections to the report
prior to the imposition of the sentence. Petitioner's motion was denied,
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The court held that petitioner failed in his allegation of denial of
effective assistance of counsel to meet his burden of proving that (1) his
counsel acted unreasonably; and (2) that such resulted in prejudice to
petitioner. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
subpoena witnesses, since subpoenas need not be issued for witnesses
providing mere cumulative evidence. And though it is error for a trial
court to permit a defendant to testify only at the beginning of his case in
chief, the error was harmless. The evidence also showed that petitioner
had, in fact, read the presentence report. Finally, the court held that the
trial court did not err in failing to resolve alleged factual inaccuracies in
the presentence report, since no objection was raised by petitioner.

COURTS AND PROCEDURE
United States v. Evans & Associates Construction Co. Inc., 857 F.2d 720
The government sought to retain control of grand jury transcripts
for its own use and to exclude defendants' use of the same despite the
court's order to produce the transcripts. The Tenth Circuit held that
the trial court's order to produce the transcripts was well within its dis-
cretion because the defendants showed particularized need. Although
the Tenth Circuit did not agree with the sanctions imposed by the trial
court when the government refused to produce the grand jury tran-
scripts, the court affirmed the lower court's original opinion.
Hoops v. Watermelon City Trucking, Inc., 846 F.2d 637
Hoops was injured in an automobile accident involving trucks
owned by Watermelon City Trucking, Inc. (WCT) and Leeway Motor
Freight, Ins. (Leeway). Leeway and Hoops entered into a contingency
agreement setting a minimum and maximum amount that Leeway would
pay Hoops, regardless of whether there was no verdict or a verdict
greater than the maximum amount. The district court denied WCT's
motion for dismissal based on the contingency agreement.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had invalidated "Mary Carter" agreements for being against pub-
lic policy. However, the court affirmed the district court's order, finding
that an essential element of the typical Mary Carter agreement was miss-
ing from the contingency agreement; that is, Leeway had no interest in
Hoops' verdict against WCT. Thus, the court held that the contingency
agreement was not void.
Westcot Corp. v. Edo Corp., 857 F.2d 1387
The Tenth Circuit chastised appellant's counsel for wasting the
court's time and appellant's funds. The court's rule that a petition for
rehearing should not be filed routinely is not a mere suggestion; it's a
standard to which counsel must adhere. Pursuant to Rule 40.1, the
court ordered appellant to pay costs to appellee for filing a meritless
petition for rehearing.
Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 851 F.2d 1239
The company in this action appealed a district court ruling that the
objectives of a union's strike ("coal lands" and "royalty" clauses) were
not in violation of § 8(e) of the Labor Management Relations Act. Lone
Star challenged the court's fact finding with regard to the strike's objec-
tive. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's opinion as "not
clearly erroneous" (when review of the entire evidence does not leave
the reviewing court with the "definite and firm conviction that a mistake
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has been committed") (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
Tuck v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842
Appellant USAA appeals from an adverse judgment, claiming that
the judgment was entered without subject matter jurisdiction. Re-
manded for consideration of the jurisdictional question.
Appellees Tuck were awarded $775,000 in damages as a result of
USAA's failure to pay benefits under the uninsured motorist provision
of an insurance policy they issued to appellees' son, Captain Johnny L.
Tuck. Captain Tuck was killed in an automobile accident caused by an
uninsured motorist. USAA filed a notice of appeal from the judgment,
and several months later, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction alleging incomplete diversity between the parties. USAA is
structured as an unincorporated association. For purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, the citizenship of all of its members must be considered.
Because some members of USAA are citizens of Oklahoma, as are the
Tucks, complete diversity is lacking.
USAA's motion to dismiss is denied, and the case remanded for fur-
ther inquiry into the issue of jurisdiction. Consideration is to be af-
forded the following issues: (1) whether the court may dismiss
nondiverse parties in order to achieve diversity after the judgment has
already been entered, (2) whether appellees must move to first dismiss
USAA from the suit, and then add as defendants only the diverse mem-
bers of the association, (3) whether any such members of association are
indispensable, and thus, must be joined, and (4) if dismissal of the action
is required, whether sanctions should be imposed against USAA for al-
lowing an improper action to proceed.
Wiliner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032
Appellant Willner appeals the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant-appellees and the imposition of attorney's
fees and costs in her civil rights suit. Affirmed.
'Appellant alleges that while acting as agents of the Univeristy of
Kansas and under color of state law, the appellees conspired to commit
and did commit acts of harassment and retaliation against her for bring-
ing a sex discrimination claim against the univeristy. Appellant claims
those acts violated the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments, the Civil
Rights Acts (Title 42 U.S.C. § § 1983, 1985, 1986) and Title IX (20
U.S.C. § 1681). Appellant added pendent state law claims for fraudu-
lent interference with economic relations, slander, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
The Tenth Circuit found that appellant's claims in this case were
necessarily decided in an earlier employment discrimination suit
brought by appellant against the univeristy. In that case, the court en-
tered judgment for the defendants, finding that neither the university
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nor its agents, employees, or officials retaliated against Willner or
harassed her because of her sex discrimination claim. Appellant's sec-
tion 1983 claim was therefore barred by collateral estoppel.
The court of appeals also held that the court properly granted sum-
mary judgment on appellant's section 1985, section 1986, and pendent
state law claims because appellant failed to meet her burden of showing
there were genuine issues for trial. The court denied appellee's request
for costs, expenses and attorney's fees.
Farmers Irrigating Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Kane, 845 F.2d 229
Claimants appeal the district court's denial of their motion to dis-
miss appellee-Farmers from this interpleader action. The panel re-
versed the district court, holding that appellee was not a proper party in
interpleader. The case is remanded with direction that the district court
grant claimant's motion to dismiss appellee.
Appellee was the owner of a reservoir that broke, flooding the
Town of Estes Park and causing several deaths and great property dam-
age. The panel considered whether appellee, an admitted tortfeasor
who caused considerable damage, can file an interpleader action, tender
in to the court registry a minimal sum ($2,500), ask that this sum be
prorated among numerous individuals, and ask to be discharged from
further liability for flood damage. The panel found that appellee could
not.
Zimmer v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047
Plaintiffs brought this suit against Western Plains Service Corpora-
tion (WPSCP), a savings and loan service company that packages, serv-
ices, and sells loans made by other banks or associations. Plaintiffs
allege that WPSC agreed to loan them 2.2 million dollars to finance a
housing development in Gillette, Wyoming, that WPSC only loaned
them $600,000 and then wrongfully foreclosed the project. At trial,
plaintiffs based their claims against defendants on theories of breach of
contract, promissory estoppel and fraud. The jury found against plain-
tiffs on all claims except promissory estoppel. On that claim, the jury
awarded plaintiffs 1.5 million dollars in damages. The Tenth Circuit up-
holds the trial court in all matters except an error in the jury instructions
regarding the promissory estoppel claim. It stated that since the jury
found for the plaintiffs, only on a promissory estoppel claim, it could not
hold Brown and Bjordahl, officers of WPSC, personally liable for their
corporation's failure to keep its promise. The court reversed the judg-
ment against them on the promissory estoppel claim.
Tolbert v. Martin Marietta Corp., 858 F.2d 1479
Upheld the Colorado Supreme Court's decision that the state
Workman's Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy for an em-
ployee against her employer (1) for injuries resulting from a sexual as-
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sault by a co-worker motivated by considerations neither personal to the
injured employee nor distinctively associated with the employment, and
(2) when the employee has fixed hours and place of employment and the
injury occurred while employee was in her building of employment but
away from her work station, on her way to lunch in the employees'
cafeteria.
Wiliner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1023
Plaintiff appeals a judgment for the defendant. The Tenth Circuit
addresses on appeal her arguments of prejudice due to exclusion of pa-
rol evidence and failure of the trial judge to recuse himself.
The district court determined the exchange of letters between
plaintiff and defendant constituted an integrated contract. The Tenth
Circuit concluded under Kansas law that the court's instruction to the
jury not to consider parol evidence was appropriate. The Tenth Circuit
then held that where, as here, a recusal is requested many months after
an action has been filed, denial of the motion is warranted. Affirmed.
Toma v. City of Weatherford, 846 F.2d 58
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint for failure to com-
ply with the district court's scheduling of a discovery order. The court
of appeals held that absent a showing of wilfulness, bad faith or some
fault of petitioner other than inability to comply, dismissal for violation
of discovery rules constitutes an abuse of discretion by the district court.
Reversed and remanded.
Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of Western Art, 858 F.2d 618
Plaintiffs Benally appeal from the district court's dismissal of their
invasion of privacy action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The issues
on appeal were (1) whether the New Mexico long-arm statute, N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 38-1-16, permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over the
Texas-based museum, and if so, (2) whether the exercise of such juris-
diction would offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Re-
versed and remanded.
Plaintiffs are Navajo Indians residing in New Mexico. In 1932, Lillie
Benally permitted artist Laura Gilpin to photograph Lillie and her baby
in native dress, but it is alleged that the Benallys never authorized publi-
cation or public exhibition of the print, entitled "Navajo Madonna."
Many of Gilpin's works were published and exhibited, including "Nav-
aho Madonna." Before her death in 1979, Gilpin bequeathed her pho-
tographic collection, including the Benally photograph, to the
defendant museum, a nonprofit corporation organized under Texas law.
Throughout the gift process, the museum made several visits to New
Mexico for purposes of negotiating the terms of the exhibition with
Gilpin, taking possession and transporting the collection, and invoking
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the benefits of New Mexico's laws of testamentary disposition. After
Gilpin's death, the museum maintained ties with New Mexico through
its continuing obligation to make annual reports regarding the exhibit to
a resident of New Mexico.
In August 1981, the Benallys learned of a recent reproduction of
the Benally photograph in two Texas-based magazines. At that time,
plaintiffs were not aware that the photograph had previously been pub-
lished. The Benallys filed suit in federal district court in New Mexico for
unlawful public disclosure of private facts and misappropriation of
likeness.
The case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
museum. The district court found that the nonprofit museum had not
"transacted business" in New Mexico within the meaning of the long-
arm statute, that the plaintiff's cause of action was not sufficiently re-
lated to the museum's business in New Mexico to support jurisdiction
under the statute due to the time lapse between most of the museum's
activities in New Mexico and the complained-of publication. This court
reversed, finding that a nonprofit organization can "transact business"
within the meaning of the long-arm statute through the accomplishment
of its objectives, when such accomplishemnt purposely invokes the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum state. This court also held
that the plaintiffs' cause of action is closely related to the museum's ear-
lier activities in New Mexico, justifying the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion. The court also held that the exercise of such jurisdiction does
comport with the requirements of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment since the museum intentionally conducted business
in New Mexico and the burden on defendant is slight.
Grimes v. Crown Life Insurance Co., 857 F.2d 699
Appellant Grimes, the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner and the
receiver for the United Equity Life Insurance Co., appeals a district
court decision which found a reinsurance agreement between Crown
Life and the United Equity Life Insurance Co. to be invalid on the basis
of fraud and ambiguity. Reversed.
Grimes challenged the jurisdiction of the district court. The court
of appeals held that while the district court had jurisdiction over the
matter, it should have abstained from exercising it. In reaching this de-
cision, the court noted the McCarran-Ferguson Act encourages states to
regulate insurers, and that a federal court's exercise of its jurisdiction
would prove highly disruptive of state efforts to provide comprehensive
schemes for insurance company regulations and liquidation.
Here, the suit was not based on an exclusively federal cause of ac-
tion, and required the district court to decide issues directly relevant to
state policy. In addition, the decision to exercise jurisdiction overlooked
an Oklahoma statute which gave exclusive original jurisdiction in insur-
ance liquidation matters to the Oklahoma County District Court.
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Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 851 F.2d 316
Plaintiff appealed dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In an en banc decision, the Tenth Circuit held that notice of the appeal
filed after the order granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction was effective to confer jurisdiction for appeal, notwith-
standing that counterclaims and crossclaims were not specifically
addressed or dismissed. The appeal, though premature, was viewed as
having ripened when the district court formally dismissed the cross-
claims and counterclaims, leaving nothing unadjudicated in the suit.
The court also held that notice of appeal from an order dismissing an
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is premature and is not ap-
pealable without a Rule 54(b) certification when counterclaims and/or
crossclaims remain pending, even if the pending counterclaims and
crossclaims are substantively dependent upon the dismissed action. Or-
dered accordingly.
Gates Leariet Corp. v. Duncan Aviation, 851 F.2d 303
Gates Learjet Corp. ("Gates") brought this action for contribution
and indemnification in a Kansas state court against Duncan Aviation
("Duncan") which serviced the aircraft prior to the crash giving rise to
wrongful death actions against both companies. The district court
granted Duncan's motion for summary judgment and Gates appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court correctly relied on state
law in deciding whether the plaintiff was estopped from asserting its
claims based on prior state court litigation. The court held that under
Michigan law, Duncan cannot use the traditional doctrine of collateral
estoppel to prevent Gates from litigating the issue of liability, as Michi-
gan adheres to recognized limitations on collateral estoppel. These in-
clude actual litigation and determination of an issue leading to judgment
and the requirement that the same issue underlie the original action and
subsequent action. Concerning the issue of negligence, however, the
court held that Gates was equitably estopped from litigating the fault, if
any, of Duncan with respect to the aircraft crash previously tried in
Michigan. Gates was a party in the Michigan action at the time of the
trial on the wrongful death claims and had not developed any theory
that Duncan was negligent nor had it responded to the crossclaims.
Duncan's motion for a directed verdict on Gates' negligence claim was
considered and granted, without any evidence of Duncan's negligence
asserted by Gates. Gates is estopped from asserting that claim now.
Affirmed.
Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641
Plaintiff sued defendants for slander in federal district court. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
summarily disposing of less than all of the claims. Plaintiff appealed.
After plaintiff filed notice of appeal, the remaining claims were dis-
[Vol. 66:4
COURTS AND PROCEDURE
missed. The Tenth Circuit held that premature notice of appeal from an
order disposing of less than all of the claims in the case is nevertheless
effective where appellant obtains certification or a final adjudication of
matter before the appeal is considered on its merits. So ordered.
Bryant v. O'Connor, 848 F.2d 1064
Plaintiff, a former probation officer of the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, appeals summary judgment. He al-
leged termination of his employment with the court and denial of equal
employment opportunities due to racial discrimination. All the judges
of the district recused themselves. A judge from Wyoming was assigned
to adjudicate the case. Plaintiff had three chances to comply with a court
order requiring him to file a specific discovery plan limited to respond-
ing to appellees' motion for summary judgment and explaining why his
massive discovery requests were necessary. He failed to produce any
specific facts to support his allegations and his response was insufficient
to forestall the summary judgment granted to appellees. The lower
court also held that ChiefJudge O'Connor was absolutely immune from
civil damage liability and that the Chief Probation Officer and plaintiff's
immediate supervisor was shielded by quasi-judicial immunity. The
Court of Appeals upheld the verdict for summary judgment because
there were no specific facts illustrating a genuine issue for trial.
Burnette v. Dreser Industries, 849 F.2d 1277
Appellants appeal from an interlocutory order denying their motion
to amend a pretrial order to include a claim of manufacturing defects
against appellee Dresser. Appellee cross-appeals denial of summary
judgment.
Appellants claim that unless the pretrial order is modified to add a
manufacturing and design defect claim against Dresser, they will sustain
manifest injustice. Dresser claims that it had no duty to warn appellants
because it was a supplier of a non-defective part and was not aware that
the part would be used in the way the refinery ("Total") used it.
The Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs had knowledge of, but failed
to allege, claims for manufacturing or design defects before date set by
magistrate and thus were not entitled to amend the pretrial order to
assert such claims against Dresser in products liability action. The court
found that material fact issues existed, such as whether refinery employ-
ees controlling the use of the pressure relief valve on the storage tank
knew of the need for a servicing schedule. Thus, summary judgment as
to whether the valve manufacturer was liable, on theory of failure to
warn, for explosion of tank allegedly caused by malfunctioning of relief
valve was precluded. Denial of summary judgment affirmed.
Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394
Counsel for plaintiff did not notice that the City filed a motion for
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summary judgment since the motion was placed at the bottom of a one
and one-half inch stack of materials received by counsel on December
24, 1986. Local Court Rule 14(A) of the district court for the Western
District of Oklahoma provides that any motion not opposed within 15
days shall be deemed confessed. In conjunction with this rule, the dis-
trict court entered a formal summary judgment in favor of the City. The
Tenth Circuit reversed stating that (1) this was an innocent mistake
which counsel attempted to rectify as soon as it was discovered, (2) the
City would not have been prejudiced in any legal or equitable sense, by
allowing the plaintiff to file a brief in opposition and having the motion
resolved on its merits, (3) any interference with the judicial process was
too insufficient a burden to justify dismissal, and (4) the district judge
abused his discretion. The district court's judgment is reversed and case
remanded.
Paz v. Carman Industries, 860 F.2d 977
Appellant Paz appeals the district court's denial of his motion for
judgment n.o.v. and his alternative motion for a new trial. Affirmed.
On March 7, 1982, Paz was severely burned in an explosion at his
employer's gilsonite plant. Paz's original complaint named four defend-
ants. He entered into an out-of-court settlement with all but Carman.
Paz's claim against Carman proceeded to trial before a jury based on a
strict products liability cause of action. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Carman. The judgement was appealed by Paz. The Tenth Cir-
cuit found there was sufficient evidence before the jury upon which it
could properly find against Paz, thus the motion for judgement n.o.v.
was properly denied. Additionally, the district court's denial of the mo-
tion for a new trial did not constitute a manifest abuse of discretion.
Varley v. Tampax, 855 F.2d 696
Defendant Tampax appeals the denial of its motion seeking amend-
ment of the court's order of dismissal. The action was a consolidation of
two cases. The plaintiffs were the deceased's administratrix (a Kansas
citizen) and her parents (Iowa citizens). The defendants were also di-
verse. Tampax alleged in its motion this consolidation was improper.
Extensive discovery was heard on the case below. The trail court
found the plaintiffs' evidence insufficient to establish either toxic shock
syndrome as the cause of death or product defect. Summary judgement
as to this defendant was granted. However, in the same order, the court
then dismissed the case in its entirety due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Tampax filed its motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) asking both for
an extension of time to file a supporting brief (granted) and that the
district court dismiss the administratrix' action to preserve federal juris-
diction over the remaining plaintiffs' claim against all defendants. In its
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supporting brief, Tampax argued, for the first time, that since co-de-
fendants were not indispensable parties, they should be dismissed.
The Tenth Circuit found Tampax's motion to amend judgement
was timely filed and permitted the district court jurisdiction to amend
for any reasons; hence the court was not limited to grounds set forth in
Tampax's motion alone. The Tenth Circuit further found the district
court's failure to dismiss the indispensable defendants, which would
have caused no prejudice to plaintiffs, constituted an abuse of discre-
tion. Finally, it was held that since summary judgment was granted to
Tampax on the merits, to force a second defense of these claims would
be inequitable. Reversed and remanded, with directions to the court to
vacate its previous order and enter judgement for Tampax.
Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Industries, 847 F.2d 1458
Appellant Ocelot Oil Corp. appeals a district court decision uphold-
ing a magistrate's order which struck Ocelot's pleading as to certain de-
fendants and imposed attorney's fees on Ocelot as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37
sanction for abuse of the discovery process. Affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded.
The district court adopted the report of the magistrate after review-
ing it under the clearly erroneous standard. The court of appeals held
that while the decision to impose attorney's fees was properly reviewed,
that part of the magistrate's decision which struck Ocelot's pleadings
was a "dispositive motion," and thus was subject to a de novo standard
of review and determination by the district court.
ANR Pipeline Co. v. The Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma,
860 F.2d 1571
Appellant Corporation Commission appeals a district court ruling
that the Oklahoma ratable take structure for natural gas is in contraven-
tion of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
Affirmed.
The appellate court first held that the district court did possess suf-
ficient jurisdiction under the Declatory Judgement Act to enjoin the
Commission from enforcing its regulations, despite the fact the Com-
mission had yet to undertake any enforcement action. The court then
determined that the Natural Gas Act and Natural Gas Policy Act pre-
empted all state regulation of the purchase or taking of natural gas by
interstate gas companies, and that the state interest in conservation did
not warrant interference with the federal regulatory scheme.
Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244
Plaintiff appeals the order for summary judgement entered for
Deere & Co. ("Deere") on February 11, 1986. Plaintiff was injured by
equipment manufactured in 1961 by Deere and originally filed suite for
breach of warranty, negligence and strict liability against two Deere sub-
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sidiaries, neither of whom was in existence at the time of the equip-
ment's manufacture. Deere itself was added on May 24, 1985. On
August 14, 1985 the district court dismissed the two subsidiaries as im-
proper defendants. Deere was granted summary judgment on breach of
warranty claim and then, on February 11, 1986, the district court held
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) doesn't preserve the negligence and strict lia-
bility claims against the Colorado statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration of the district court's orders, which that
court denied as untimely. On review, the Tenth Circuit held that since
the district court's orders of August 14 and 28, 1985 were interlocutory,
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, filed within ten days of the district
court's final order issued February 11, 1986, was not untimely. The dis-
trict court's error as to timeliness was held harmless on review since the
Deere subsidiaries were improper defendants and thus properly
dismissed.
The Tenth Circuit then stated three requirements to be met for an
amendment adding a new party to "relate back" under Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c). Plaintiffs fulfilled all three requirements. It was also held that
plaintiff's delay in adding Deere once knowledge of identity was ob-
tained could not defeat the relation back of the amendment. Upheld in
part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.
Furr v. AT&T Technologies, 842 F.2d 253
The Tenth Circuit was petitioned for rehearing based upon the
withdrawal of a piece of evidence prior to the submission of the case to
the jury. The court concluded that since the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's findings of liability and willfulness, the petition would
be denied.
Grubb v. FDIC, 833 F.2d 222
Appellant filed a petition for rehearing, with an en banc suggestion,
raising a new argument in support of its motion to exonerate supersedeas
bonds, which was denied previously. The Tenth Circuit declined to ad-
dress an issue not raised prior to the petition for rehearing and denied
the suggestion for a rehearing en banc.
United States v. 31.63 Acres of Land, 840 F.2d 760
The United States, appellee, initiated a condemnation action to ac-
quire land owned by Tinker Area Investors, the appellant. The district
court awarded Tinker an amount greater than the government's deposit.
Tinker, in addition, requested attorney's fees. The court denied attor-
ney's fees finding the government's position to be substantially justified.
Instead of appealing the order, Tinker sought reconsideration pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6). The motion under Rule 60(b) was denied because it
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. Affirmed. A Rule 60(b)
motion requires that the appellant show unusual circumstances which
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justify the extraordinary relief provided by the rule. The Tenth Circuit
held that since Tinker was arguing the merits of the underlying judg-
ment, Rule 60(b) relief was inappropriate.
First National Bank in Dallas v. Don Adams Mining, Inc., 840 F.2d 766
A federal court in Texas entered judgment in May 1977 for plaintiff
bank against several defendants. The bank had a writ of execution is-
sued in New Mexico. The statute of limitations for enforcement ofjudg-
ments in New Mexico was seven years. In 1983, New Mexico amended
its limitations period to the lesser of 14 years or the applicable limita-
tions period in the foreign jurisdiction. Two years later, 1985, the bank
registered the judgment a second time. Defendant objected to the regis-
tration and moved for a stay of execution, claiming the seven-year
limitatins period had passed and barred any action on the 1977 judg-
ment. The district court denied the stay. The bank attempted to take
the deposition of the defendant's wife in a companion case to facilitate
collection on the second writ of execution. Although the defendant's
wife objected the lower court denied her motion to quash. Both defend-
ant and his wife appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. First, it held that New Mexico's amend-
ment of the limitations period was retroactive and applied to the bank's
writ of execution. Consequently, the bank had the lesser of 14 years
from judgment or the limitations period of the foreign jurisdiction,
which was Texas. Since Texas allows for two 10-year periods, or a total
of 20 years, the lesser 14-year period was applied and bank's second writ
was deemed valid. Second, the court held that a post-trial deponent has
the same rights as a pre-trial deponent. Since pre-trial discovery orders
are not final and are not appealable, neither was the defendant's wife's
motion to quash.
Greenwood Explorations v. Merit Gas, 837 F.2d 423
Appellants were sued for breach of contract for failure to drill oil
wells. Prior to trial, appellants' counsel moved to withdraw from the
case due to appellants' refusal to cooperate. Withdrawal was granted,
and the trial was continued. Prior to the subsequently scheduled trial,
the new counsel also moved for withdrawal, asserting the same grounds.
Although the judge was willing to grant the request, the judge asked the
counsel to remain. Counsel obliged, but was unable to win at the trial
due to appellants' lack of cooperation. Appellants moved to vacate the
judgment pusuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 60(b), or in the alternative, for a
new trial pusuant to Rule 59(b). The district court denied the motions,
finding that the appellants were guilty of gross carlessness in the han-
dling of their case. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that appellants'
explanation that they failed to file for a new trial within the required
time due to suprise as a result of their not receiving a copy of the district
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was merely an invalid
excuse.
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Eastridge Development Company v. Halpert Associates, 853 F.2d 772
Appellee Eastridge Development sued appellee Halpert Associates
and its parent company, Professional Services Insustries, Inc. (PSI). The
complaint alleged that Eastridge suffered damages from water seepage
at a construction site because of Halpert's negligent engineering tests
and reports. Eastridge further alleged that PSI was the alter ego of Hal-
pert, which was bankrupt by the time Eastridge filed its suit. The district
court ruled that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over the matter because
PSI had no contact with Wyoming aside from this litigation. Reversed.
The court of appeals found that PSI had assumed all responsibility
and control over Halpert's financial and legal affairs, and that there was
gross undercapitalization and complete domination of Halpert by its
parent company. Thus, the court held PSI had sufficient contacts with
Wyoming to make exercise of in personam jurisdiction reasonable and
consistent with due process.
United States v. Sharp Ranch, Inc., 850 F.2d 634
Appellant Sharp Ranch, Inc. sued the U.S. government for inverse
condemnation and severance damages. At the conclusion of this trial,
the jury returned a substantial verdict for the appellant, based in part on
evidence of offering prices of replacement properties which were
mathmatically erroneous. The government moved for, and was granted,
a new trial. In the second trial, the court refused to let the appellant
testify regarding the value of the condemned property unless it could
substantiate these opinions with statistical evidence. Appellant was un-
able to produce this evidence, and the second jury returned a lower ver-
dict. Appellant moved for, and was denied, a motion for yet another
new trial. Appellant appeals both this denial and the district court's de-
cision to grant a new trial following the first jury verdict. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court of appeals held that (1) the district court properly
granted the second trial, because the first verdict was based in part on
improper evidence and was against the clear weight of the evidence; and
(2) the district court committed reversible error by refusing a third trial
because the landowner's unsubstantiated opinion evidence of the value
of his land is admissable, though challengable, as a matter of law. The
court noted that thejury must determine the validity and accuracy of the
owner's opinion.
Massie v. Godfather's Pizza, Inc., 844 F.2d 1414
After being raped on her employer's premises in the course of rob-
bery attempt, plaintiff sued her employer, alleging negligence and vica-
rious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. After the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $36,000 in special damages
and $200,000 in general damages, the district court reduced the special
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damage award to $10,000. Both the plaintiff and the defendant em-
ployer appealed. Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that (1) whether or not plaintiff's injuries
arose out of, or in the scope of, her employment so that worker's com-
pensation would bar her tort claim was a factual question for the jury;
(2) the jury could determine that Godfather's written "robbery policy"
established forseeability giving the defendant a duty to the plaintiff; (3)
thejury could find the supervisor's refusal to cooperate with the robbers
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries; (4) the district court's in-
struction to the jury that any damages assessed were strictly for the pur-
pose of compensating the plaintiff and not to punish the defendant
remedied an improper remark by plaintiff's counsel in closing argu-
ment; (5) the district court's instruction, coupled with the clear focus of
the case remedied improper references by the plaintiff's counsel to the
applicable standard for determining whether plaintiff was working at the
time of the injuries; (6) the general damage award of $200,000 was not
excessive in light of plaintiff's injuries; and (7) the district court's order
of remittitur to reduct plaintiff's special damages from $36,000 to
$10,000 was within the court's discretion due to the imprecise nature of
the plaintiff's future medical expenses.
Oklahoma v. Graham, 846 F.2d 1258
An action was filed by the state of Oklahoma in state court against
the Chickasaw Nation based upon the state's attempts to tax certain tri-
bal affairs transacted on the territory of the Chickasaw Nation. Upon
removal to federal district court, the case was dismissed for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Affirmed.
The court of appeals examined the issue of whether removal from
state court was proper. The court held that since the state's complaint
only alleged state claims which were grounded in state law, and since the
Chickasaw nation is only subject to suit under conditions prescribed by
Congress, the complaint was not well-pleaded since it failed to plead
either tribal consent to the suit or that the tribe had validly waived its
rights, and that there was no essential element of a federal question in-
herent in the state's action; thus, removal was not available. Therefore,
the court of appeals was without subject mater jurisdiction.
Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307
Appellant attorney brought a class action against the Social Security
Administration on behalf of individuals who were improperly subjected
to withholdings from their old-age, survivors, and disability benefits.
The district court denied certification of the class. Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that a class action must comply with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a), and that a prerequisite of compliance with this rule is the
existence of a "live class" of aggrieved individuals. Because appellant
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failed to show the existence of a "live class," the court held that the
district court properly dismissed the action.
Gear v. Boulder Community Hospital, 844 F.2d 764
Appellant appeals the granting of defendant's motion for summary
judgment, alleging that the district court violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by
failing to give appellant an oral hearing or notice of the date on which
the motion was to be decided.
The Tenth Circuit held that although a hearing on a motion for
summary judgment is required, it need not be formal and accompanied
by oral argument. Because the issues and evidence of this case could be
adequately addressed with written briefs and affidavits, the district court
had satisfied the Rule 56 "hearing" requirement. The court also held
that the district court's reliance on Rule 402 of the Local Rules of Prac-
tice for the United States District Court of Colorado fulfilled the notice
requirement.
The court found that the filing requirements of Rule 402 provide
non-movants with adequate notice that the motion is ready for determi-
nation on its merits. The court held that it was not an abuse of discre-
tion for the district court to base its judgment on a review of the record
as of the date the parties should have known the motion would be con-
sidered. Because appellant failed to produce evidence to support her
allegations after sufficient notice of the need to do so, the court held
that summary judgment was proper.
Wheeler v. John Deere Company, 862 F.2d 1404
Plaintiff was seriously injured when his right arm was caught in a
combine machine manufactured by defendant. Jury returned a verdict
for plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
asserting (1) the judge improperly admitted live testimony of five indi-
viduals injured previously by other combines manufactured by defend-
ant; (2) the judge improperly refused to grant defendant's motion for
directed verdict; (3) the judge improperly instructed the jury on the ele-
ments of Kansas strict liability law; (4) the judge improperly permitted
defendant's expert witness to be impeached with other accidents which
the judge had not previously found to be substantially similar; and (5)
the judge erroneously permitted evidence of subsequent remedial
measures.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. First, the court found
no error in (1) the permittance of testimony from the five witnesses due
to the substantially similar nature of their accidents; (2) the denial of
defendant's motion for directed verdict, since evidence was sufficient to
support a jury verdict; and (3) the attempt to define in the jury instruc-
tions the duties of all those whose fault must be comparatively deter-
mined. The court, however, held that it was reversible error to permit
the introduction of evidence of (1) other accidents which the judge had
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not previously found to be substantially similar; and (2) subsequent de-
sign changes where defendant had previously stipulated to their feasibil-
ity and thus had not brought feasibility into issue.
Cascade Oil Company v. Crooker, 848 F.2d 1062
Issue in this case is whether a notice of appeal was timely filed. The
judgment was entered on October 28, 1987 and the appeal filed Novem-
ber 30, 1987. Appellant argued that Thanksgiving Day fell on Thurs-
day, November 26, 1987, and the following day was a day appointed as a
holiday in the state of Kansas because the state courts were closed.
Therefore, his appeal was timely filed. The Tenth Circuit held that legal
holidays are those designated by the legislature enumerated state holi-
days in Kan. Stat. Ann. sec. 35-107 (1986). The day following
Thanksgiving was not among those designated holidays, therefore the
notice of appeal was not timely filed.
Bath v. National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, 843 F.2d 1315
Appellant Bath participated in an athletic competition at the small
college level before enrolling in Mesa College. At Mesa she learned that
her eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics was adversely af-
fected by a rule of the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics
(NAIA). She filed suit against Mesa and NAIA, a Missouri corporation
and the only diverse defendant. The district court dismissed leaving
only a section 1983 claim against the Colorado defendants and dis-
missed with prejudice as to NAIA.
The only ground for dismissing the negligence claim against NAIA
was that the state law claim would predominate and confuse the jury.
The Tenth Circuit held that this is a permissible reason for the district
court's refusal to exercise pendant jurisdiction over a state law claim,
but because the dismissal was not on the merits, the district court incor-
rectly designated the disposition as a dismissal with prejudice. The
court held that because the district court did not determine the negli-
gence count on its merits, the claims should not be examined for the
first time on appeal. Reversed and remanded.
United States v. Toribio Soto-Orneles, 863 F.2d 1487
The defendant was charged with illegal representation and use of a
social security number and illegal representation of U.S. citizenship. He
was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to two years proba-
tion and a $50.00 fine for each count. The issues were raised in this
appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in denying defendant's mo-
tion to suppress all evidence obtained following allegedly unconstitu-
tional interrogation and arrest; and (2) whether his conviction violated
fifth amendment due process rights because of inconsistency with the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
The Tenth Circuit court holds that defendant's initial interrogation
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did not violate defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel because he
had not been placed in custody and no formal charges had been initiated
against him when he was questioned by INS agent Bell. Neither did Bell
act unlawfully in directly approaching the defendant because the INS
guidelines are internal administrative policies, not statutory nor consti-
tutional requirements.
The court finds the second issue bordering on the frivolous because
the Act was not intended to bestow amnesty to aliens for their unlawful
acts committed during their undocumented residency. There is no men-
tion in the Act or its legislative history of granting amnesty for anything
other than the status of being an illegal alien.
Walters v. Western State Hospital, 864 F.2d 695
This case involved an appeal of a denial of summary judgment
based on a defense of qualified immunity. This interlocutory appeal
found that whether or not the plaintiff's seclusion was justified is a gen-
uine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment.
The defendant doctors contend that they are immune from suit be-
cause their conduct was the product of professional judgment in an
emergency situation. The Tenth Circuit held there were genuine issues
of material fact as to whether a reasonable person, exercising prefes-
sional judgment and possessing the information before the defendants,
would have believed that an emergency existed and whether the forced
medication of the plaintiff was consistent with the exercise of profes-
sional judgment. Furthermore, the plaintiff's constitutional right to
communicate with others outside the institution was clearly established
at the time of his involuntary admission and the doctors should have
known that their actions in forcibly detaining him without his consent
and holding him incommunicado for seven to ten days infringed upon
that right.
Dalton v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 863 F.2d 702
Ajudgment was entered awarding plaintiff $50,000, "plus the inter-
est that the sum would have accumulated had it not been withdrawn
according to the terms of the certificate of deposit at defendant bank to
this date." Plaintiff timely moved to amend the judgment with respect
to the interest. Defendant also filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment and to stay enforcement. The district court granted the plain-
tiff's motion and entered an amended judgment reflecting the requested
clarification.
A motion questioning the correctness of a judgment and timely
made within ten days thereof will be considered under Rule 59(e) by the
Tenth Circuit. Defendant argued that the motion to amend the judg-
ment should be construed as a Rule 60(a) motion to correct a clerical
error rather than Rule 59(e) which permits amendment ofjudgment for
any reason. The court adhered to its previous policy of only allowing
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Rule 60(a) in cases where the thing spoken, written, or recorded is not
what the person intended, not because the person later discovers the
thing said, written, or recorded was wrong.
The court dismissed the defendant's appeal holding that the Rule
59(e) motion requires that a new notice of appeal be filed after disposal
of the motion.
FDIC v. Antonio, 843 F.2d 1311
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took over the
Aurora Bank and brought an action for civil violations of RICO for vio-
lations of a similar Colorado law against Aaron Mosko and 21 others.
The FDIC alleged a scheme to defraud the bank, and sought damages.
Because Mosko appeared to be dissipating his assets, an injunction was
sought and granted requiring all defendants to give an account of their
assets without prior notice and authorization. Mosko appeals this pre-
liminary injunction.
The court of appeals upholds the district court's authority under
Colorado statute. The Colorado pretrial injunctive relief provisions are
broader. than those of the federal RICO statute, and specifically allow an
injunction before a final determination on the merits. The lower court's
interpretation of Colorado law as permitting an injunction upon a show-
ing that Mosko appeared to be transferring most of his assets to relatives
and others is not erroneous.
Sawyer v. Swift & Co., 836 F.2d 1257
Sawyer brought suit against his former employer, Swift & Co.,
claiming that he was terminated in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3).
Sawyer was also a member of the Navy Reserves and his termination by
Swift was allegedly due to his attendance at a reserve make-up drill on
January 8, 1983, which caused him to fail to report to work. Sawyer had
been scheduled to attend the drill one month earlier, in December. The
district court ruled in favor of Sawyer since there was evidence that he
had given Swift adequate notice in December of his intention to attend
the January drill. Swift appealed and the Tenth Circuit reversed.
Sawyer's notice was inadequate as it was not understood and acted
upon by Swift, and Sawyer knew or should have known that the notice
was inadequate. Furthermore, Sawyer's record was replete with unex-
cused absences and tardiness, and he was one infraction away from ter-
mination. Thus, the court said it would be erroneous to find Sawyer was
terminated due to his reserve status since other reservists at Swift were
given time off without problem. Sawyer was terminated for reasons of
absenteeism and tardiness having little to do with his Reserve
obligations.
Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 653
Appellant E.F. Hutton appeals from a jury verdict for the plaintiffs
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on allegations of unauthorized trading pursuant to the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b), on the grounds that the plaintiffs' cause of
action was barred due to the running of the statute of limitations. Re-
versed and remanded.
Plaintiffs filed their complaints in February, 1984, more than four
years after the disputed transactions had taken place. At trial, E.F. Hut-
ton asserted that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limi-
tations. Since § 6(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act does not specify a
statute of limitations, a three year time limit borrowed from Colorado
law was adopted by the trial court. While the plaintiffs did not deny the
validity of the three year limit, they successfully argued that the statute
had been tolled due to mental illness.
The Tenth Circuit held that while three years was the proper statute
of limitations in a § 6(b) action, the federal equitable tolling doctrine
controlled its application. Since this doctrine does not permit mental
illness to toll the statute of limitations in fraud actions, the case was re-
manded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
ELECTIONS
Rainbow Coalition of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma State Election Board, 844 F.2d
740
The Rainbow Coalition, Libertarian, and Populist Parties of
Oklahoma contended they were denied equal protection under the law
by a state statute governing the process by which a minority party be-
comes recognized and thus able to place party candidates on the ballot.
The district court awarded summary judgment to the Board.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court judgment. It held
that election laws restricting ballot access to candidates who file peti-
tions containing signatures equal to five percent of the voters in the last
election are proper and have been upheld in the past. Furthermore, the
court ruled that the May 31st filing deadline which Oklahoma had estab-
lished was proper since the Supreme Court has held that a filing dead-
line in the second week of June is constitutional, even when it operated
in a scheme requiring more signatures than required in Oklahoma. Fi-
nally, the court found that since Oklahoma had only three counties with
computerized voter rolls, requiring it to identify minority parties on the




Wilder v. Prokop, 846 F.2d 613
Wilder, a federal employee, appeals the dismissal of a complaint
concerning his removal. The court of appeals held (1) that jurisdiction
was proper in the district court, and (2) agency refusal to waive filing
deadline for appeals of personnel decisions was within its discretion,
and not arbitrary nor capricious, in the absence of a special showing of
good cause for the filing delay.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service, 860 F.2d
372
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued ap-
pellee, United Parcel Service (UPS), on behalf of Jerome Patterson and
similarly situated black males who suffer a disfiguring skin condition
whose sole treatment is to refrain from shaving. Pursuant to UPS's "no
beard" policy, Patterson, a UPS employee, was told to shave. After the
EEOC filed suit, Patterson settled with UPS. The district court granted
summary judgment for UPS holding that the EEOC lacked standing be-
cause it no longer represented an actual injured party.
The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the district court errone-
ously concluded that the EEOC must proceed on behalf of an actual
injured party when challenging a discriminatory policy under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC is not required to act
through an individual in order to vindicate the public interest. The
EEOC's right to proceed endures until the alleged discrimination is
eradicated.
Brown v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Utah, Inc., 850 F.2d 631
Claimant alleges that her former employer discharged her from her
position because of her gender and her complaint of discriminatory
treatment. In addition, she claims the appellees breached her employ-
ment contract by failing to comply with termination procedures pursu-
ant to their personnel manual.
The panel affirmed the trial court's finding that appellees did not
discharge claimant for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons but had
breached the contract. However, the panel concluded that damages
were improperly calculated. The panel stated that if claimant's dis-
charge resulted from unsatisfactory job performance, she was entitled to
back pay and reasonable front pay. However, if the lack of work claim-
ant was qualified to perform was the determinative factor in her dis-
charge, the appellee's breach did not damage claimant. Thus, the panel
remanded to determine whether claimant is entitled to damages.
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Summers v. State Farm, 864 F.2d 700
Appellant Summers appeals the district court's decision to grant
State Farm's motion for summary judgment on his claims of wrongful
termination because of age and religion. Affirmed.
Summers worked for State Farm as a field claims representative un-
til 1982, when he was fired on the stated grounds of poor job perform-
ance and the falsification of company records. Summers, however,
claimed that he had already been disciplined for these problems prior to
his discharge, and that State Farm's stated grounds for firing him were
merely a pretext.
State Farm admitted to the prior disciplining of Summers, but re-
sponded by saying that after Summers was fired, more instances of Sum-
mers' misconduct were found, and that even if Summers was still
employed by State Farm then, he would have been discharged when
these instances were discovered. The court of appeals approved of this
use of "after-acquired evidence," and said that post-termination discov-
eries of misconduct by an employee can be used to deny relief in certain
wrongful termination cases.
Pitre v. Western Electric, 843 F.2d 1262
Janice Pitre brought an action individually, and on behalf of a class,
against appellant Western Electric, alleging gender-based discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), after she was de-
moted from section chief. She alleged that Western's all-male
management personnel held discriminatory attitudes which resulted in a
clustering of women in lower salary grades. The district court ruled in
favor of Pitre and the class, and enjoined Western from continuing to
discriminate. The court also awarded damages which included some
back and front pay.
The court of appeals held that the district court properly consid-
ered past discrimination as evidence of Western's intent to discriminate,
since the decision-making process at Western had undergone no change
before the case began. The court further ruled that Pitre had presented
ample evidence of discrimination despite the fact that the small sample
sizes in the case impaired the effective use of statistics.
The damage award was calculated incorrectly. The district court
unintentionally disregarded earnings lost due to the lingering effects of
past discrimination. Front pay is intended to compensate victims of dis-
crimination for the continuing future effects of discrimination until the
victim can be made whole, and is not a substitute for back pay. Further,
the court did not sufficiently consider the effect of past discrimination in
determining how to distribute back pay. Remedy reversed and re-
manded. Liability findings affirmed.
Richardson v. The City of Albuquerque, 857 F.2d 727
Appellant appeals denial of a new trial following: (1) a jury verdict
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for the defendants on Richardson's allegations of wrongful discharge,
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, outra-
geous conduct, defamation, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sex, age, and handi-
cap discrimination; and (2) a directed verdict for the defense on her
fourteenth amendment due process claims. Affirmed.
Richardson was a thirty-nine year old female who was admitted into
the Albuquerque police cadet academy in late 1982. A month into the
training program, Richardson was removed from the academy class and
terminated. The stated grounds for this termination were Richardson's
failure to pass certain physical requirements.
Richardson claimed the instructors at the police academy subjected
her to verbal abuse and discriminated against her. Defendants insisted
that verbal harassment was a part of a high stress, military-type training
program, and that women were not treated differently than men because
both had to perform the same job in the field.
Following the jury and directed verdicts, Richardson made a motion
for a new trial on the basis that the jury verdict was against the weight of
evidence. The Tenth Circuit noted this decision was a factual one for
the trial court to make, and that there was no showing of manifest abuse
of discretion in this case. Regarding the directed verdict on the due
process claims, the Tenth Circuit stated that the trial court was cor-
rected in holding that Richardson had no protected property interest in
her probationary position as a police cadet.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought
this action against Sperry Corporation (Sperry), alleging that Sperry im-
properly discharged and then failed to rehire Elizabeth Koyen, in viola-
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq. The jury found for EEOC and Koyen at trial, and both par-
ties appealed. The only issue addressed on appeal was whether the dis-
trict court improperly denied Sperry's motions for a directed verdict and
judgment n.o.v.
Koyen, then 54 years of age, took a five-month leave of absence.
Shortly before the end of her leave, she tried to regain her former posi-
tion. When told that the position was filled, she unsuccessfully applied
for other openings at Sperry.
In reviewing the district court's denial of the motion for judgment
n.o.v., the Tenth Circuit instructed that there must be evidence upon
which the jury could properly find a verdict for the nonmovant. More-
over, the panel noted that under the ADEA, plaintiff must prove that age
was a determining factor in defendant's treatment of the complaining
employee. Upon evaluating EEOC's four theories of age discrimination,
weighing every reasonable inference from the facts in evidence in favor
of EEOC, the Tenth Circuit concluded that EEOC did not present suffi-
cient evidence to prove discrimination on any of the theories.
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Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order
denying Sperry's motion for a judgment n.o.v. and remanded with in-
structions to dismiss the action.
Cooper v. Asplundh, 836 F.2d 1544
Appellee Cooper worked as a foreman for Asplundh from 1966 un-
til he was discharged in 1984. He was 49 years old and replaced by a 32
or 33 year old. He brought this suit alleging Asplundh willfully discrimi-
nated against him in firing him. The jury found for Cooper and the
court entered ajudgement for back pay, liquidated damages, front pay,
and attorney's fees. Both parties appealed.
The issue upon appeal was double damages for willful violation as
opposed to intentional violations. To find willful violation, a factfinder
must find that age was the predominant factor in the employer's decision.
The jury instruction failed to refer to the predominate factor require-
ment so the "willfulness" issues was remanded. Front pay was held rea-
sonable given the animosity between the parties. Reinstatement terms
offered were precluded here. The arbitral award should only be sub-
tracted once, not twice as respondent argued, from the overall award.
Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 858 F.2d 610
Petitioner Phillips appeals from the district court's denial of sum-
mary judgment in this age discrimination suit. Affirmed in part, re-
versed in part.
In March 1982, Phillips announced its plans to close its Kansas City
refinery in six months. As part of its agreement with the employee
union, Phillips agreed to consider Kansas City employees for employ-
ment at Phillips' other facilities where openings existed during the six
month closing period ending on September 9, 1982. The agreement
also stated that the refinery would cease all operations on August 31,
1982 whereupon all remaining employees would be terminated.
On August 31, 1982, Plaintiff Gray filed a charge of age discrimina-
tion against Phillips, as did Plaintiff Walsh on October 15, 1982, claim-
ing that Phillips had denied them an employment transfer due to their
ages. On March 2, 1983, a class action was filed on behalf of all former
employees of the refinery similarly situated. The actions were
consolidated.
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), charges
of discrimination must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged wrongful termina-
tion date. According to the district court, as affirmed by this court, that
date is August 31, 1982. Consequently, the district court held that only
plaintiffs Gray and Walsh had complied with the limitations period, and
that the other plaintiffs had not raised facts sufficient to establish equita-
ble tolling of the 180-day period. However, the district court denied
Phillips' motion for summary judgement on the ground that plaintiffs
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Gray and Walsh were representative of the plaintiffs who had not met
the 180-day limit.
This court reversed, ruling against equitable tolling on the ground
that the EEOC actively mislead plaintiffs into a late filing and that equi-
table considerations mandate that plaintiffs be permitted to proceed
with their claim. As a result, the district court's denial of Phillips motion
for summary judgment is affirmed on the basis of equitable tolling.
Graham v. City of Oklahoma City, 859 F.2d 142
Appellant was terminated from his position as a police officer with
the appellee city because he allegedly falsified a police report. Appellant
sued alleging that his termination violated due process. The lower court
granted summary judgment to the city.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the appellant did
not posses a property interest under Oklahoma law and, consequently,
could not invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment. This
was because removal from office was conditioned, by the city charter,
soley upon the good of the service. The court held this standard does
not create a legitimate expectation of entitlement to continued employ-
ment with cause for discharge.
Grandchamp v. United Airlines, Inc., 854 F.2d 381
Appellees were employees of appellant airline until they were elimi-
nated from their jobs due to a company reorganization that did not in-
clude their continued services. Both appellees sued for violations of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and for damages result-
ing from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The lower
court found for the airline with regard to the ADEA claim but found for
the plaintiffs as to the tort claim. The airline appealed the tort claim
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the tort claim judgment, holding that
under Colorado law, the plaintiffs must show outrageous conduct on the
part of the defendant to support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The plaintiffs, however, showed nothing more than
that they had not been given new positions based on their age.
Although such conduct is unlawful under the ADEA, the appellees failed
to appeal their ADEA claim. Consequently, their bare age discrimina-
tion claims without any showing of outrageous conduct failed to support
the tort claim.
Branson, et. al. v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768
Appellants Branson and Saccomanno claimed they were discrimina-
torily discharged by appellee Coal Co. because of their age in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district
court granted the Coal Co.'s motion for summary judgment. Judgment
affirmed.
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The Tenth Circuit found that the employees had established a prima
facie case of age discrimination in connection with the employer's reduc-
tion-in-force by showing that the employer fired qualified older em-
ployees, but retaining younger ones in similar positions. The court
agreed with the district court's determination that the appellants failed
to raise a genuine issue of fact about whether the employer's articulated
reasons for the layoffs were a mere pretext for discrimination. Appel-
lants' mere conjecture that their employer's explanation was a pretext
for intentional discrimination was an insufficient basis for denial of sum-
mary judgment.
Wyoming Laborers Health and Welfare v. Morgen & Oswood, 850 F.2d 613
Trustees of an employee benefit pension and insurance fund sued
employer to recover deliquent contributions. The district court held
that the employer owed a portion of the delinquent contributions
claimed by the trustee, and awarded a double interest penalty on that
amount, auditor's fees, attorney's fees, and costs to the trustees.
Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Wyoming ten year statute of limita-
tions for actions based on a written contract was applicable to an action
brought under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act by
trustees of a pension plan to recover delinquent contributions, and that
the doctrine of laches did not bar the action.
Norton v. Worthen Van Service, Inc., 839 F.2d 653
Appellants were and are employees of appellee Worthen Van Ser-
vice, Inc. The employees were required to be on call and available to
drive within fifteen to twenty minutes of notice. Appellants brought this
suit under the Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA) seeking unpaid
wages for this waiting time. The district court denied recovery by find-
ing that this waiting time was in accordance with the provisions of the
FLSA, and did not constitute "working time." Affirmed.
Barnard v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 863 F.2d 694
Appellant Barnard appeals a district court's decision to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the appellees, Commercial Carriers, Inc.
(CCI), and Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Local No. 222 (Local 222). Reversed.
Appellees are bound by a multi-employer collective bargaining
agreement. CCI hired appellant Barnard as a yardman in 1980. Later,
he was laid off as a yardman, but was later rehired as a driver. His sen-
iority date of 1980 was retained in spite of his rehiring into a different
position. Grievances were filed by other employees at CCI who pro-
tested Barnard's seniority date. A special subcommittee heard the griev-
ances, in spite of the fact they were not filed within the 30 day period
specified by the collective bargaining agreement. Following a hearing of
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which Barnard was given no notice, the subcommittee decided to
change Barnard's seniority date to a later date.
Barnard filed a grievance with Local 222. The union refused to
hear the grievance, and Barnard subsequently filed this action against
the appellees.
The court of appeals held that the processing of untimely griev-
ances did violate the express terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and that Local 222 breached its duty of fair representation to
Barnard in failing to protest the untimeliness of the grievances. Since
the 30 day time limit had expired, the court held that the subcommittee
lacked the jurisdiction necessary to change Barnard's seniority date. In
addition, the lack of notice to Barnard violated his due process rights.

EVIDENCE
In re Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 857 F.2d 710
Company X appeals an order to compel the production of docu-
ments for grand jury use. The district court determined that the scope
of the subpoenas and the primafacie evidence of attorney involvement in
the alleged crime and fraud fell within the exception to the attorney-
client privilege and did not need to be individually examined. The
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's findings since the purpose of
the communication between Company X and Law Firm Y was to further
a crime or an intended fraud.
United States v. Law Firm Z, 857 F.2d 707
The United States appeals that portion of the district court's order
denying its motion to compel production of nonprivileged documents
for use in its grand jury investigation.
The Tenth Circuit found the district court's failure to compel pro-
duction of nonprivileged documents, because that court deemed the
documents redundant, was insufficient to permit meaningful review.
The portion of the district court's order relating to its failure to so com-
pel was therefore vacated and remanded.
United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690
Appellant appeals from a conviction of possession and aiding and
abetting the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Her pre-
trial motion to suppress certain evidence was denied and she was con-
victed. At the appellate level she made various claims of error, none of
which warranted reversal.
The court stated that documents used by the prosecution were not
hearsay and were relevant for the purpose for which they were intro-
duced. The jury instructions were supported by sufficient evidence at
trial and did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and evidence was suf-
ficient to prove intent to distribute the marijuana. The conviction was
affirmed.
Alexander v. United States, 849 F.2d 1293
Defendant Alexander appeals his conviction for mail and wire fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § § 1341 and 1343 on the grounds of prosecutorial
misconduct and improper exclusion of evidence. The Court of Appeals
held that (1) prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial only when it influ-
ences the verdict (which the record here failed to show), and (2) eviden-
tiary rulings are only reversible for abuse of discretion. Here, in view of
the many conflicting reasons for settlements, evidence of prior settle-
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ment of civil damages arising out of the same incident were properly
excluded. Affirmed.
Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 865 F.2d 1150
Appellant Meuli appeals an unfavorable jury verdict on the grounds
the district court improperly excluded evidence of prior lawsuits against
a manufacturer of grain silos, and did not offer reasons for dismissing
other parties to the lawsuit. Affirmed.
The court of appeals held that the district court properly excluded
Meuli's offer of proof, since it related to lawsuits against the manufac-
turer in California which took place in the 1960's. Noting that the law-
suits involved a different product and a large gap in time, the court
agreed that evidence concerning them would likely serve only to confuse
a jury. The court also held that since Meuli never objected to the dis-
missal of the other parties, they waived their right to raise this issue on
appeal.
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512
Appellant United States appeals the district court's granting of a
motion to suppress evidence discovered in the course of a traffic stop.
Affirmed.
A New Mexico State Police Officer pulled over Guzman, who was
driving a rented 1987 Cadillac with Florida plates, for not wearing his
seatbelt. Guzman's driver license and registration were in order, but the
officer persisted in his questioning of Guzman, and finally obtained a
consent to search from him. Upon searching the car, $40,000 in cash
and five kilograms of cocaine were seized.
The court of appeals held that the proper test for determining
whether a traffic stop is valid is whether a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances would have made the stop. In this instance, the court
held that the stop was merely a pretextual one, and that insufficient
probable cause existed to justify the actions taken by the police officer.
United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173
Appellant Cuch appeals his conviction of sexual assault and illegal
possession of a firearm. Affirmed.
Appellant appeals on the grounds the district court improperly ad-
mitted evidence of a prior sexual assault. The court of appeals held that
this evidence was properly admitted under FRE 404(b), because evi-
dence had real probative value, was established with clear and convinc-
ing evidence, was not about acts unduly remote in time, and all the




Willner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1020
On appeal from ajudgment for defendant-appellee in a sex discrim-
ination action. Affirmed.
The panel found that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the recusal motions because the motions failed to allege suffi-
cient facts, involved adverse rulings, or were untimely. Upon review of
the record, the panel upheld the district court's findings that the appel-
lant wilfully disregarded the court's orders to cooperate in the discovery
process. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the individual de-
fendants prior to trial was not error. Finally, the panel concluded that
the thoroughness of the court's findings and extensive discussion of the
evidence shows that the court carefully considered the entire record.
The district court's findings were not clearly erroneous.
Big Horn Coal Company v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259
This breach of contract case involved an Illinois public utility
(Edison), and two Wyoming coal producers. Edison notified coal com-
panies that it was exercising section 3.01, a force majeure clause, to re-
duce its scheduled minimum purchase obligations (amounting to 1.5
million tons of coal per year for a ten-year period) in order to comply
with an Illinois EPA order. The coal companies brought this suit.
Edison appeals a jury verdict totalling more than $500 million rendered
against it in the district court.
This appeal explores the good faith doctrine of contract law in some
depth, although "good faith" is never defined. The judgment is upheld
as the Tenth Circuit found no error in the instructions given by the dis-
trict court.
United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. On
appeal, Markopoulos challenged the admissibility of several items of evi-
dence, and claims the trail court erred in failing to limit certain jury in-
structions to his co-defendant. He also contends the evidence at trial
was insufficient to support his conviction. The Tenth Circuit held that
none of the issues constituted reversible error and the evidence sup-
ported the conviction.
The court affirmed the district court holding that a co-defendant's
statements are admissible under the sixth amendment if the court ex-
cludes all references to defendant and instructs the jury that the state-
ment is not admissible against defendant. Admission of codefendant's
statements were only "inferentially incriminating."
The court found that the jury instructions had been erroneous with
respect to defendant, but did not believe they required reversal. De-
fendant was convicted only on the conspiracy charge and this conviction
could not have been based on the evidence of the codefendant's prior
acts.
1989]
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United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426
Appeal from conviction for conspiring to defraud the United States
and falsifying tax returns. Affirmed.
Pinto and her husband concealed $150,000 in income from selling
marijuana. They used cash to purchase three residences and then ob-
tained false mortgages to make it appear that the purchase money had
come from loans. The court rejected defendant's claim that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support a conviction. From witness' testimony
and inferences drawn therefrom, the evidence was sufficient to support
the jury's finding of Pinto's intent to conspire. The lower court admit-
ted co-conspirator hearsay before finding the existence of a conspiracy,
but, if admitted as such, it was conditionally admissible subject to being
connected to the conspiracy and, therefore, it was not improper to admit
it. This hearsay was also admissable because it was an admission by the
co-conspirator.
Pinto also claimed that the evidence adduced at trial varied too
greatly from the actual charges in that it indicated the existence of an
uncharged conspiracy to possess, sell, and distribute drugs. Even
though Pinto was not charged with this crime, the court found that the
defendant could have anticipated this evidence at trial based on the ac-
tual charges, and therefore, her claim was meritless. The lower court's
denial of Pinto's motion to sever the trial was proper based on judicial
economy, avoidance of duplicitious trials, the court's continuous admo-
nitions, and the general rule to jointly try individuals jointly indicted.
Finally, charges were filed within the six-year statute of limitations be-
cause the object of the conspiracy did not end with the filing of the tax
return.
United States v. Temple, 862 F.2d 821
Temple appeals the district court's decision to admit evidence of-
fered under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) concerning prior acts of the defendant.
Reversed and remanded.
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and aiding and abetting the
smuggling of illegal aliens from Mexico into the United States. Prior to
trial, the defendant moved to exclude government evidence of three
prior acts which were of the same nature as the charge at bar. The dis-
trict court denied the defendant's motion in limine and admitted the
evidence. When reviewing evidentiary rulings of the trial court, this
court may only reverse upon a finding of abuse of discretion. This court
found the first prior act properly admissable under Rule 404(b) in order
to show the defendant's common plan, preparation, and intent to trans-
port aliens. The other two prior acts were deemed inadmissable, how-
ever, since Rule 404(b) excludes evidence of a person's character "for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith." The govern-
ment failed to show that these two prior acts fell within an exception
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under Rule 404(b). The probative value of this evidence was substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Martin v. Internal Revenue Service, 857 F.2d 722
Martin filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act to compel
the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) to disclose the tax protests filed by
three other individuals who participated with him in pass-through cor-
porate and partnership entities. These protests concerned proposed ad-
justments to the returns of these three individuals based on prior I.R.S.
adjustments to the informational returns of the pass-through entities.
Martin's avowed purpose was to use the protests of these three individu-
als to prepare his own response to the I.R.S. The district court ordered
the I.R.S. to disclose the protests to Martin. Reversed.
The I.R.S. audited the returns of a limited partnership, a general
partnership, and a subchapter S corporation in which Martin and three
other individuals all had interests. A copy of the revenue agent's report
was sent to all four individuals. The I.R.S. then audited and sought ad-
justments in the individual tax returns of Martin and his three partners.
Section 6103(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), allows
partners and shareholders to obtain the returns and tax information of
the partnerships and corporations in which they have a material interest.
Citing this section, Martin sought access to the protests made by those
who participated with him in the pass-through entities. The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that such disclosure was not mandated by § 6103(e), since the
information sought related not to the pass-through entities, but to the
tax returns of other individuals.
DeSalvo v. Internal Revenue Service, 861 F.2d 1217
Appellant, subject of a federal tax investigation, requested under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 all records
maintained by the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) pertaining to him
and the names of third parties whose tax returns were contained in his
file. The I.R.S. refused. The trial court held that FOIA did not apply to
DeSalvo's request, concluding that the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
§ 6013 is the sole standard governing disclosure of tax return informa-
tion. The court limited its review to whether the I.R.S. abused its discre-
tion, concluding that it did not.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision to withhold
DeSalvo's own return information, holding that the FOIA and IRC
§ 6103 both apply and the FOIA's requirement of de novo review must be
provided. The court affirmed summary judgement on the request for
disclosure of the third party names.

INSURANCE
Gilbertson v. State Farm, 845 F.2d 245
Appellants Gilbertson appeal the district court's grant of summary
judgement to the defendant, holding that the Gilbertson's auto accident
was beyond the coverage of the uninsured motorist clause in their pol-
icy. Affirmed.
In December, 1982, two members of the Gilbertson family were se-
riously injured and one was killed when their pick-up truck was struck by
a 51 pound rock which fell from the overpass under which they were
driving. The Gilbertsons sought compensation under their insurance
policy on the grounds that Steven York, the person responsible for the
fall of the rock onto their pick-up truck, drove to the overpass in an
uninsured motor vehicle. The court found that the accident did not
arise out of the operation, maintenance, or use of the uninsured vehicle.
The claim failed to meet two requisite tests: (1) the accident must have
arisen out of the use of the vehicle as a vehicle; and (2) a causal relation-
ship must exist between the accident and the use of the vehicle.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 861
F.2d 250
Appellant Hartford appeals a district court decision which found it
liable for defective work performed by a subcontractor on a building
owned by Pacific Mutual covered by two comprehensive general liability
policies issued by Hartford. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Contrary to the district court's findings, the court of appeals held
that coverage of Hartford's policies was not intended to extend to ordi-
nary business risks, such as those relating to the repair and replacement
of faulty products. The only damage claimed by Pacific Mutual which
was not excluded from the policies' coverage was the amount of any
diminution in value which exceeded the replacement costs.

PENSIONS
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457
Appellant Guidry, a trustee of the Sheet Metal Workers Pension
Fund (Fund), embezzled $377,000 from the Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national Union (Union). Guidry sued after he was denied early retire-
ment benefits.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the order compelling Guidry's pension
funds to be placed in a constructive trust and paid to the Union. The
court held that the Union, as a beneficiary of the trust, could compel
repayment of losses to the trust resulting from Guidry's breach of duty
as trustee. Because Guidry was also a beneficiary of the trust, repayment
out of his beneficial interest was proper. The court also held that Gui-
dry's failure to comply with Colorado's garnishment procedures denied
him the protections of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1673.
Anderson v. Emergency Medicine Associates, 860 F.2d 987
Plaintiff appeals from the district court decision in favor of the de-
fendant. The issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly held
that Emergency Medicine Associates' (EMA) retirement plans did not
partially terminate on March 1, 1979, when the plaintiff voluntarily quit
working for the EMA. If the plan partially terminated, plaintiff is enti-
tled to 100% of EMA's contributions to his retirement account. If the
plan did not partially terminate, plaintiff's rights to the EMA contribu-
tions are forfeited.
Plaintiff contends that partial termination occurred within the
meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 411 (d)(3) (1982) when a significant percentage
of the plan's participants, in this case 50%, left employment with the
EMA, regardless of whether the participants left voluntarily or were dis-
missed. This court held that partial termination, under Sage v. Automa-
tion, Inc. Pension Plan and Trust, 845 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1988), only
occurs when there is a substantial reduction in plan participants attribu-
table to involuntary exclusions or employee terminations, not including
voluntary employee decisions of resignation. Affirmed.
Sb~aub v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 851 F.2d 1262
Appellant Straub appeals a summary judgment based on the
grounds that no liability can exist under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) for purported oral modification of a written
pension plan. Affirmed.
In affirming the district court decision, the court of appeals noted
that ERISA § 514(a) preempts all state law claims relating to an em-
ployee pension plan, and that the ERISA requirement that all plans be
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maintained in writing bars all attempted oral modifications to a pension
plan.
Trustees v. Morgan & Oswood Const. Co., 850 F.2d 613
Appellant Morgan & Oswood Const. Co. appeals a district court
judgment finding it liable for benefit payments required by a collective
bargaining agreement during the time the agreement was in effect, de-
spite the fact Morgan & Oswood repudiated this agreement two years
after it was signed. Affirmed.
Morgan & Oswood claimed this action was barred by the six month
statute of limitations for "hybrid" labor actions, or by the two year Wyo-
ming statute of limitations for actions seeking to impose liability based
on a federal statute. In dismissing these arguments, the court of appeals
noted the six month limit applied only to federal "hybrid" actions be-
tween employers and employees, and that the trustees of a union pen-
sion plan are not "employees." The two year limit was disregarded on
the grounds it discriminated against a federal cause of action. The court
instead held that the appropriate statute of limitations was the 10 year
limit found in Wyoming law for written contract disputes.
Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan and Trust, 845 F.2d 885
Plaintiff appeals from a district court decision in favor of the de-
fendant which held that a partial termination of pension and profit shar-
ing plans did not occur, thus denying plaintiff's entitlement to full
vesting of amounts credited to its plan accounts. Affirmed in part, re-
versed in part, and remanded.
Plaintiff argues that the pension and profit sharing plans of Automa-
tion did not comply with the Employment Retirement and Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1461, and the Internal
Revenue Code. Plaintiff maintains that his departure from Automation
was a partial termination of the plan, entitling him to full vesting of
amounts credited to his plan; and that the plan failed to provide an ade-
quate claims denial procedure and that such failure constitutes a breach
of fiduciary duty on the part of the plan's trustee. When the plaintiff
voluntarily departed from employment with Automation he was granted
partially vested benefits, but was denied full benefits as the trustee de-
termined there to be no partial termination of the plan. The trial court
concluded that a partial termination of the plan had not occurred.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that partial termination occurs when-
ever there is a substantial reduction in plan participants in connection
with a significant corporate event, and cannot be determined based on
whether or not an employee voluntarily left an employer. This court
denied such a contention and held that partial termination only occurs
when there is a substantial reduction in plan participants attributable to
involuntary exclusions or involuntary employee terminations.
The court of appeals held the claims review procedure to be defi-
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cient. It failed to comply with 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(f)(3) and (4),
which provide that appropriate information must be provided to allow
the claimant to perfect his claim prior to submission of this claim for
review. The opinion failed to provide a reasonable opportunity for a full
and fair review of the denial of a claim. However, this court found that
the procedural defects do not require reversal on the partial termination
issue.
On remand, the district court should consider the issue of attorney




Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. Kansas, 862 F.2d 1415
The Shawnee Tribe of Indians (Indians) in Oklahoma sought pos-
session and title to land located in Kansas which previously belonged to
the Indians, but was granted to a charitable society in an 1854 treaty
with the United States government. Eleven years later, the United
States patented the land to a deceased individual and the Indians chal-
lenged in district court the validity of this patent, since under common
law, patents to deceased individuals are void. The lower court found the
patent valid under a statute effective at the time of the patent that made
patents to deceased persons valid and vesting in the deceased's heirs,
devisees, and assigns, so long as the patent was for "public land." The
Indians appealed to the Tenth Circuit, asserting that the statute was in-
applicable because the land was Indian land and not public land.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the land public. The court be-
gan by looking to the treaty between the tribe and the U.S. government
and held that it must be treated like a contract. In the treaty, the court
first found the subject property was sold in consideration for $10,000.
Since the Supreme Court of the United States had held previously that
"public lands" are those "subject to sale . . . under general laws," this
land qualifies as public land and substantiates the patent under the stat-
ute. Second, the court found that in the treaty the Indians agreed to
recede to the United States to hold title to all property which may be
sold. Because the government held title to this land, it was deemed
"public." Third, the court held that "unclaimed lands," not taken by
the Indians among the land made available to them is public, since such
land is subject to sale. Since the subject property was never claimed by
any members of the tribe, it is unclaimed. Consequently, it is subject to
sale, which makes it qualify as "public land."
United States v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502
Defendant appeals from a final order of the district court ordering
him to modify or remove from his lands a fence which enclosed some
9,600 acres of public lands. Portions of this land provide winter range
for Wyoming pronghorn antelope. The fence, although on private land,
denied the antelope access to their winter range. Defendant argued that
the antelope have been granted an easement across his land or that a
servitude has been imposed upon his land. He further argued that the
imposition of this public servitude on his private property without pay-
ment of compensation is a "taking" within the fifth amendment, for
which he should be compensated. The Tenth Circuit rejected all of the
defendant's arguments and upheld the district court. The court held
that the Unlawful Inclosure of Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061 to
1066, was intended to prevent the obstruction of free passage or transit
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for any and all lawful purposes over public lands. One of the lawful
purposes of public lands is to provide food and habitat for fish and
wildlife.
United States v. Trujillo, 853 F.2d 800
Henry Trujillo and Magdalena Duran, the appellants, requested ti-
tle to property, the ownership of which was being contested between
Taos Pueblo and the United States. The Trujillos asserted that their
predecessors in title had made a claim to the land before the Pueblo
Lands Board, which granted most of their claim but denied these partic-
ular parcels. Because their predecessors met the rest of the require-
ments for a patent under the Pueblo Lands Act, appellants believed they
were the rightful owners of the property.
The district court denied these claims because there was insufficient
evidence to show that the claims were made to the land by appellants'
predecessors, and the property was ordered to be restored to the
Pueblo. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision that a patent under the
Pueblo Lands Act must fail if there is a lack of sufficient evidence to
show the Pueblo Lands Board ruled on the contested properties. The
court quieted title to the property in the Taos Pueblo and held the
Trujillos to be innocent trespassers.
United States v. 10,031.98 Acres of Land, 850 F.2d 634
Appeal from an order granting the first new trial and denying a re-
quest for a second new trial. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the order
granting the first new trial and reversed the order denying the second
new trial.
The federal government condemned appellant's property. At the
first trial, the appellant testified as to the value of his property based on
offering prices that he had received on potential replacement ranches in
the general area. Evidence of a mere offer to buy or sell property cannot
be used to show the fair market value of condemned land. The trial
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in granting the government
a new trial.
At the second trial the court refused to allow the appellant to testify
regarding his opinion of the value of his property based on actual selling
prices of comparable ranch properties. The trial court would not allow
the appellant's opinion testimony without giving details of the individual
sales that he had used for his comparisons. It was improper for the dis-
trict court to prevent the appellant from offering his opinion because the
opinion testimony of a landowner about the value of his or her land is
admissible without further qualification. Denial of appellant's motion




King v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 855 F.2d 1485
Southern Pacific employee King appeals the district court's sum-
mary judgment against his allegations that because the Southern Pacific
ran a locomotive which lacked armrests on the brakeman's chair, the
railroad was liable under the Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34,
for back injuries he suffered in a grade crossing collision. Also appealed
was a jury verdict for the Southern Pacific on King's claims that the rail-
road was liable for his back injuries under the Federal Employer's Liabil-
ity Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34, and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16. Affirmed.
King's cause of action arose from two separate accidents: a grade
crossing collision in 1980 and an emergency stop in 1984. The only
contested issue at trial was causation, and the Southern Pacific success-
fully avoided liability by showing that King had a long history of back
problems prior to the accident.

REAL PROPERTY
Amoco Production Co. v. United States, 852 F.2d 1581
Newton & Sons Sheep Co. conveyed a one-half interest in the min-
erals in certain Utah land to Bass Enterprises. The land became in-
volved in a quiet title action in which the United States claimed a one-
half interest in the mineral rights. Newton and Bass were joined in the
action. Newton claimed if the United States had a one-half interest then
Bass could only receive one-half of the one-half interest that the New-
tons still owned. Bass disputed this interpretation, claiming that it re-
ceived one-half of the minerals regardless of whether the United States'
claim was upheld. The district court upheld the United States' claim to
one-half of the minerals. The district court held that Bass had the other
one-half.
Because the court reversed the district court in the related action
involving the United States and found that the United States had no
claim to a one-half interest, the court noted that the Bass and Newton
interpretations in this action were no longer in conflict.
Amoco Production Co. v. United States, 852 F.2d 1574
In 1942, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. (FFMC) conveyed cer-
tain land in Utah to the Newtons by special warranty deed. Believing it
had retained a mineral interest in the land, the FFMC later conveyed
that interest to the United States. The Newtons, believing they had re-
ceived all the mineral rights in the land, later conveyed a mineral lease
to Amoco Production Co. The recorded deed did not contain a reserva-
tion of mineral rights. The district court entered judgment quieting title
in the United States.
The Tenth Circuit held that the recorded deed presumptively trans-
ferred the mineral rights to the Newtons and that the government failed
to overcome that presumptive transfer with clear and convincing evi-
dence. The court reversed the district court's judgment and quieted ti-
tle to the disputed minerals in Amoco.
Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717
Petitioner filed suit against city officials, a county commissioner, and
officers in an Air Force base, alleging a taking of property without just
compensation, and denial of due process and equal protection. The ac-
tion was based on allegations that defendant attempted to impede and
prevent petitioner from constructing a shopping center on his property
by refusing to grant certain necessary building permits while a proposed
zoning odinance affecting the subject property was being considered.
Petitioner appealed to the City Board of Adjustment, which upheld the
refusal. The district court then dismissed on grounds that petitioner
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failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Petitioner
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. First, it held petitioner's takings, sub-
stantive due process, and equal protection claims were not ripe for ac-
tion, since a "final decision" by local authorities, setting forth the level
of development permitted on the subject property, had not yet been
rendered. Second, the court held petitioner's procedural due process
claim unfounded due to the hearing granted before the City Board of
Adjustment.
Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Baca, 844 F.2d 708
Defendant-appellants appeal from the district court's judgment al-
lowing plaintiff-appellee to eject appellants from a parcel of land and to
recover damages caused by their trespass. Appellants claim that the
court erred in relying on the boundaries established by an 1813 adjudi-
cation by Spanish authorities rather than on the boundaries set forth in
an official United States survey. Affirmed.
The panel found that appellee's expert convincingly established
that the adjudication settled the ownership of the disputed parcel.
Thus, the panel upheld the district court's findings that the adjudication
conclusively determined the dispute in favor of appellee. The suspect
survey should not outweigh the findings of the detailed adjudication.
The panel also found that the fence that appellee constructed and
maintained along the northern and eastern boundary of the disputed
parcel was plainly sufficient to inform any individual of appellee's occu-
pancy. The panel concluded that appellee adversely possessed the land
and should be entitled to absolute ownership.
United States v. 2560 Acres of Land, 836 F.2d 498
A flood control project caused a taking of real property and mineral
rights. The district court held fully compensating a landowner in a con-
demnation suit requires consideration for diminution of value of prop-
erty not expressly taken. The court of appeals, however, held the
method of valuation of mineral interest using the "net income ap-
proach" was correct.
Messiah Baptist Church v. Jefferson County, 859 F.2d 820
Appellant church purchased agricultural property for church use.
Zoning regulations allowed for such a use if a special permit were
granted. The county denied the special use permit, and the church filed
suit alleging the zoning regulation was an invalid infringement upon the
church's religious freedom. The court granted appellee's motion for
summary judgement. Affirmed.
The court of appeals held that nothing in the record indicated any
friction between the appellant's religious beliefs and the zoning regula-
tions, and thus, the district court's dismissal of the action was proper.
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Sant v. Stephens, 848 F.2d 1119
In an action filed in federal district court, plaintiff Sant attempted to
vacate defendant Stephens' certification of redemption and public
trustee deed. Since this required resolution of questions regarding Col-
orado law, two issues were certified to the Colorado Supreme Court: (1)
whether a lien created by § 22-2 of the Glenwood Springs Municipal
Code for unpaid utility services is entitled to redemptive rights under
C.R.S. § 38-39-103 and (2) whether such a lien's redemptive rights are
extinguishable as the whole property by the failure to exercise them at a
public trustee sale of an undivided one-half interest.
The Colorado Supreme Court answered the first question in the af-
firmative and the second question in the negative. Since Glenwood
Springs is a home rule city, it possesses the plenary power to pass ordi-
nances concerning local and municipal matters so long as they do not
conflict with state statutes. Since no state statute prohibits a home rule
city from creating liens, the ordinance is valid. On the second issue the
court held that a lien attaching to the interests of both co-tenants carries
distinctive redemptive rights as to each interest. Thus, the failure to re-
deem from the first foreclosure sale, which covered the interest of only





Pitts v. Turner & Boisseau, Chartered, 850 F.2d 650
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claims contending that defend-
ants knowingly conspired to breach the fiduciary relationship between
himself and defendant law firm (Turner), thus violating his civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 and 1985(2), as well as the Racketeering Influ-
ence and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (RICO)).
The Tenth Circuit Court (viewing the amended complaint in its most
favorable light) held that (1) in alleging only one scheme to defraud,
plaintiff failed to meet the "continuity requirement" (threat of ongoing
activity) thus failing to properly plead a "pattern of racketeering" under
RICO; and (2) plaintiff failed to allege how defendants either conspired
to keep him from testifying, injured his person or property thereby
(under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)), or violated his constitutional rights while
acting under the color of state law (in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Since there was no federal diversity jurisdiction, the pendant state claim




United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664
Drug agents investigated the purchase of chemicals to make illegal
drugs. A witness told the agents that the individuals they sought were
on a houseboat. After observing activity that looked like drug manufac-
turing, the agents boarded the boat. They arrested Hill and Pemberton,
conducted a cursory search, and found an amphetamine laboratory.
The agents secured the boat and then obtained a search warrant. Hill
and Pemberton claimed that their arrests were unlawful and that the evi-
dence seized should be suppressed. The Tenth Circuit held that the
agents had probable cause to arrest the two men. The court also held
that the houseboat was not considered a home; therefore, the require-
ment that a warrant be obtained before making a nonconsensual entry
into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest was not applicable.
The court concluded that the boat was more like a vehicle than a house.
Specht v. Jensen, 837 F.2d 940
In an en banc rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed an earlier
panel opinion. The rehearing was limited to the issue of whether an
attorney could serve as an expert witness on the issue of illegal search
and seizure. This testimony had been allowed at the district court level,
and a jury verdict had been entered for the plaintiffs. A Tenth Circuit
panel had reversed on the grounds that F.R.E. 702 would not permit an
attorney called as an expert witness to state his views on the law gov-
erning a case, and then give his opinioin as to whether the defendant's
conduct violated that law. Affirmed.
The court of appeals agreed with the panel opinion that this expert
testimony encroached upon the court's authority to instruct the jury and
that it was prejudicial enough to warrant reversal.
United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268
Appellant Aquino appeals his conviction on illegal possession of a
firearm. Affirmed.
Aquino's conviction was secured using evidence discovered in his
home in the course of a warrantless search. The court of appeals held
that the search was proper, since the facts indicated that the government
had ample probable cause, and there was a high likelihood of evidence
being destroyed if police action was delayed.
United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103
Appeal of the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress
evidence seized and statements made when appellant was stopped at an
airport by two police officers.
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Two officers were at the airport following a tip they had received
when one officer recognized appellant from a previous arrest. Believing
appellant had violated the conditions of his pretrial release, the officer
decided to stop and question appellant. When appellant's name was
called out, appellant quickened his pace at which point the officers phys-
ically stopped and detained him and conducted a search.
Under New Mexico law, while the court could have had appellant
arrested for violation of conditions of pretrial release, such a violation
was not a crime and thus did not provide a basis, for stopping defend-
ant. At most, the officer should have reported seeing the appellant at
the airport.
The Tenth Circuit found that the pat-down search for weapons was
not supported by reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and
presently dangerous inasmuch as he had just passed airport security de-
tectors to gain entry to the gate area. Additionally, the actions of the
officer exceeded the scope of a permissible frisk for weapons under the
Terry exception, where an officer went beyond patting defendant's outer
clothing and reached into his pockets. This conduct cannot be consid-
ered minimally intrusive.
The Tenth Circuit remanded with directions to grant appellant's
motion to suppress.
Goichman v. City of Aspen, 859 F.2d 1466
While the appellant was in Aspen as a tourist, his car was towed and
impounded for a parking violation. Appellant paid the fine and the tow-
ing fee but filed suit against the city. He alleged that he had been de-
prived of personal property without a judicial hearing, prior to the
payment of the fines, to determine the legal justification for the seizure
and impoundment of his car. The district court granted the city's mo-
tion for summary judgment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the reasonable availability
of a hearing to adjudicate the underlying parking violation satisfied due
process. Consequently, no additional hearing, judicial or otherwise, was
necessary to determine the validity of Aspen's impoundment and towing
procedures.
Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999
Jim Floyd allowed private security agents at the Denver airport to
search his duffel bag. When the agents found large amounts of money,
they alerted the police who escorted petitioner to an airport security of-
fice. The bag was searched again, this time without petitioner's consent,
and a trained dog was summoned to test the bag for drugs. Floyd de-
nied ownership of the bag and left the airport. When the dog reacted to
the presence of drugs in the bag, the money was turned over to federal
agents. Floyd filed a motion for return of the money under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41(e). The government moved to dismiss the
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Rule 41(e) motion, but the government motion was denied. The gov-
ernment initiated forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881. The
lower court, however, found that the money had been illegally seized
and ordered it returned. The government appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that in
order for Floyd to prevail on a Rule 41 (e) motion, he must show that he
has no adequate remedy at law and that irreparable injury would result
to him if he were denied the motion. Even though the evidence sup-
ported the lower court's finding that Floyd had no adequate remedy at
law, there was reversible error by the lower court in that it did not also
require a showing by Floyd that irreparable harm would result from dis-
missal of his motion.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS
First National Bank of Amarillo v. Southwestern Livestock, Inc., 859 F.2d
847
Appellant Southwestern Livestock appeals the district court's judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff bank. The issues before the court included:
(1) whether an auction house acting as the livestock owners's agent, is
liable in conversion to a secured creditor of the owner, whose agree-
ment denied authority to sell the livestock as it served as collateral; and
if so (2) whether the fact that the buyers of the auctioned cattle took free
of the security interest, or that the creditors failed to perfect its security
interest in Kansas, should relieve the auction house of liability.
Affirmed.
The bank loaned money to the Newmans of Oklahoma, to help fi-
nance their cattle operation. The plaintiff took a security interest in the
cattle which was perfected in Oklahoma. The Newmans sold the cattle
in violation of the security agreement through the defendant's auction
barn in Kansas. The defendant auctioned the cattle in good faith and
without actual knowledge of the bank's security interest, but was held
liable for conversion as commission agent. Because the Uniform Com-
mercial Code does not address the conversion liability of commission
agents, the district court relied on the common law of Kansas which
states that commission agents are liable for conversion despite an asser-
tion of good faith or ignorance of the principal's want of title. The dis-
trict court determined that liability is based exclusively on the authority
of the agent's principal to sell the collateral. Whether the buyer would
take free of the security interest is irrelevant in that determination. The
bank's failure to perfect its security interest in Kansas does not serve to
relieve the defendant of liability.

SECURITIES
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 855 F.2d
677
The securities dealer, Blinder, Robinson & Co., and its principal
shareholder, Meyer Blinder, appealed the district court's denial to va-
cate an earlier injunction which prohibited the defendants from dissemi-
nating deliberately deceptive information. The defendants claimed that
the district court applied an incorrect standard in deciding not to vacate
and that the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) civil prose-
cution of the defendants without participation by the executive branch
violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The court of appeals, in affirming the district court's decision, held
that the defendants failed to show proof of unseen conditions before
vacating the injunction, as required by United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106
(1932). Additionally, the court held that the SEC could constitutionally
exercise civil enforcement authority. Denial of appellants' motion
affirmed.
Carlson, Inc. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 859 F.2d 1429
Petitioner Carlson, Inc. is a registered securities broker-dealer and
Charles E. Carlson is a registered broker and president of Carlson, Inc.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed sanctions on
petitioners based on their activities in closing a public offering of com-
mon stock. Petitioners allegedly violated federal securities laws by bor-
rowing funds to purchase the minimum number of shares necessary to
close the offering and then repaying those loans with proceeds from the
offering. This was done to avoid refunding amounts paid by the public
investors. The SEC had found that the petitioners were aware of the
part-or-none provision. Affirmed.
Carlson violated SEC Rule 15(C)2-4 by receiving funds and then
instructing the escrow banks to disburse the funds in accordance with
the prospectus as if the appropriate event, the sale of 20 million shares,
had occurred in genuine transactions. In reality, the contingency of
sales of less than 20 million shares had occurred, so the investors' funds
should have been returned. The court found that the sanctions imposed
against petitioners were reasonable under the circumstances. There was
no abuse of discretion by the SEC. Among other things, the SEC was
entitled to consider that the petitioners were sanctioned by the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) for similar misconduct in a




Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668
Adamson brought individual and class claims against the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Secretary). The
individual claim was an appeal of the Secretary's denial of social security
disability benefits despite reports from Adamson's treating physician
supporting the claim. Finding Adamson totally disabled, the district
court reversed and imposed sanctions upon the Secretary pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 of the cost for Adamson's attorney's fees in the previ-
ous action. Adamson also sought certification of a class action, alleging
that the Secretary had an illegal policy of nonacquiescence to the law of
the Tenth Circuit concerning the weight to be given reports of treating
physicians. The district court declined to certify the proposed class
action.
Whether imposing monetary sanctions against the Secretary under
Rule 11 violated the federal government's sovereign immunity is an is-
sue of first impression.
The Tenth Circuit found that the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412, expressly waives immunity against attorney fee awards.
An award of Rule 11 sanctions involves two steps: first the district court
must find that a pleading violated Rule 11, then the court imposes an
appropriate sanction. The Tenth Circuit applies an abuse-of-discretion
standard on all Rule 11 issues. The court held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by concluding that the agency's ruling was so
lacking in evidentiary support that the Secretary should have conceded
the merits of Adamson's complaint. Because the record was filled with
overwhelming evidence of Adamson's disability, the Secretary could not
have believed its position was well-grounded in fact, as Rule 11 requires.
Adamson also argues that the district court erred in denying class
certifications; and the Secretary's policy of disregarding Tenth Circuit
rulings on the proper weight to be given treating physicians' reports vio-
lated the Social Security Act, the class members' due process rights, and
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The court held that
the district court did apply an improper standard by placing upon the
class a burden that the rule does not authorize, i.e., common question
did not predominate.
The court affirmed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, vacated the
denial of class certification, and remanded to the district court to con-
sider a new class certification.
Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297
Plaintiff brought this action after his application for Social Security
disability benefits and supplemental security income was denied. The
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district court affirmed the decision of the administrative agency and this
appeal ensued. There is a five-step process used in evaluating disability
claims. In this case, the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that
plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal those set forth in the So-
cial Security Act at the third stage of the evaluation procedure. The ALJ
then proceeded to the fourth stage of the process and determined that
plaintiff was not prevented from engaging in his prior work as a security
guard and that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the So-
cial Security Act. Plaintiff argued that medical evidence showed he was
in fact disabled. The Tenth Circuit felt that the treating physician's re-
port was brief, conclusory, and without foundation and that the ALJ's
decision to reject that report was supported by substantial evidence in
the record. Furthermore, the fact that the case review and RFC were
completed without the assistance of a mental health professional was not
prejudicial to the plaintiff since the ALJ's decision was amply supported
by the medical reports and records. Affirmed.
Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125
Appellee Huston, who gave up farming as a result of a back injury,
applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits. Despite non-
medical evidence that Huston suffered pain, the administrative law
judge (ALJ) found that Huston retained functional capacity for light
work. The district court reversed, finding that the record established
substantial evidence of disability.
The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ's opinion ignored the fact
that Huston established the existence of a medically determinable back
impairment that can cause pain. Thus, the court held that a finding of
no disability cannot be made without a full evaluation of all subjective
and objective evidence of pain. The court stated that the district court
usurped the ALJ's function by reweighing the evidence and making, in
effect, its own determination. Reversed and remanded.
Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244
Plaintiff suffered injuries to his back and was treated with surgery.
Subsequently, he applied for disability benefits. His claim was denied at
every step in the administrative process. On appeal to the district court,
the case was remanded to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Again, the claim was denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ). The
district court affirmed the denial. Plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, alleging that the ALJ erred in determining that plain-
tiff's injuries were not gevere enough to merit an award and that plaintiff
retains capacity to do light work.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
the case to the district court. The court held the ALJ's findings of no
severe impairment were supported by evidence of inconsistencies in
plaintiff's treating physician's report and plaintiff's testimony. The
ALJ's finding that plaintiff was capable of doing light work was sup-
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ported by the evidence. However, the ALJ's finding of no disability
based on a determination of functional literacy was not supported by the
evidence. The ALJ erroneously presumed that plaintiff's mere holding
of certain jobs in the past provided, contrary to his testimony, he must
be literate.
Doughty v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 644
This was a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. The issue is
whether a district court has sufficiently broad remedial powers to direct
payments of interim benefits when the individual has never been certi-
fied as disabled. This court agreed with the Fourth Circuit in conclud-
ing that interim benefits are similar to mandatory deadlines, and held
that a district court could not use its remedial powers to order interim
benefits when Congress has not so provided. If a district court were
allowed to order interim benefits payments in the initial denial of bene-
fits cases, it would be doing something Congress has considered and not
provided for.
Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802
The Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Oklahoma Disa-
bility Determination Services denied plaintiff's application for disability
benefits initiallly and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff obtained a de novo
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who concluded plain-
tiff was not disabled within the meaninig of the Social Security Act. The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma affirmed. The
Tenth Circuit also affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held a claimant has the burden of proving a disa-
bility preventing him from engaging in his prior work under the SSA.
Proof of such shifts the burden to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to show by substantial evidence that the claimant can perform
other light or sedentary work activity and that these jobs exist in the
national economy. Use of medical-vocational guidelines (grids), which
take into consideration a claimant's ability to do light work, his age, edu-
cation and work experience, may be used to determine if such other jobs
exist. Where the claimant's injuries cause limitations to more than
merely his ability to exert physical strength, the grids should be used
only as a guideline. Since the ALJ determined claimant's credibility was
doubtful and that his injuries did not extend beyond limiting his ability
to exert physical strength, the ALJ properly used the grids to determine
that claimant could perform other work. Therefore, claimant was not
disabled within the meaninig of the Social Security Act.
Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242
Petitioner applied for disability benefits under the Social Security
Act. Her application was denied. She appealed to the district court,
which remanded the case to the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
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ices (Secretary). On remand, an Administrative law judge (ALJ) found
that petitioner was disabled. The Appeals Council, acting for the Secre-
tary, reversed. Petitioner appealed the district court, which affirmed the
Appeals Council's denial of benefits. Petitioner appealed to the Tenth
Circuit asserting that the Appeals Council lacked authority to review the
ALJ's decision and that the Appeals Council's decision to reverse was
not supported by substantial evidence.
The Tenth Circuit held that while the Secretary has the authority to
review and alter any decision of an ALJ, the Secretary's ultimate decision
must be supported by substantial evidence. To qualify as being sup-
ported by substantial evidence, the decision must include substantial
consideration of the treating physician's opinion. This opinion is to be
given greater weight than an examining physician's opinion. If, how-
ever, the Secretary rejects the treating physician's or the ALJ's opinion,
the Secretary must fully articulate legitimate reasons for such. Because
the Secretary has improperly given greater consideration to the examin-
ing physician's opinion over that of the treating physician, and because
the Secretary has failed to give legitimate reasons for such, the decision
to deny benefits is reversed.
Descheenie v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 624
Claimant unsuccessfully applied for Social Security benefits in 1971
and again in 1981. After a hearing before an ALJ, she was awarded ben-
efits on both applications. The Social Security Administration's Appeals
Council (Council) opened reconsideration of the award of benefits on
the 1971 application, on grounds that the denial became final before the
1981 ALJ hearing. The record included memoranda asserting that
claimant had received written notice of the denial of the first application,
but the notice itself was not included in the file. The Council reversed
the award of the 1971 benefits. The district court reversed that denial.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding the absence of actual evi-
dence of written notice denying the Social Security claim negates the
finality of the denial. The internal memoranda asserting that written no-
tice of denial was given to Descheenie was presumptively unreliable
hearsay. The court reiterated that a decision not supported by substan-
tial evidence must be reversed.
Everhart v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 1532
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, filed
this action challenging the netting methodology employed under the
Social Security Act (SSA). The SSA offsets any overpayments against
any underpayments to arrive at a single net amount of either a net over-
payment or underpayment. The parties stipulated that the netting regu-
lations had been applied to the named plaintiffs and filed cross motions
for summary judgment. Upon hearing those motions, the district court
held that the regulations contravene the waiver of recoupment provi-
sions by denying recipients notice and a hearing on the issue of waiver
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of recovery of overpayment. The district court remanded the plaintiffs'
claims to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to re-
calculate their overpayments and underpayments without utilizing the
netting methodology and to accord the plaintiffs their procedural rights.
The Secretary was enjoined from applying the netting methodology to
all other beneficiaries under Title II or Title XVI of the Social Security
Act in Colorado. The statewide injunctive relief was stayed pending the
appeal. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary had exceeded his statu-
tory authority in implementing the netting regulations. The netting
methodology disregarded the differential treatment accorded underpay-
ments and the overpayments. Mandatory statutory provisions dictate
that administrative convenience cannot be countenanced when the net-
ting regulations contravene the plain language of the statute.
The statewide injunction granted by the district court was tanta-
mount to a grant of classwide relief. Absent a class certification, the
lower court should not have treated the suit as a class action by granting
statewide injunctive relief but rather should have tailored its injunction




Southwest Public Service Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 842
F.2d 1204
Appellant Southwestern Public Service Co. appeals a Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order requiring it to (1) retroac-
tively change its method of accounting for investment tax credits from
the "flow through" method to the "normalization" method; and (2) stop
including accrued unbilled revenues in its rate base until it shows these
revenues are legally collectible. Reversed in part, affirmed in part.
The court of appeals noted that the FERC had issued no directives
or guidelines relating to investment tax credits prior to the order requir-
ing the retroactive accounting change. Because of this, the court invali-
dated the accounting ruling on the grounds the FERC had abused its
discretion under the 1971 Revenue Act. The court did uphold the
FERC's ruling requiring a showing of collectibility before accrued unbil-
led revenues could be included in Southwestern's rate base.
United States v. Bell Credit Union, 860 F.2d 365
Appellant credit unions appeal a district court decision allowing the
I.R.S. to levy the credit union share accounts of individual taxpayers.
Affirmed.
In affirming, the court of appeals noted that only two defenses will
justify a third party's refusal to comply with an I.R.S. levy; (1) the third
party does not possess the property, or (2) the property is subject to a
prior judicial attachment or execution. The credit unions failed to es-
tablish either of these defenses.
Freede v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 864 F.2d 671
The Commissioner appeals from a decision in favor of the taxpayers
which held that disputed excess payments created "production pay-
ments" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, 16 U.S.C.
§ 636(a), and as such, were to be treated as nontaxable loans. The Com-
missioner sought reversal, arguing that the excess payments should have
been included as taxable income in the year received. Reversed.
Taxpayers own fractional working interests in various oil and gas
leases in Oklahoma. In 1975 and 1976 they contracted with Oklahoma
Gas and Electric Company ("OG & E") whereby OG & E agreed to pay
for a specified minimum quantity of gas each year without regard to ac-
tual delivery of the gas. If the amount of gas paid for under the "take or
pay" provision exceeded the amount of gas actually received, OG & E
had the right to credit the excess amount in later years against gas taken
in excess of the minimum contract quantity. The taxpayers did not in-
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clude the amounts received in 1979 for gas not taken in that year as
income.
In order for OG & E's right of recoupment to qualify as a produc-
tion payment under § 636(a), five criteria must have been met. On ap-
peal, the Commissioner challenges only one of these criteria - that OG
& E's recoupment right constituted an "economic interest" in the min-
erals in place. Under Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933), a two-part
test is used to determine whether an economic interest exists. Under
the first prong of the test, this court found that OG & E has only an
arguable economic interest in the minerals in place, but that no conclu-
sion need be drawn, since OG & E's recoupment right clearly fails the
second prong of the Palmer test, as OG & E has not made any investment
in the gas producing enterprise and does not look to income derived
solely from extraction of the mineral for the return of any investment.
The result is that OG & E's interest is clearly one of a consumer, not one
of an investor. Thus, this court found that OG & E's interest was an
"economic advantage" rather than an "economic interest" as set forth
in Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938). Furthermore, OG &
E is not seeking, through its recoupment right, a profit from the extrac-
tion of gas. The possibility of profit that is dependent solely on the ex-
traction and sale of a mineral is essential to the existence of an economic
interest. Therefore, the excess payments did not create production pay-
ments for § 636(a) purposes and is to be included in taxpayers' income
in the year received.
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Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 842 F.2d 1200
Appeal from district court's determination that appellant failed to
state a cause of action against handgun importer for death and personal
injury resulting from criminal use of gun. Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that appellant failed to show the handgun
was defective for purposes of establishing strict product liability. Sellers
of handguns are not liable under New Mexico's interpretation of the
ultrahazardous activity doctrine and there is no duty on a manufacturer
of firearms not to sell its products merely because there is potential that
such weapons may be used for criminal purposes. To apply the Mary-
land Supreme Court's doctrine of strict product liability for "Saturday
Night Specials" to New Mexico would amount to an act ofjudicial legis-
lation, particularly when there is no other guidance from local courts.
Platte Pipe Line Co., v. United States, 846 F.2d 610
In 1982, Platte, a carrier of crude oil, suffered a leak of about 3,880
gallons from its pipelines between Illinois and Wyoming. Platte filed a
complaint against the United States in an attempt to recover cleanup
costs and other expenses. Basing its claim on the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), Platte claimed the United States was independently negli-
gent and vicariously liable for the rupture of the pipeline. The district
court dismissed the action.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that if Platte were allowed to bring an ac-
tion for cleanup costs under the FTCA the intent of Congress, as re-
flected in the Clean Water Act, would be frustrated. Therefore, the
dismissal of the cleanup was not affirmed, however, Platte's non-cleanup
costs were cognizable under the FTCA. Because the district court did
not differentiate among Platte's various claims the posture of the case
precluded appellate review of the merits of Platte's FTCA claims. Dis-
missal affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473
Appellant Zaccardi was discharged from his position with Zale for
refusing to sign a consent form for a polygraph examination. Zaccardi
claims that Zale violated New Mexico public policy by firing him for re-
fusing to sign a form that contained false statements. He also claims
Zale breached his employment contract by failing to have his discharge
approved by senior management as required in a personnel policy
manual.
The district court granted Zale's motion for summary judgment on
the wrongful discharge claim, denied Zaccardi's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on that claim, and granted Zale's motion for summary
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judgment on the breach of contract claim. The Tenth Circuit held that
there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment
of Zaccardi's claim for breach of contract, but no such issues on his
claim for wrongful discharge. Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim and re-
versed the lower court on the breach of contract claim.
Bills v. United States, 857 F.2d 1404
Appellant Bills brought a case under the Federal Tort Claims Act as
personal representative of Mrs. Lamb, a waitress who injured herself
while working on an Air Force Base. Mrs. Lamb had been scheduled for
an exploratory cancer operation the next day and was treated for burns
and cancer simultaneously. The complaint admitted she died of cancer
and not as a result of claimed negligence of the United States.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed a trial court dismissal for failure to pros-
ecute. The court noted there was little reason for attempting to find
abuse of discretion in order to excuse Bills lack of diligence in pursuing
his claims, when on the merits his case was prima facie weak because he
stipulated that Mrs. Lamb died as a result of a cause other than the in-
jury received.
Shaw v. United States, 854 F.2d 360
Plaintiff, a member of the armed services, brought this action under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), for damages arising out of the al-
leged negligent operation of a military vehicle by another member of the
Army. The district court determined the United States was immune
from liability and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The court held that plaintiff's injuries arose out of or were sus-
tained in the course of activity incident to his military service and con-
siderations underlying the Feres doctrine militated against maintenance
of the suit. In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the United
States Supreme Court decided that the FTCA does not waive the United
States' immunity from liability for such injuries. The Feres doctrine bars
all suits of service members against the government when based on ser-
vice-related injuries. The three rationales underlying this doctrine are:
(1) the distinctive federal nature of the government and members of its
armed forces; (2) the availability of alternative military compensation
systems; and (3) the fear of damaging the military disciplinary structure.
Plaintiff meets each one of these rationales since he was an active mem-
ber of the armed forces, he received medical treatment and rehabilita-
tion at military facilities and is eligible for disability benefits under the
military compensation system and, lastly, because maintenance of the
suit could have a detrimental effect on military discipline and decisions.
Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff's claim under the FTCA is
barred by the Feres doctrine. Affirmed.
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Burnette, et al., v. Dow Chemical, et al., 849 F.2d 69
Appellants appeal an order granting the motions for summary judg-
ment of defendants Dow Chemical, Nalco Chemical and Independent
Tank.
On June 17, 1981 a storage tank being filled with chemicals ex-
ploded at a refinery operated by Total Petroleum.
The tank was originally manufactured by Independent as an atmos-
pheric tank. It was tested to withstand pressure to ensure that it would
not leak. After delivery to Nalco, Independent had no further contact
with the tank. Total modified the tank and had it filled with the chemical
DEA, manufactured by Dow. When the DEA was delivered it came with
papers including a product label, safety sheet and an emergency infor-
mation sheet. After the accident, the tank was again tested and the relief
valve did not open until pressure reached beyond its original pressure
point.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's reasoning holding
that Nalco, the supplier and original manufacturer, was not liable on a
design defect theory for explosion of the tank that occurred after Total
had converted the tank into a pressure tank. Such a conversion and the
type of malfunction that occurred were not frequent or even periodic
occurrences, and thus the court was unwilling to require suppliers to
reasonably foresee the possibility that the tank would be modified in
such a way. The court affirmed summary judgment for Independent
based on the same reasons.
Regarding Dow, however, the court found that material fact issues
existed as to the nature of the warnings on the DEA product label, safety
sheet and, warnings emergency sheet and whether these were adequate.
Thus, summary judgment was precluded. (The adequacy of the descrip-
tion of the chemical as merely "irritating" should have been for a jury to
decide.)
Continental Casualty Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 860 F.2d 970
On appeal, plaintiff-appellant contended that the amount of dam-
ages awarded by the jury on tortious interference of contract claim was
so low that the verdict was, on its face, inconsistent with the evidence at
trial. The panel held that the jury's damage award is clearly, decidedly,
and overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence, such that a trial
judge abused his discretion in denying a new trial.
The appellant based its second claim of error on the district court's
determination that statements made by appellee were not libel per se.
The statements were made to appellee's independent contractors, in-
forming them that bids would no longer be accepted from contractors
who are insured by appellant. The panel found that the statements pub-
lished by appellee to third persons were libelous per se under Oklahoma
law.
The panel found that the trial court did not commit error in its ad-
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mission of testimony and exhibits at trial. The panel remanded to the
district court for a new trial on the damage and libel claim.
Gruntmeir v. Mayrath Industries, Inc., 841 F.2d 1037
Appellee Gruntmeir was injured by an auger manufactured by the
appellant company. The auger's shield had been removed either by
Gruntmeir's employer or by the first owner.
Mayrath argued on appeal that the district court should have
granted its motion for directed verdict on the exemplary damages issue.
The Tenth Circuit held that a jury verdict was not improper because
evidence showed that Mayrath knew the auger was likely to be used un-
shielded and that accidents similar to Gruntmeir's were common. The
court affirmed the denial of a directed verdict on Mayrath's affirmative
defense of assumption of the risk, and affirmed the refusal to join
Gruntmeir's employer as a third-party defendant.
Mussett v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 844 F.2d 760
This is an appeal from a district court order granting defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that a release signed by the plaintiff
released defendant from all liability. Affirmed.
Plaintiff brought a products liability action against the manufacturer
of a pallet jack for injury she sustained while attempting to unload a
truck at a third party's store. The Tenth Circuit held that the release
executed by the plaintiff and the owner of the property where the acci-
dent occurred, in which the plaintiff agreed to release the property
owner "and all other persons, firms, and corporations" from any claims
arising out of the accident, unambiguously barred any products liability
action against the manufacturer of the jack. When a release is unambig-
uous, the court must interpret the contract as a matter of law and is
precluded from looking beyond the contract.
Day v. Memorial Hosp. of Guymon, 844 F.2d 728
Approximately two years after being treated, Plaintiff brought a
medical malpractice action against hospital owned and operated by the
county. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment based on plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice provision
of the Oklahoma Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Act). The dis-
trict court found that the hospital was a political subdivion under
Oklahoma law and thus was entitled to notice. Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the notice provision of the Act does not
violate equal protection on the grounds that it does not treat tort victims
equally. Notice of claim provisions serve legitimate state interests, in-
cluding the reduction of spurious claims, allowing the government to
prepare its defense and ensuring that proper officials are notified of dan-
gerous conditions. The right to sue the government in Oklahoma is a
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right granted by statute. As such, the legislature may place reasonable
restrictions on that right.
The court held that the notice provision did not violate the section
of the Oklahoma Constitution requiring that the subject of the statute be
clearly expressed in its title. The court also held that the hospital was a
"political subdivision" within the meaning of the Act since it was owned
and operated by the county and the hospital did not waive its right to
receive notice under the Act by purchasing liability insurance.
McMurray v. Deere and Co., 858 F.2d 1436
Appellant McMurray's husband attempted to start a tractor manu-
factured by the appellee by touching a screwdriver to the terminals on
the starter and the starter solenoid. By doing this, he bypassed the trac-
tor's neutral start switch. This caused the tractor to lurch forward when
the starter engaged, which killed the appellant's husband. A jury re-
turned a verdict for appellee Deere and Co. McMurray appealed, alleg-
ing that the district court's instructions to the jury on assumption of risk
and misuse were prejudicial. Reversed and remanded.
The court of appeals held that to assert the defense of assumption
of risk, there must be a showing that the user knew of a defect in the
product that was unreasonably dangerous in nature, yet still chose to
use the product. To use the defense of misuse, the court of appeals held
that it must be shown that the person used the product for some pur-
pose for which it was not intended. The court went on to indicate that
McMurray's husband did not use the tractor for an unintended purpose
but rather in a careless manner. This, the court said, constituted mere
contributory negligence, which was not a defense in a strict product lia-
bility action. Since it was possible for the jury to find the tractor defec-
tive but still hold the decedent's actions as a complete bar to recovery,
the instructions given by the district court were prejudicial and a new
trial was required.
Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449
Appellee Miller and several other farmers brought suit against a
subsidiary of the appellant Cudahy Co., alleging that an underground
salt mining operation owned by the appellant's subsidiary had polluted
an underground aquifer, thus damaging their crops and lowering their
crop yields. The district court found appellant liable for temporary
damages to crops and awarded $3 million in actual damages and $10
million in punitive damages. After a period of three years, the lower
court rejected a motion to dismiss and taxed upon appellant additional
costs for the calling of an expert witness. Affirmed in part, remanded in
part.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the appel-
lant's operation constituted a continuning nuisance which was causing
temporary damages to the appellees. The court also held the award of
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punitive damages was supported by the evidence, but did agree with the
appellant's position that it should not be forced to pay the expert wit-
ness fee since the district court had ordered the remedial plan.
TRADE REGULATION/ANTITRUST
Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 850 F.2d 1373
Plaintiff initially sued Peugeot for breach of contract and failure to
act in good faith in terminating the former's dealership, in violation of
the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act (Act). Plaintiff then impleaded
Chrysler alleging Chrysler tortiously induced Peugeot to breach plain-
tiff's contract and that Chrysler and Peugeot engaged in and conspired
to engage in unfair competition in violation of federal antitrust laws.
The district court granted summary judgment and awarded attorney's
fees to Chrysler, all of which plaintiff appeals. Affirmed except as to the
award of attorney fees, which was reversed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the district court's grant of summary
judgment was in error because discovery had been limited. Without de-
ciding the adequacy of discovery, the Tenth Circuit held that Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(f) requires an affidavit be prepared by the nonmoving party
explaining why facts cannot be presented in opposition to summary
judgment and how additional time would aid rebuttal. If this is not
done, as here, it was held that no abuse of discretion occurs by granting
summary judgment.
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate defendant's actual knowledge of
fraudulent warranty claims prior to the date this knowledge was im-
parted by plaintiff. Up to that time defendant Peugeot was rightfully
able to terminate the dealership without breach of contract. Accord-
ingly, no issue of fact remained. The Tenth Circuit then held that since
summary judgment was appropriate as to breach of contract, plaintiff's
argument on remaining issues of fact regarding tortious interference
also failed.
Plaintiff next argues defendant Peugeot used the fraudulent war-
ranty claims as a pretext for terminating the dealership in violation of
the Act. This court held Peugeot's termination was not used to coerce
or intimidate the plaintiff, thus, plaintiff's allegations state no claim for
relief under the Act.
The court held plaintiff failed to meet the two-part Matsushita test,
475 U.S. 574 (1986). Summary judgment as to the section 1 antitrust
claim was therefore held to be appropriate. Plaintiff's evidence that de-
fendants attempted to monopolize the market failed to fulfill the four
required elements set forth in Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, 703 F.2d
432 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983).
Each party bears its own litigation expenses except in the instance
of bad faith. Here, the court found a reasonable attorney facing these
facts may have filed the suit and accordingly held the district court's
award of attorney fees to Chrysler was in error. The district court was




MacCuish v. United States, 844 F.2d 733
Appellants MacCuish appeal the district court's denial of their mo-
tion for a new trial in this medical malpractice suit. Affirmed.
MacCuish's minor son, Damien, received a circumcision shortly af-
ter his birth and due to subsequent complications, was subjected to a
corrective surgical procedure known as the Cecil procedure. As a result,
Damien's penis is permanently deformed. Finding no negligence on the
part of the U.S. Army Hospital, the court entered judgement in their
favor. MacCuish appeals the denial for a new trial on three bases: (1)
the district court erred in permitting the testimony of a government ex-
pert in violation of the pre-trial order; (2) MacCuish's trial attorney
failed to accept a $50,000 settlement offer; and (3) her attorney's con-
duct at trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The district court's decision is affirmed on the basis that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the expert testimony
since MacCuish suffered no prejudice or surprise as a result of such tes-
timony. The right to counsel in a civil matter is not a constitutional right
under the sixth amendment. Therefore, the only appropriate remedy
for allegedly incompetent representation is a malpractice suit against the
attorney.

